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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, 1 focus on whether adequate mental health resources exist and are 
available to a category of persons in the forensic mental heaith system - those found not 
criminally responsible on account of mental disorder of an offence under the mental 
disorder provisions, Part XX. 1, of the Criminal Code. 1 argue that adequate mental heaith 
services which address the needs of accused persons are necessary for the proper 
functioning of the mental disorder provisions of the Code. 1 argue that these provisions 
were designed to foster the release and re-integration into society of persons within this 
system as quickiy as possible. My contention is that, without access to adequate mental 
heaith resources, accused persons are k ing  arbitrarily detained Ionger than they would 
otherwise be and that this lengther detention is contrary to section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Furthemore, I argue that the equality rights of accused 
persons are affected because a lack of adequate mental heaith resources results in adverse 
effects discrimination. Even though Part XX. 1 of the Code requires a Review Board to 
grant the least restrictive and least onerous disposition, this does not happen because of 
lack of resources within the menta1 health system. As a result, 1 question the validity of 
the mental disorder provisions, Part XX. 1, of the Criminal Code. 
To explore these issues 1 have divided the thesis into three chapters. In chapter l1  
I trace the origins and developrnent of the mental dlsorder provisions of the Criminal 
Code and the mental health system, and discuss the factors which have fueled the reform 
of the mental health system and mental disorder provisions. In chapter 2,I review the 
mental disorder provisions and analyze the case law to isolate the pnnciples that have 
shaped the courts' view of the mental disorder system. 1 question whether the mental 
disorder provisions work in reality as they were intended by Parliament. 1 examine the 
Iink between treatment and release of accused persons. 1 discuss the impact of mental 
health resources on the legislative scheme of the mental disorder provisions by focusing 
on the mental health systems in Ontario and British Columbia. 1 conclude that some 
accused persons in Ontario and British Columbia do not have access to the mental health 
resources required to ensure that they receive the Least onerous and least restrictive 
disposition or, to ensure that if such a disposition is made, it is implemented. In chapter 3. 
1 analyze the constitutionai issues raised by the effect of inadequate mental health 
resources on accused persons. 1 argue that the liberty rights of accused persons are 
infinged in contravention of section 7 of the Charter, as well as their equality rights 
under subsection 15(1), when their detention is lengthened as a result of decisions of 
health offtcials regarding the allocation of mental health resources. 1 also argue that these 
infingements of the Charter rights of accused persons cannot be justified under section 1 
of the Charter. 1 contend that accused persons should seek a remedy under subsection 
24(1) of the C h e r .  1 suggest that the appropnate Charter remedy is a declaration that 
the failure to fund adequate mental health services is unconstitutional and a direction to 
governments to adrninister the mental health system, including forensic services, in a 
manner that is consistent with the Charier. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decades of closing psychiatric beds, budget cutting and a failure to 
establish community supports for the mentally il1 have taken their toll on 
society 's most vulnerable. . .. 
'The last tirne the [psychiatric] hospitals were downsized 
was just disastrous. It created social and justice problems, 
but most importantly, it created a tragedy in hurnan terms." 
In the last year in Ontario and British Columbia, media reports of the mental 
heaith system's failure have emphasized the lack of psychiatric beds and the inadequacy 
of community mental health reso~rces.~ At the same time, governments in Ontario and 
British Columbia are proposing in their latest mental health reform initiatives3 to continue 
'T. Boyle and D. Vincent, "Madness: First of seven parts on how we 're failing rhe 
mentally ill, " m e  Toronto Star, January 10, 1 998, at 2 & 3, 
htpp//www.thesbr.corn/back~issues/ED 19980 1 10AO 1 b-CI-MADNESS 1 O.html02/02/98. 
They quote Ontario's Chief Coroner, Dr. James Young. 
'Editorial, "Hove we abandoned the mentally il!?," The Globe and Mail. 
November 16, 1997, at A- 20; M. Valpy, "Cleaning out the cuckoo S nest: 
Deinstitutionalizing the mentally il1 has gone down a road none foresaw. The new 
institutional addresses for the visibly disoriented are becorning the jaik ~ h e  hostels and 
the streets. " The Globe and Mail, dated March 7, 1998 at Dl ; T. Boyle and D. Vincent. 
"iLIudness: Seven parts on how we 're failing the rnentally ifl, " The Toronto Star, Janii;w 
1 0 to 16, 1998, 
htpp//www.thestar.corn/back~issues/ED 19980 1 1 O/news/980 1 10AO 1 bCI- 
MADNESS lO.html02/02/98, and C. Mcimes, Victoria correspondent "How the system 
failed a troubled mind: Case of a schizophrenic who killed his mother highlights cracks 
in mental-health care, " The Globe and Mail, Apnl8, 1998, at A2. 
'For Ontario's mental health refom initiative see: Health Services Restnicnuing 
Commission (HSRC), Change and Transition: Planning Guidelines and Implementation 
Strategies for Home Care, Long term Care, Mental Health, Rehabiiitation, and Sub-acute 
Cure (Toronto: HSRC, Apnl 1998). HSRC, Discussion Paper, Rebuilding Ontario S 
Health System: lnterim Planning ~uidelihes and Implementation Sirategies (Toronto: 
July, 1997)' HSRC, Ottawa-Carleton Health Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: 
HSRC, August 1 997), HSRC, Brockville Health Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: 
HSRC, February 1 998)' HSRC, Toronto Health Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: 
E-ISRC, April 1 W8), HSRC, London Health Services Restructuring Reporr (Toronto: 
with the closure of psychiatric beds and with the delivery of mental health services in the 
community. In Ontario, the Health Services Restmcturing Commission was established 
in 1996 and given the mandate to "make decisions about hospital restructuing, and to 
recommend changes to other aspects of the heaith care ~ystern. '~ As a result, the 
Commission has proposed the closure of five psychiatric hospitals,' cutbacks in 
HS RC. June 1 997), HSRC, Thunder Bqy Heaith Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: 
H S R C ,  October 1996), HSRC, Lambton Heaith Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: 
HSRC. October 1997). HSRC, Pembroke Heaith Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: 
HSRC, February 1997), HSRC, Sudbury Health Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: 
HSRC, Decernber 1996), HSRC, Hastings &Prince Ehvard Counties Health Services 
Restructuring Reporr (Toronto: HSRC, April 1998). HSRC, Essex County Healrh 
Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: HSRC, February 1 997), HSRC, Kent County 
Health Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: HSRC, February 1998), HSRC, 
Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry, Prescoti dt Russell Counties Healrh Services 
Restructuring Report (Toronto: HSRC, May 1 998), HSRC, Brant Counîy Fiealth 
Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: HSRC, May 1 998), HSRC, Frontenac, Lennox 
and Addington Heaith Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: HSRC, June 1 998). 
HSRC, Hamilton- Wenîworth Health Services Restructuring Report (Toronto: HS RC , 
May 1 998), HS RC, Halibtirton, Kawartha and Pine Ridge Health Services Restruciuring 
Repori (Toronto: HSRC, June 1998), HSRC, GTM905 Heaith Services Resrrucruring 
Report (Toronto: HSRC, April 1998) and HSRC, Waterloo Region Health Services. 
Restrucruring Report (Toronto: HSRC, May 1998); and for British Columbia see Adult 
Mental Health Division, Ministry of Health and Ministry Responsible for Seniors. 
Revital izing and Rebalancing British Columbia S Mental Heaith System: The 1 998 
Mental Heaith Plun (Victoria: Queen's Printer for British Columbia, 1998). These reports 
will be discussed in chapter 2. 
'This description is found in Health Services Restructuring Commission, 
Discussion Paper, Rebuilding Ontario S Healrh System: Interim Planning Guidelines and 
Implernentation S~ategies, ibid at 5.The Health Services RestrucMng Commission was 
establ ished as a non-pro fit corporation under the Savings and Restructuring Act, 1 996, 
S.O. 1996, c. 1. As was pointed out by G: Sharpe and D. Weisstub, in "Bill 26: Towczrds 
the Restructuring of Ontario 's Health Cure System " (1 996) 2 Healfh Law in Canada 3 1 
at 32 that '' the Commission is unique in that it has Ministerial powers under the Public 
Hospitais Act to change the hospital system." 
* See supra note 3. for Lakehead Psychiatrie Hospital, Health Services 
Restmcturing Commission, Thunder Bay Health Services Restructuring Report at 9; for 
psychiatric beds by the year 2003 and recommended other changes respecting mental 
health services, which changes are discussed in chapter 2. In British Columbia, 
Revitalizing and Rebalancing British Columbia 's Mental Health Systern: The 1998 
Mental Health Plan6 proposed to continue the downsizing of Riverview Hospital, the 
main psychiatric hospital in the province, and to focus on comrnunity mental health 
services. also reviewed in chapter 2. 
In this thesis, 1 focus the discussion on whether adequate mental health resources, 
including forensic mental health resources, exist and are available to a category of 
persons in the forensic mental health system - those found not criminafly responsible on 
account of mental disorder (NCRMD) of an offence under the mental disorder provisions, 
Part XX. 1, of the Criminal Code (the Code). ' These persons require mental health 
resources due to their mental illness. However, the unavailability and inadequacy of 
mental health resources may also impinge on their liberty because of the finding of 
NCRMD under section 672.34 of the Code. An accused person8 is subject to a 
Brockville Psychiatric Hospital see Health Services Restructuring Commission, 
Brockville Health Services Restructuring Report at 9; for S t. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital 
see Health Services Restnicturing Commission, Kent County Health Services 
Restructuring Report at 9; for London Psychiatric Hospital Health Services Restructuring 
Commission, Kent County HeuZth Services Restructuring Report at 9; and for Hamilton 
Psychiatric Hospital Health Services Restnicturing Commission, Hamiifon- Wenrworrh 
Health Services Restructuring Report at 44. 
'Supra note 3. 
7Part XX. 1 was added to the Criminai Code by  S.C. 199 1, c.43 and proclaimed in 
force on February 4, 1992, except for sections 672.64,672.65 and 672.66. 
'The term "'accused" is defined in section 672.1 of the Code as including '' a 
defendant in surnmary conviction proceedings and an accused in respect of whom a 
4 
disposition hearing, under section 672.45 of the Code by the court that rendered the 
verdict of NCRMD or where the court does not make a disposition, under section 672.47 
by a Review Boarde9 Even where a court. following a disposition hearing, has made a 
disposition regarding an accused person, a Review Board must, within 90 days of the 
disposition of the corn, hold a hearing and make a new disposition. The only exception 
is where the court grants an absolute discharge under section 672.54 of the Code. Where 
the court or a Review Board does not gant an absolute discharge, the accused person is 
either detained in a hospitaliO or given a conditional discharge. The conditions generally 
place that person under the supervision of a hospital. Very few accused persons who are 
found NCRMD receive an absolute discharge on an initial disposition.' l Section 672.81 
of the Code requires a Review Board to conduct an annual review for each accused 
verdict of not criminally responsible is rendered." 1 prefer the terni "accused person" 
which recognizes the person as a whole rather than just their legal status. 
'Defineci in section 672.1 and established under section 672.38 of the Code. 
"Definition of "hospital" in 672.1 of the Code refers to a place in a province 
designated by the Minister of Health of that province for the custody, treatrnent or 
assessrnent of an accused person. 
"A definite number is difficdt to ascertain because no statistics are available 
regarding number of absolute discharges granted by the court or a Review Board on an 
initial hearing. 1 base my statement on the study done by 1. Grant who found that 
-'absolute discharges are rare in the context of initiai dispositions. Of the 1 12 cases, only 
one person was granted an absolute discharge" in 1. Grant, "Canada's New Mental 
Disorder Disposition Provisions: A Case Study of the British Columbia Criminal Code 
Review Board" (1 997) 4 International Jmnal of Law and Psychiatry 419 at 429. As 
well, seeing the growth in the number of accused persons under the jurisdiction of the 
Ontario Review Board from 426 to 754 and British Columbia Review Board fiom 125 to 
306 from 1992 to 1997, one cm postulate that one of the reasons for the growth is that 
not many absolute discharges are k ing  granted by these Boards on initiai dispositions. 
person which results in a new disposition. An accused person remains under the 
jurisdiction of a Review Board and her or his liberty is restricted to varying degrees until 
the Review Board grants an absolute discharge. Therefore, the mental health system and 
criminal law are inextricably intertwined in situations where the mental disorder 
provisions of the Code are invoked, 
I argue that adequate mentai health services which address the needs of accused 
persons are necessary for the functioning of the mental disorder provisions of the Code." 
Therefore. if the mental health system does not fund the services required by accused 
persons, the mental disorder provisions cannot fiinction as intended. 1 argue that these 
provisions were designed to foster the release and re-integration into society of persons 
within this system as quickly as possible. My contention is that, without access to 
adequate mental health resources, accused persons are k ing  arbitrarily detained longer 
"~hese issues cannot be discussed in theory alone; concrete exarnples on which to 
base my arguments were necessq.  Therefore, 1 chose to focus on the mental health 
system in British Columbia and in Ontario and its impact on accused persons for the 
following reasons. These provinces are currently actively pursuing mental health reform 
which has brought issues of the adequacy of mental health resources to the fore. In my 
view, the problems arising fiom the de-institutionalization of persons with mental 
disabilities chronicled in the various mental hedth refonn initiatives in these provinces 
are representative of those across the country. Psychiatrie bed(s) closures have taken 
place in al1 provinces since the I 980s. However, govemments have not provided 
adequate community mental health resources. Therefore, to varying degrees, accused 
persons in other provinces and temtories face sirnilar problems of avaitability of mental 
health resources to those described in Ontario and British Columbia. In addition, the 
accused persons in these provinces have ddlenged the mental disorder provisions and 
appealed decisions of the respective Review Boards which has resulted in a number of 
decisions at the Court of Appeal level. Furthemore, both the chairperson of Ontario 
Review Board, Mr. Justice D.H. Carruthers and the chairperson of the British Columbia 
Review Board, Mr. Bemd Walters and staff of these Boards and the officiais within the 
forensic system and within the respective Ministries of Health extended their cooperation 
to me. 
than they would otherwise be, since their detention under the mental disorder provisions 
is indeter~ninate,'~ and that this lengthier detention is contrary to section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter)." Furthemore, 1 argue that the 
equality rights" of accused persons are afTected because a lack of adequate mental health 
resources results in adverse effects discrimination. Even though Part XX. 1 of the Code 
requires a Review Board to prit the least restrictive and least onerous disposition, this 
may not happen because of lack of resources within the mental heaith system.16 As a 
result, 1 question the validity of the mental disorder provisions, Part XX. 1, of the 
Crinlinal Code. 
1 believe that the current mentai disorder provisions of the Code are premised on 
the availability of mental health resources, as evidenced by the requirement that if an 
accused person is to be detained in custody under paragraph 672.54 (c) of the Code it 
"Section 672.64 of the Criminal Code which sets a maximum penod of detention 
for accused perçons based on the offence for which they were charged has not been 
proclaimed in force. 
I4Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, k i n g  Schedule B of the Canada Act 
1982(U.K.), 1982, c. 1 1. Section 7 of the Charter states " Everyone has a right to life. 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." 
lSSubsection 1 S(1) states: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and 
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the Iaw without discrimination 
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, coloul. 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." 
I6For example the Court of Apped of Ontario in Brockville Psychiatric Hospital 
v. McGilZis (1996) 2 C.R. (5") 242 (0nt.C.A.) held that if the necessary resources are not 
available in the community then the Review Board must detain the accused person in a 
hospitai. 
must be in a hospital. " Though treatment cannot be ordered under the mental disorder 
provisions." at least the chances of an accused person k ing  treated are greater if she or 
he is in an appropriate sening. The Court of Appeal of Ontario in R v. Lepage'" 
reiterated the importance of treatment in determining whether that person represents a 
significant threat to the safety of the public. The Court stated 
The significance of the accused person's mental condition to that 
determination will depend on many variables, including the nature of the 
mental disorder, if any, from which the accused person suffers at the time 
of inquiry , the available treatment. the accused person's understanding of 
his mental condition, and the accused person's willingness to conform to 
any proposed course of treatment." 
Without available treatment and other mental hedth resources, the mental condition of an 
accused person is not likely to improve," and without such improvement, a Review 
Board is unlikely to be convinced that the accused person poses no significant threat to 
"AS will be discussed in the following chapters, the mental disorder provisions 
(previously referred to as the insanity provisions) were enacted so that persons suffering 
from mental disorders who as a resuit of the mental disorder cornrnitted a crime would 
not be punished but treated. This rationale was first espoused in the Criminul Lunatics 
Act, (U.K.), 1800, c. 94, and reafirmed in R. W. Swair?, Cl9911 I S.C.R. 933. and in a 
number of Court of Appeai cases regarding the legislative scheme of the current mental 
disorder provisions, such as Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatrie hsritute), 
( 1  996) 1 12 C.C.C. (3d) 3 1 (British Co1umbiaC.A.); and R. W. Lepage (1997) 152 D.L.R. 
(4'h) 3 18 (0nt.C.A.). 
I8See section 672.55 of the Code. 
I9R. v. Lepage, supra note 17. . 
"A Review Board in making a disposition under section 672.54 of the Code has 
to consider the mental condition of an accused person, the need to protect the public from 
dangerous persons, the te-integration of the accused and any other need of an accused 
person. 
the safety of the public. The Board is therefore uniikely to grant an absolute discharge. 
Furthemore, if there is a lack of psychiatric beds for accused persons, they are likely to 
be detained in jail, as has happened in Ontario." In addition, a nurnber of accused 
persons have had to wait lengthy periods before mental heaith services or the appropriate 
psychiatric bed became available. This has resulted in a lengthening of their detention. 
Such a situation is contrary to the explicit philosophy that these persons should not be 
punished, but helped by society." 
Concems over lack of adequate community mental health resources and the 
impact of psychiatric beds closures have been expressed time and time again by mental 
health consumers and families, advocates, and mental health professionals. since the 
1980s. when the first wave of mental health refonn swept the country. They al1 argue that 
the current mental heaith system is "significantly ~nderfunded"'~ anci express concems 
11 
--As was the case in Ontario in the last few years as commented on by the 
C hairperson of the Ontario Review Board, D.H. Camthers, iri V i n e t  and McGillis and 
the Cutbacb: Some Views, Comrnents, and Opinions on How They Aflect The Ontario 
Review Board, " A p d  28, I 997, (unpublished) and noted in a nurnber of articles of T. 
Boyle, "More hospital beds urged for mental& ill offenders: Bid to address 'illegal 
jailing ofpatients" The Toronto Star, April28, 1998 at A6; "Beds to open forjailed 
mental patients: Queen Street Centre &O home patients juiled i llegally " The Toronto Star. 
March 3, 1998 at B 1; "Legal bid brings beds for 6 mental patients: Ali in jail becatcse 
psychiatric hospiral isfirll "The Toronto Star, Febniary 26, 1998 at A24; "JaiIing 
mentaily il1 accused illegal: Lawyer Accused should be in hospital, but no beds 
mailable " The Toronto Star, February 24, 1998 at A5. 
" ~ e e  Swain supra note 1 7 at 1 003 & 1 005, Winka v. British Columbia (Forensic 
Psychiatric Instituie), supra note 1 7 at 58 & 59; and Davidson v. British Columbia 
(Attorne-v General), ( 1  994) 87 C.C.C. (3d) 268 (British Co1umbiaC.A.) at 277. 
"See Heaith Services Restnicturing Commission, Change and Transition: 
Planning Guidelines and Implementation Straîegies for Home Cure, Long term Care, 
Mental Health, Rehabilitation, and Sub-acute Care, supra note 3 at 5 1. 
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that the community mental health systern is not equipped to handle the additional st;ain 
placed upon it if more psychiatric beds are ~losed. '~ Furthemore, as will be discussed in 
"The following are exarnples of concems expressed about the mental health 
system in Ontario: "Timely and effective diagnosis and treatment of schizophrenia under 
mental hedth reform is primarily an issue of resources ... We have Learned through bitter 
expenence that the system ofien fails persons with schizophrenia ... If this is true before 
reform. before the transfer of resources fiom institutions to the community, 1 suggest that 
afier reform. the situation will be much worse. unless resource deployment follows need." 
S. Volpatti. President, Ontario Friends of Schizophrenics, in "Mental Healrh and 
Restructuring: The Perspective of Patients " (1 997) 4 Health Law in  Canada 1 19 at 12 1 ; 
"Who has the authority to decide on the delicate balance between shifiing resources and 
making more effective use of existing resources to ensure an adequacy of services and 
supports dong each point in the service continuum? We know that either way this will 
require a rapid development of comunity services, especially if hospitals are expected to 
reach their bed targets in the face of decreasing budgets." C. Roup, Director, Operational 
Planning, Metropolitan Toronto District Health Council in "The Perspective of a District 
Health Council " (1997) 4 Health Law in Canada 1 1 1 at 1 12; "What's especiaily 
worrisome is the province's Health Services Restnicniring commission has recommended 
c1osing five of Ontario's 10 psychiatric hospitals by 2003 and almost 2,00 of the 
province's remaining 5,282 mental health beds. Community services aren't in place to 
pick up the slack and, at the current Pace of change, they won't be." S. Lurie, Executive 
Director, Canadian Mental Health Association. Toronto Branch in T. Boyle and D. 
Vincent, "Madness: First of seven parts on how we 're failing the mcntally zll, " supra 
note 2 at 7; "These people ~ o m e l e s s  persons with mental disabilities] do not receive 
'care within the commwiity' whatever that phrase was intended to imply in the 1970s 
when it was first mooted- but have instead been dumped unceremoniously ont0 the streets 
and le!? to fend for themselves, wandering fiom program to program and temporary roof 
to roof, the client of many services but the ultimate responsibility o f  none." Report of a 
Coalition of Neighborhood Groups cited in Editoriai, "Have we abandoned the mentally 
ill?." supra note 2;  in British Columbia "...access to regional beds is extremely difficult. 
Reliance on 'squeaky wheel' access is not conducive to effective care and places ail 
involved at nsk." L. Coles, CEO, Kitirnat General Hospital, cited in Adult Mental Health 
Division, Minisûy of Health and Ministry Responsible for Seniors, Revitalizing and 
Rebalancing British Columbia's Mentai Health Systern: The 1998 Mental Health Plan. 
supra note 3 at 30; "To me, al1 this stuff [the 1998 Bntish Columbia Mental Health Plan] 
is kind of like the cheque's in the mail'said Ms. Duncan [director o f  Bntish Columbia 
Schizophrenia Society], who argued that mental illness is vastly underfunded relative to 
disorders that are physically disabling," in C. McImes, Victoria correspondent "How the 
system failed a troubled mind: Case of a schizophrenic who killed his mother highlighrs 
cracks in mental-health care," supra note 2; "Why not first improve the services for the 
mentally ill- access to housing, jobs, case managers, new medications? My fear is that 
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chapter 2. persons with serious mental illnesses have been underserved within the mental 
health ~ystem.'~ Unless governments provide additional funding to comrnunity mental 
health programs and services and supports to persons with serious mental illnesses so that 
a continuum of services exists, the necessary mental health resources that these persons 
require will not be available. Mental health consumers and their families, advocates, and 
mentai health professionals have argued that more cornmunity services need to be in 
place, pnor to any M e r  psychiatric bed cuts. ïhe  Heaith Services Restructuring 
Commission reiterates these concerns, which are also reflected in the 1998 British 
it's easier to introduce these changes [compulsory treatment orders under Mental HeaZth 
Act] than to guarantee services" B. Gutray, Executive Director, The Canadian Mental 
Health Association, British Columbia Division cited in M. Jimenez, ''New Bill Governing 
Mentally 111 Stirs Fears " The Vancouver Sun, June 1 6,1998 at AB. 
16This is exemplified in Adult Mental Health Division, Ministry of Health and 
Ministry Responsible for Seniors, Revitalizing and RebaZancing British Columbia 's 
Mental Health System: The 1998 Mental Heafth Plan, supra note 3 at 15 which 
emphasizes that the seriously mentally il1 will in future receive the highest priority in the 
allocation of mentai health fimding because "people with the most disabling mentai 
illness have not always received priority in services." A similar statement can be found in 
Ontario's Ministry of Health, Puning People Fimi: The Reform of Mental Healrh in 
Ontario (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1993) at 15. Another example is the 
comment of Dr. J. Hamilton, chair of the OMA Section on Psychiatry, that " the 
seriously mentally il1 are under-served because there are insufficient incentives to 
encourage psychiatrists to see them." in T. Boyle and D. Vincent, "Madness: Seven parts 
on how we 're failing the mentally ill, " The Toronto Star, January 12, 1998, supra note 1 
at 8. A study in the early 1990's noted that "[pJeople with severe mental illnesses have 
traditionally k e n  cared for in provincial psychiatric hospitals, and it is these people who 
have been the most disadvantaged by deinstitutionalization. They are the most disabled 
by of al1 psychiaîric patients, yet they receive the least effective treatment and care." D. 
Wasylenki, P. Goering, Eric MacNaughton, "Planning Mental Hecalth Services: i. 
Background and Key Issues " (1 992) 3 Can. J. Psychiatry 199 at 20 1. 
Columbia Mental Heal th Plan.27 Addi tional concems have been voiced by di fferent 
stakeholders regarding the reform of forensic services. in particular regarding the need for 
increased access to both inpatient and community-based ser~ices. '~ Forensic services 
target persons with mental disorders who come into conflict with the iaw who are 
governed by the mental disorder provisions, Part XX. 1 of the Code; or who are in need of 
mental heaith services while serving a sentence in a correctionai fa~ility.'~ Therefore. 
"See Health Services Restructuring Commission. Discussion Paper, Rebuilding 
Ontario S Health System: Interim Planning Guidelines and Implementation Strategies. 
supra note 3 at 53 &54, the recommendations of the Health Services Restructuring 
Commission in Change and Transition: Planning Guidelines and Implementation 
Strategies for Home Care. Long term Care, Mental Health, Rehabilitation, and Sub-acute 
Care, supra note 3 at 5 1-60 and Adult Mental Health Division, Ministry of Health and 
Ministry Responsible for Seniors, Revitalizing and Rebalancing British Columbia S 
Mental Health System: The 1998 Mental Healrh Plan. supra note 3 at 43 to 48. 
" For a discussion of these concerns see Health Services Restructuring 
Commission, Change and Transition: Planning Guidelines and Implernentation 
Strategies for Home Care, Long term Care, Mental Heaith, Rehabilitation and Sitb-aczt f e 
Care. supra note 3 at 55; and in Adult Mental Health Division. Ministry of Health and 
M i n i s ~  Responsi ble for Seniors, Revitalizing and Rebalancing British Columbia 's 
Mental Health System: The 1998 Mental Healrh Plan, supra note 3 at 24. For additionai 
discussion on the Ontario situation sec D.H. Carruthers, "Pinet and lMcGillis and the 
Curbach: Some Views, Comments, and Opinions on How They Aflect The Ontario 
Review Board, " supra note 22. 
' 9~ome have argued that insufficient mental health resources have driven persons 
with mental disabilities into the criminal justice. For example see C. Milstone, The 
Mentally fil and the Criminal Justice System: Innovative Community-Based Programs 
1995 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1 995) at 13- 16. Other examples 
are the following comrnents of: Judge L. Marshall of the Ontario Provincial Court who 
stated regarding the curent mental heaith'system in Ontario "We have tied the hands of 
families, police and the medical community, who can't do anything until disaster strikes. 
Serious mental health issues are then dealt with in the criminal justice system, which 
wasn't set up to deal with them." in T. Boyle and D. Vincent, "Madness: First of seven 
parts on how we 're failing the mentafly ill, " The Toronto Star, January 10, 1 998, supra 
note 1 at 4; Dr. S. Malcolmson, Forensic Director, Queen Street Mental Health Centre 
who stated "[tlhe Criminal Code has become the Mental Health Act of the 1990s." in M. 
12 
these persons are afZected both by inadequate mental health services in general and lack 
of forensic services in particular. As well, persons in the forensic mental health system 
have had problems accessing services in the mainstream mental health system.jO 
In chapter 1 , I  examine the legal philosophy and developments that have shaped 
the present mental disorder provisions and argue that the mental disorder system is meant 
to be a more humane and compassionate system for accused persons. First, I discuss the 
ongins of the mental health system and the first legislation respecting the detention of 
accused persons in the 19& century. I analyze the factors that animated the establishment 
of the "lunatic asylurn" and the failure of this institution- Then, 1 discuss the 
developrnents that led to the transition fiom asylum to mental hospital and, finally, 1 
address the impact of deinstitutionalization in the 2 0 ~  cenniry. Furthemore. 1 argue that 
changes during this century, the trends in criminal Law, the civil rights movements. and 
the adoption of the Charter have influenced the movement to reform the mental disorder 
provisions. 1 contend that these events created a societal climate more receptive to 
Valpy "Cleaning out the cuckoo s nest: Deinstitutionalizing the mentally iIl has gone 
down a road noneforesm. ?ne new institutional addresses for the visibly disoriented are 
becoming the jails, the hostels and the streets. " The Globe and Mail, dated March 7. 
1 998 at D 1 ; and J. Hy Iton, Cure or control: Healrh or criminal Justice options for the 
long term rnentafly ill, Social Action Series (Toronto: Canadian Mental Health 
Association, 1993). However, 1 do not ded with this issue in this thesis. 
''AS noted in the most recent documents on mental health reform, one goal is to 
integrate forensic services into mainstreah mental health services so that persons with 
mental disorders in the forensic system may access mainstream mental health services. 
See Health Services Restructuring Commission, Discussion Paper, Rebuilding Ontario 's 
Health System: Interim Planning Guidelines und Implementation Strategies, supra note 3 
at 56; and Adult Mental Health Division, Ministry of Health and Ministry Responsible for 
Seniors, Revitalking and Rebalancing British Columbia S Mental Heafth System: The 
1 998 Mental Health Plan, supra note 3 at 24. 
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inclusion of persons with mental disabilities in the cornrnunity and to the beginnings of 
recognizing their rights. 
In Chapter 2,1 review the mental disorder provisions and anaiyze the case law to 
isolate the principles that have shaped the courts' view of the mental disorder system. 
This chapter questions whether the mental disorder provisions work in reality as they 
were eniisioned by the Supreme Court in R. v. Swuid' and as described by the Courts of 
Appeal in different provinces. 1 examine the link between treatment and release of 
accused persons. I discuss the impact of mental health resources on the Iegislative scheme 
of the mental disorder provisions. Then, 1 focus on the mental health systems in Ontario 
and British Columbia and survey previous and current strategies for mental health refonn 
in these provinces. 1 utilize the reports of the Health Services Restructuring Commission'' 
in Ontario regarding mental health resources and the 1998 Mental Heaith Plan for British 
Columbia3%o demonstrate the need for more community mental health services that 
respond to the needs of accused persons. 1 discuss the problems encountered by accused 
persons and the impact on their liberty. 1 also look at the impact of inadequate mental 
health resources on the jurisdiction of the Review Boards and the ability of persons in 
charge of hospitals to cany out the orders of the Review Board. 1 assess the implications 
of the Cour& of Appeal decisions in Brockville Psyfhiahic Hospiral v. McGillis " and R. 
"Swain. supra note 17. 
" ~ e e  supra note 3 for the listing of these repom. 
''supra note 3. 
"Supra note 1 6. 
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v. Pinet," involving mental health resources issues. I conclude that some accused 
persons in Ontario and British Columbia do not have access to the mental health 
resources required to ensure that they receive the least onerous and least restrictive 
disposition- or, to ensure that such a disposition, if made, is implemented. 
In researching chapter 2.1 attempted to gather data fiorn the different stakeholders 
in the administration of the mental disorder provisions in Ontario and British Columbia. 1 
prepared and sent out surveys to the Chairperson of each Review Board and the directors 
of mental health programs to determine the effects that the curent level of mental health 
resources had on accused persons, on the implementation of disposition orders, and on 
cornpliance with the mental disorder provisions. Although the Chairpersons and the staff 
at the Ontario Review Board and British Columbia Review Board and the Clinical 
Director of the British Columbia Forensic Psychiatric Institute extended their full 
cooperation, it becarne evident that no statistics were available on the implementation of 
dispositions, or the problems arising from lack of enforcement of these orders as they 
relate to the availability of mental health resources. The Ministries of Health in British 
Columbia and Ontario do not appear to gather statistics on these issues. Therefore. 1 was 
unable to obtain the exact nurnber of accused persons whose liberty was restricted or 
detention lengthened each year due to inadequate mental heafth resources. However. 1 
was able to gather anecdotal evidence of Review Boards not granting the l e s t  onerous or 
Ieast restrictive dispositions or dispositions not k i n g  implemented due to inadequate 
"(1995) 23 O.R. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A). 
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mental health r e s o ~ r c e s . ~ ~  
1 begin chapter 3, by analyzing the constitutionai issues raised by the effect of 
inadequate mental health resources on accused persons. Then. 1 discuss the application of 
the Charter to decisions on allocation of mental hedth resources and the jurisdictional 
issues that an attack on allocation decisions raises. 
1 advance the argument that the liberty rights of accused persons are infringed in 
contravention of section 7 of the Charter when their detention is lengthened as a result of 
decisions of health officiais regarding the allocation of mental heaith resources and the 
delivery of mental health services. 1 also argue that despite the deferential approach 
j61 was able to obtain a copy of a paper prepared by the Chairperson of the Ontario 
Review Board, D.H. Carruthers, "Pinet and McGillis and the cutbach: Some Views. 
Comments, and Opinions on How They Affect The Oniario Review Board, " supra note 
22. unreported decisions of the British Columbia Review Board outlining concerns 
regarding lack of community resources, see In the Matter of Robert Allen Mitchell. 
Reasons for Disposition, British Columbia Review Board, dated Mach 1 S. 1998 
(unreported) and In the Matter of Anthony Florence, Reasons for Disposition, British 
Columbia Review Board, dated May 3 1, 1998 (unreported), a background document 
prepared by the Institutional Health and Community Services, Mental Heal th Programs 
and Services, Ministry of Heaith of Ontario, Backgrounder: The Provincial Forensic 
System, dated April 1997 (unpublished) and a briefing note prepared by the Ministry of 
Health and Ministry Responsible for Seniors, "Briefing Document: Reaction of the 
Criminal Justice System to a Delay in admissions Caused by a Backlog ut the Forensic 
Psychiatrie Institute " dated Apnl2 1, 1997 (unpublished). In addition, 1 had a number of 
discussions with the Chairpersons of the Ontario and British Columbia Review Boards 
regarding the issue of adequacy and availability of mental health resources for accused 
persons. Other information was gathered from the various reports of the Health Services 
Restnicturing Commission, in particular, Change and Transition: Planning Guidelines 
and Implementation Strategies for Home Cure, Long Term Care. Mental Health, 
rehabilitation. and Sub-acute Cure, supra note 3, and Rebuilding Ontario f Health 
System: Interim Planning Guidelines and implementation Strategies, supra note 3,  from 
the mental health pian prepared by the Adult Mental Heaith Division, Ministry of Health 
and Ministry Responsible for Seniors, Revitalizing and Re balancing British CoZumbia 3 
Mental Health System: the 1998 Mental Health Plan, supra note 3 and fiom other articles 
referred to in chapter 2. 
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adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada towards the state on issues of social programs 
and allocation of resources and benefits, this infingement of liberty interests of accused 
persons cannot be justified under section 1 of the Charrer. 
Then, I argue that the equality rights of accused persons are adversely affected by 
the lack of adequate mental health resources. Allocation decisions regarding mental 
health resources result in a discriminatory effect on accused persons on the basis of their 
mental disability which is the reason that they are under the jurisdiction of the mental 
disorder provisions of the Code. Under these provisions, accused persons must rely on 
the mental health system to provide the necessary mental health resources to treat their 
mental disabilities to gain their fkeedom. Otherwise, they will be unable to do so. As 
well, 1 contend that these persons have difficulty accessing mental health services because' 
they suffer greater stigma and discrimination as a group because they are persons with 
mental disabilities who receive forensic services." These accused persons are 
stereotyped as more violent and dangerous than those in the mainstrearn mental health 
system. 1 contend that the infiringement of the equality rights of accused persons cannot 
be justified under section t of the Charter. 1 base my Charter arguments on the Supreme 
Court of Canada decisions in Eldridge and   ri end." as well as other equality cases. 
Since 1 argue that the inf igement  of the Charter rights and freedoms of accused 
"This term refea to the specialized service within the mental health system 
serving those persons who suffer fiom a mental disorder and are in the criminal justice 
system, including the correctionai system. 
3'Efdridge v. British Columbia (Attorney Generai) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 and 
Vriend v. Alberta Cl9981 1 S.C.R. 493. 
persons results fiom the aliocation decisions on mental heaith resources, 1 conclude that 
accused persons should seek a rernedy under subsection 24(1) of the Charter. I suggest 
that the appropriate Charter remedy is a declaration that the failure to fund adequate 
mental health services is unconstitutional. Furthemore, accused persons would seek a 
direction to goveniments to administer the mental heaith program. including forensic 
semices. in a manner that is consistent with the Charter. In support of my argument I cite 
the Eldridge case.39 
In conclusion, 1 suggest that the govenunents should provide funding to ensure 
accused persons access to adequate mental health services. I suggest accelerating current 
mental health refonn initiatives in Ontario and British Col~mbia"~  which are aimed at 
increasing community mental heaith services. Furthemore, I discuss the principles 
recornmended in Besi Practices In Mental HeaZih Reform" and in A Provincial Strategy 
To Coordinate Human Services and Criminal Justice Systems In Ontario" which suggest 
strategies for the provisions of comrnunity mental health services and devising a system 
aimed at supporting persons with mental disabilities in the community. The spint and 
"OSupra note 3. 
"Health Systems Research Unit, Clarke Institute of Psychiaty, Best Fractices In 
Mental HeaZth Reform, Discussion Paper Prepared for the Federal/Provincial/ Territorial 
Advisory Network on Mental Health (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government 
Services Canada, t 997). 
"Human Services and Justice Coordination Project, A Provincial Strafegy To 
Coordinate Human Services and Criminal Justice systems in Ontario (Toronto: Queen's 
Printer for Ontario, 1997). 
intent of the mental disorder provisions would be respected if mental health resources 
were available to keep an accused person in the community or, if detention in custody 
was required, to integrate the accused person into the community as quickly as possible. 
Chapter 1 
The Factors that Shaped the Mental Disorder Provisions 
In this chapter, 1 trace the ongins and development of the mental disorder 
provisions of the Criminal Code. Through these provisions the criminal justice system 
and the mental health system are linked and interdependent? I examine histoncal 
developrnents in the mental health system and the factors which fueled the changes in 
various periods, as well as those which fostered refonn of the criminal justice system, 
particularly in the mental disorder provisions. These trends must be discussed in light of 
societal changes and changing attitudes towards persons with mental disabilities, as well 
as the shifis in philosophy regarding the management and provision of services to persons 
with mental disabilities. In addition, I discuss parafiel shifts in the criminal justice 
system. 1 contend that reforms both in the mental health system and to the mental 
disorder provisions have k e n  animated by the desire to provide hurnane and 
compassionate treatment to persons with mental disabilities and to ensure that accused 
persons receive care and treatment rather than punishment." 
"For a more detailed discussion of the juncture points between the mental health 
system and the criminal justice system see S. Davies, Exploring the Impact of Bill C-30 
on ihe Handling of Mentally Rl Offender, Ph D Thesis (School of Criminoloey, Simon 
Fraser University, 1994) [unpublished] at 243, L. Teplin, ed., Mental Healrh And 
Criminal Jmtice. vo1.20 (BeverIy Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications Inc., 1984) at 13 and 
Human Services and Justice Coordination Projec t, A Provincial Stmtegy To Coordinute 
Human Services und Criminal Justice Vstems in Ontario, supra note 42. 
USee R v. Hadfie[d (1 800) 27 St-Tr. 128 1 at 1354 & 1355; A. Scull, Museums of 
iMadness (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979) at 55-124, in which the author describes 
lunacy reform and moral treatment which in my view grew out of concem for the ptight 
of insane persons. Though he cnticizes the motives of the reformers and posits that 
economic factors fbeled this reform, as pointed out by V. Skultans in English Madness: 
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Part 1: The Nineteenth Century 
During this period, English society was moving fiom an agrarian society to an 
urban-industrial one and "the advent of a mature market ec~norny'"~ resulted in changes 
in the economic and social order. The hierarchically organized rural society was replaced 
with an urban '-one based on class.'" As explained by Scull 
The market when given its head destroyed the traditional links between 
nch and poor which had characterized the old order. The great 
transformation' wrought by the advent of a throughly market-oriented 
society sharpiy reduced the capacity of the lower orderç to cope with 
economic reverses." 
In addition, the population increased rapidly during this peri~d.~' These profound 
changes led to new problems of "poverty and dependence in an urban environment" 
which was reflected in the increase in the nurnbers of persons that were receiving poor 
relief. Some authors have suggested that there was an increasing public awareness of 
the plight of persons with mental disabilities (referred to as Iunatics or the mad or the 
Ideas on Insanify, 1580-1 890 (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1979) at 10-1 1 that 
econornic factors do not provide a full explanation of the public concem of the plight of 
the insane in the period fiom 1800-1 850's; D. Robinson, Wild Beasts & Idle Humours: 
The Insanity Defense From Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1996) at 140; Law Refom Commission of Canada Report to 
Parliament on Mental Disorder in the Criminal Process ( Ottawa: Information Canada, 
1976) at 5 & 6; and Swain, supra note1 7 at 1003 & 1005. 
45 A. Scull, Museums of Madness, supra note 44 at 3 0. 
491bid at 27 and 35-36. 
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insane) and their plight, sternming from the belief that the reigning monarch. George III 
was insane." As argued by various authon, at this time there was a shifi in the concept of 
madness and how persons with mental disabilities should be managed. Previously 
madness was attributed to demonological possession and non-human animalistic qualities 
were attributed to the mad. In the nineteenth century, madness was seen as  a human 
defect which could be remedied? It was against this societai backdrop that the asylum 
system and the Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800 and other legislation pertaining to accused 
persons developed. 
A. 1800-1850: Beginnings of a mental health system and the origins of the mental 
disorder provisions (formerly known as the insanity provisions) in England and 
Upper Canada 
a) The rise of the lunatic asylum 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, in England, persons with mental 
disabilities were generally detained in so-called rnadho~ses.~' These were private. profit- 
"The public concem over the mental condition of George III arose out of two 
parliamentary inquiries into his condition in 1788 and 1790. See V. Skultans in English 
Madness: Ideas on Insanify, 1580-1890, supra note 44 at 10; and D. Robinson, Wild 
Beasts & Idle Humours: The Insanify Defense Frorn An tiquity to the Present. supra note 
44 at 140. 
"See V. Skultans in English Madness: Ideas on Insanity, 1580- 1890, supra note 
44 at 1 1 ; D. Robinson, Wild Beasts & IdZe Humours: The ïnsaniry Defense Frorn 
Antiquity to the Present, supra note 44 at 147- 182; and A. Scull, Museums of Madness. 
supra note 44 at 43 & 76- 1 19. 
"There are diffenng views regarding whether this period ushered in the era of 
institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities in hospitals or lunatic asylums and 
on the reasons for this. See A. Scull, Museums of Madness, supra note 44 and V. 
Skultans, English Madness: Ideas on Insanity, 1580-1890, supra note 44. According to 
Scull, prior to the nineteenth centwy, persons with mental disabilities were "assimilated 
into the much larger , more amorphous class of morally disreputable, the poor, and the 
making establishments. The upkeep of persons with mental disabilities who were 
paupers was paid by the parish. To turn a profit, the owners of these madhouses would 
impotent, a group which included vagrants , rninor criminais, and the physically 
handicapped." Persons with mental disorder were not segregated from the rest of society 
and were for the most part residing in the community, at 13-14. However. according to 
Skultans, "institutional care for the insane was provided on a wide scale throughout the 
eighteenth century. There were many pnvate hospitals for both private and pauper 
lunatics. General hospitals too contained wings for the insane ..." at 10. These authors 
differ as well on the reasons which underlie the expansion of the "mad houses and 
asylurns". According to Scull, the economic and social structure of English society in the 
nineteenth century was responsible for the advent of these asylurns. He argued that "[tlhe 
changing structure of the English economy fiom the late eighteenth century onwards 
undexmined and destroyed the old order."at 3 I &  32. A shift fiom an agrarian econorny to 
a market based one and a rapid growth in population, led to an institutional system 
because "[almong the lower classes in this period, family members unable to contribute 
effectively towards their own maintenance must have constituted a serious drain on 
farnily resources ... T h e  aged and children became a greater burden', as of course did the 
insane. Consequently. while the family-based system of caring for the insane and other 
types of deviants may have never worked especially well, one suspects that by the turn 
of the century it was likely to have k e n  functioning particularly badly." at 34. 
Skultans relates the rise of the public asylum to the cal1 for uniformity in 
institutional care which stemrned tiorn the growing public concem with 'ithe plight of the 
insane" resulting fiom parliamentary inquiries into the mental condition of King George 
III and parliamentary reports on the conditions of the private mad houses and pauper 
lunatic asylurns. She emphasizes the importance of the theory of moral management of 
persons with mental disorders and the optimism about insanity and its cure fueled lunacy 
refonn. 
As noted by R. Smandych & S. Verdun Jones, The Emergence of the Asylum in 
1 Y'' Century Ontario, in N .  Boyd, ed. The Social Dimensions of Law (Scarborough, 
Ontario. Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1986) at 167- 168, the last few decades have produced 
a number of histories on the developrnent in the nineteenth century of the asylum, 
"however, academics have yet to produce a coherent body of knowledge to which 
interested acadernics might refer in their search for an informative understanding of the 
process of institutional reform." The mok conventionai, liberal perspective on the 
emergence of the asylum was that it resulted fiom the " humanitarian reform efforts of 
early psychiatrists and lay-refonners, whose primary concern was with 'uplifting the mass 
of suffering hwnanity." This perspective emphasizes that the asylurn was first and 
foremost a place of medical care and treatment and had nothing to do with the 
development of penitentiaries and workhouses. This perspective was criticized by Scull. 
take in as many clients as possible since there was littfe legal control over the admission 
to or the conduct of rnadho~ses.~' The conditions in the early nineteenth century 
madhouses for criminal and pauper lunatics were marked by barbarity and neglect. These 
conditions were exposed in the Report of the Select Committee on hludhouses, 18 1 
The argument made by Scull that the emergence of the moral outrage over these inhurnan 
conditions related to the transformation of the concept of madness is persuasive. He 
In seventeenth -and-eighteenth century practice, the madrnan in 
confinement was treated no bener than a beast; for that was precisely what. 
according to the paradigm of insanity, he was. In becoming crazy, the 
lunatic had lost the essence of his humanity, his reason. 
. . . 
It was this world view which the nineteenth-century reformers, and indeed. 
society as a whole, were in the process of abandoning. ... For hem, the 
lunatic was no longer an animal, stripped of al1 remnants of humanity. On 
the contrary, he remained in essence a man; a man lacking in self-restraint 
and order. but a man for al1 that. Moreover, the qualities he lacked rnight 
and must be restored to hm, so that he could once more function as a 
sober, rational citizen? 
The public outcry over the conditions in madhouses hieled the lunacy refom 
movement. These reformers were upper class gentlemen interested in social refom of al1 
"A. Scull, Museurns of Madeness. supra note 44 at 5 1 . 
"See M. Kingma Mental Health Law: A Critique of the ' h g e r o u s n e s s  '
Criterion For Civil Cornmitment und some Recommendations For Change, LL M Thesis 
(Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, 1995) [unpublished] at 124 and A. Scull, 
~LIuseums of Madness, supra note 44 at 79-82. As a result of the Report, the English 
Parliament adopted An Act for the better Cure und Maintenance of Lunatics, being 
Paupers or Criminals (1 808) 48 Geo III c. 96 to govem the maintenance and 
administration of lunatic asylurns though this statute did not make it mandatory for a 
county to erect an asylurn. 
"A. Scull, Museums of Mudness, supra note 44 at 64 & 65. 
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types, as well as local magistrates, and belonged to either the Evangelical or Bentham 
schools of social r e f ~ r r n . ~ ~  As argued by Scull, the "final shape of lunacy legislation in 
England clearly owes much to the Evangelicais' humanitarianism and patemaiism, and to 
the Benthamite emphasis on expertise and efficiency." The lunacy refonners advocated 
an institutional approach to restore sanity and the use of "moral treatnent"." 
The mord approach to treatment of mental disability emphasized the 
minimization of extemal, physical coercion or restraint on persons with mental 
disabilities. It focused instead on placing the insane in comfortable surroundings in 
pastoral settings and on re-educating them regarding self-discipline ttuuugh kindness and 
c~nsideration.'~ The proponents of this approach argued that the moral treatment had to 
be delivered in an asyIum. However, the reformers' views were not widespread in the 
eariy half of the nineteenth century. It took another report in 1827 decailing the appalling 
and inhuman conditions in which the paupers who allegedly had a mental disability were 
'6The Evangelical lunacy reformers proselytized about the advantages of 
discipline and regularity over disorder and vice. They believed that they had a religious 
mission to rescue the lower classes fiom sin and social degradation which threatened 
them. They deplored the treatment of the insane as well as the immorality of the slave 
trade and cruelty to children and animals. The Benthamite lunacy reformers espoused the 
need for a 'science of government'- a centralized professional administration. They 
adopted a type of cost-benefit andysis, the principle of utility, by which to make rational 
decisions between alternative courses of action that would bring the greatest happiness to 
the largest number of people. Then the administrators would implement these decisions 
in an efficient and unifonn manner. For a detailed explanation of these movements as 
they relate to lunacy refom see A. Scull, Museums of Madness, supra note 44 at 56-59. 
"A. Scull, Museums of Mudness. supra note 44 at 56. 
"For a more detailed discussion of the moral treatment see A. Scull, Museums of 
Madness, supra note 44 at 67-70. 
kept59 before a system of publicly fùnded asylurns was made compulsory in 1845 by the 
Lunatics ACPO and a permanent national Lunacy Commission was established to inspect 
al1 types of asylums under another Lunatics Acr. 6' 
The asylurns which were established under this legislation reflected a more 
medicalized view of madness than that advanced by the proponents of the mord 
treatment approach . '' Treatises on the medicai nature of insanity had begun to 
emphasize that it was not curable without the aid of medicine; this "convinced almost al1 
of the educated classes that insanity was indeed a disease and its treatment ought to be 
entmsted to do~tors.'"~ As a result of this effort by the %ad-doctors',@ the 
administration of the asyluns was eventuaily placed in the hands of doctors. The 
A4adhouses A&-' of 1828 introduced the first legal requirement that each asylurn have a 
doctor visit the patients at least once a week and sign a register. and that an asylum which 
5 9 ~ h e  Report of fhe Select Cornmittee on Pauper Lunatics in Middlesex as cited in 
A. Scull, Museums of Madness, supra n ~ t e  44 at 88. 
6'(U.K.), 1845, c. 126. 
6 ' ~ .  Scull, Museums of Madness, supra note 44 at 124-163. 
6 3 ~ .  Scull, Museums of Madness, supra note 44 at 1 5 8. However, Scull argued 
that the claims advanced by the "mad-doctors" about insanity as a disease and the 
expertise of these doctors in treating insane persons were false. He criticized the view 
that the link between medicine and insanib was the outcome of the advance of science 
and human understanding. 
&This term is used by A. Scull, Museums of Madness. supra note 44 to describe 
the doctors that worked in the asylums. 
housed more than 100 patients had to employ a medical superintendent. The Lunatics 
Act of 1845 required that asylwns keep a record of medical visitations and the medical 
treatment of each patient. 
b) Rise of the lunatic asylum in Upper Canada 
A similar history of the rîse of the asylum in nineteenth century Upper Canada is 
chronicled by Smandych and Verdun- Jones." 
As is the case of the development of the public asylurn in England 
described by Scull, there also occurred a dramatic shifi in the social 
response to insanity in the nineteenth c e n t q .  ... Scull points to another 
development which seems to have occurred in both EngIand and Upper 
Canada, - namely the redefinition of madness as a 'uniquely and 
essentially medical problem,' and the consequent handing over of the 
insane to the emerging profession of psychiatryd' 
Up to the 1830s the "dangerous" insane persons were confined in district jails 
along with criminals and debtors. In this decade. the shenffs in charge of district jails 
began to complain in reports to the provincial govemment about the jailing of insane 
persons in ill-equipped jails and to lobby for the creation of a lunatic asyl~m.~ '  Since this 
lobby was supported by politicians and magistrates, the govenunent appointed in 183 1 a 
select cornmittee to inquire into the best method of establishing a Iunatic asylum in the 
province. In its report, this cornmittee argued that the provision of a special institution 
66R. C. Smandych & S.N. Verdun-Jones, &The Emergence of the Asylum in IP 
Century Ontario, " supra note 52 at 166. For a discussion of the emergence of the asylum 
in the Maritime Provinces see D. Francis."The Development of the Lunufic Asylurn in the 
Maritime Provinces " ( 1  977) Acadiensis 23 who declares that these asylurns were 
patterned on their English and Amencan counterparts. 
for insane persons would have curative powers and ensuing economic benefit for the 
comrnunity. The report stated 
A proportion amounting to ninety percent of recent cases has been cured in 
some insane hospitais of the United States ... but to render the treatment of 
insanity thus successful the patients must be entirely separated fiom their 
fiends and fiom al1 objects with which they are familiar. This can only be 
effected by placing them in institutions for that purpose and entirely under 
the control of strangers. 
. . . 
[Hlow grati@ing is the thought that the modem practice of the treatment 
of the insane, renders the recent cases as easily cured, when properly 
treated, as the ordinary diseases of the climate, and with less expense 
A temporary lunatic asylum was established in 184 1 in Toronto for al1 persons with 
mental disabilities and in 1853 the newly constructed Toronto Asylum opened its do or^.'^ 
c )  Criminal Lunatics Ac!, 1800 
Pnor to L 800, the law respecting the disposition of persons found not guilty of a 
crime because they were under the influence of insanity at the time the act was committed 
was unclear, as noted by Lord Kenyon in R. v. Hadjield. " Even though the Attorney 
General in this case advised Lord Kenyon that "it is laid down in some of the books, that 
by the cornmon-law judges of every court are comptent to direct the confinement [to a 
69Dr. C. Duncombe, Report on Lunatic Asylums, 1836 cited in R. C. Smandych & 
S.N. Verdun-Jones, "The Emergence of fhe Asyium in 1 Yh Century Ontario, " supra note 
52 at 172. 
"R. C. Smandych & S.N. Verdun-Jones, "The Ernergence of the Asylum in Wh 
Century Ontario, " supra note 52 at 172. 
7'R. v- HacifieZd supra note 44. See as well, M. Kingma, Mental Health Law: A 
Critique of the 'Dangerousness ' Criterion For Civil Cornmitment and some 
Recommendations For Change, supra note 54 at 88. 
jail, hospitd or asylum] of a person under such circumstances [ i n ~ a n i t ~ ] . " ~  Lord Kenyon 
was not convinced that this was the state of the law: 
A case is put into my hand of a person tried for felony, who, appearing to 
the Court to be mad and dangerous to society, was ordered to be removed 
to a proper place of confinement. 1 do not think that is the thing to be done 
here; 1 apprehend he should be at present confined, till properly disposed 
Lord Kenyon determined that he had to remand Mr. Hadfield back to jail where he had 
been detained prior to the triai. He gave the following reason for the detention: 
The prisoner, for his own sake and for the sake of society at large, must 
not be discharged; for this is a case which concems every man of every 
station, fiom the king upon the throne to the beggar at the gate; people of 
both sexes and of ail ages may, in an unfortunate fiantic hour, fa11 a 
sacrifice to this man, who is not under the guidance of sound reason; and 
therefore it is absolutely necessary for the safêty of society, that he should 
be properly disposed of. .." 
However, he added that "ail mercy and hwnanity [should] be shown to this most 
unfortunate creatwe wr. Hadfield] ... he must somehow or other be taken care of, with 
al1 the attention and al1 the relief that can be afforded l~ i rn . "~~ This case appeared to be 
the impetus for the British Parliament adopting An Acr for the Safe Custody of Insane 
Persons (also referred to as the Criminul Lunatics Ac&, 1800)'~ which was the first 
"R. v. Hadflefd, supra note 44 at 1355 & 1356. 
731bid at 1355. 
741bid at 1354 & 1355. 
751bidat 1355. 
"Supra note 1 7. 
legislation respecthg accused persons found NCRMD." This Act conaibuted to the 
public perception that persons with mental disabilities and charged with crimes were 
dangerous and that the public needed to be protected fiom them. The prearnble and 
section 1 of the Criminal Lunatics Act o f  1800 stated: 
Whereas Persons charged with High Treason, Murder, or Felony, rnay 
have been or rnay be of unsound Mind at the Tirne of cornrnitting the 
Offence wherewith they may have been or shall be charged, and by reason 
of such Insanity rnay have k e n  or rnay be found not guilty of such 
Offence, and it rnay be dangerous to permit persons so acquitted to go at 
large ... the Court before whom such TnaI shall be had, shail order such 
Person to be kept in strict Custody, in such Place and in such Manner as 
to the Court shail deem fit, untit his Majesty's PIeasure shail be known ; 
and it shall thereupon be lawful for his Majesty to give such Order for the 
safe Custody of such Person, during his Pleasure, in such Place and in 
such Manner as to his Majesty as to his shall deem fit ... "" 
Section 2 of the Criminal Lunafics Act  dealt with persons found insane by a jury and 
unable to stand trial on indictment for any offence. Section 3 authorized the apprehension 
and committal of persons suspected of being insane and believed to have a criminai 
purpose. 
The Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800 does not specifi where accused persons are to 
be detained and, in the first five years afier its enactment, thirty-seven persons were 
detained in jail under the authonty of this Act. Some rnay have been detained in the few 
estabtished hospitals such as Bethlem or pnvate madhouses, as well as in workhouses 
"A note at the end of the report of R v. Had'eeld, supra note 44, at 1 3 5 5 States 
that "[t] case gave rise to the two statutes of 40 Geo. 3d, chapters 93 and 94, by virtue of 
the latter of which (for the safe custody of insane persons charged with offences) Hadfield 
was continued in custody." 
"Section 1 of (U.K), 1800, c. 94. 
and poor hou se^.'^ The detention of accused persons in jails led to the cornplaint that -*to 
confine such persons in a cornmon gaol IjaiI], is equally destructive of the recovery of the 
insane and of the security and comfort of the other pris~nen."'~ However. afier the 
establishment of lunatic asy lums for criminal and pauper lunatics, accused persons were 
detained in lunatic a ~ y l u m s . ~ ~  
B. 1850s-1900: The failure of the lunatic asylum and the adoption of the insanity 
provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada 
a) The failure of the lunatic asylums in England and in Canada 
The system of county public lunatic asylums continued to expand as the existing 
asylurns became overcrowded in the second half of the nineteenth century in England. 
Similar developments respecting lunatic asylums took place in Canada where a network 
of public asylums. patterned on the English lunatic asyiums, grew during this period.s' 
Therefore. the factors which are discussed below and which explain the failure ofthe 
English lunatic asylums are likely appiicable to Canada. These factors can be summarized 
79 For a detailed discussion of the places of confinement of persons with mental 
disabilities, the poor and the homeless in England see A. Scull, Museums of Madness. 
supra note 44 at 37-43. 
80 Report of the Select Cornmittee on Criminal and Pauper Lunatics, 1807 at 4 as 
cited in A. Scuil, Museums of Madness, supra note 44 at 55 .  
"AH Actfir  the better Care and Maintenance of lunatics. being Paupers or 
Crirninals (U.K.), 1808, c.96. . 
"K. Kendall "Mental illness- Tales of Madness: Front the Asylum to 'Oprah " in 
B. Schissel & L. Mahood, eds., Social Control in Canada: Issues in the Social 
Construction of Deviance (Toronto: Odord University Press, 1996) 129 at 135. See also 
D. Francis, "The Development of the L-ic Asylum in the Maritime Provinces. " supra 
note 66, for a discussion of the origins and establishment of a system of asylums in the 
Maritime Provinces. 
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as folIows. An increase in the number of paupers with mentai disabilities and the lack of 
expected cures of these persons ied to overcrowding and the abandonment of the moral 
treatrnen~'~ In addition, the increase in the number of paupers with mental disabilities in 
lunatic asylurns is explained by the emphasis on the "dangerousness" posed by persons 
with mental disabilities and the need to protect society from these persons. As well, 
fiuiding for lunatic asytums was not increascd as nümbsrs of persofis with mental 
disabilities institutionalized grew which led to harsh living conditions and subsistence 
diets for these persons. 
According to Scull, the numbers of pauper lunatics in Iunatic asylums increased 
by 363.7 % between 1844 and 1890. Diflerent reasons have been advanced to explain the 
increase. The workhouse authorities used the lunatic asylums to "relieve their wards of 
many old people who are suffering from nothing else than the natural failing of old age. 
as well as to nd themselves of troublesome people in general."" The lunatic asylum 
became the dumping ground for the "awkward and inconvenient of al1  description^."^' 
There was also a popular belief at the time that the numbers of insane persons was 
increasing : 
The brute fact of the growing multitudes flooding into the asylums soon, 
however, gave pause for thought ... the alarming ideas struck many 
"See, for a discussion of the overcrowding of the Provincial Hospital for the 
Insane in Nova Scotia, M. Kingma, k end Heaith L m :  A Critique Of The 
'Dangerousness " Criterion For Civil Commitment and Some Recornmendations For 
Change, supra note 54 at 16 1 - 1 64. 
"A. Scull, Museum ofMadness. supra note 44 at 245 and 250. 
nineteenth-century doctors and magistrates that madness was. afier dl,  
infinitely more menacing than had been imagined. ... No sooner were 
asylwns built than they were filled to overfiowing, and still the well- 
springs of lunacy gushed forth more maniacs, more suicida1 melancholics, 
more senile dements in need of care and treatment? 
However, as Scull convincingly argues, the existence and expansion of the lunatic 
asylums created an increased demand for their seMces rather than there being an 
increase in the nurnber of persons with mental disabilities-" Furthemore, once admitted 
to an asylum, people stayed there longer than initially expected because "experience 
increasingly proved that the insane. even when placed in the much fèted utopian 
environment of the new asylums. did not recover as speedily, as certainly. as had been 
predicted. In fact most were not cured at all."" 
Another factor which is credited with fueling the growth of the asylum was the 
development of psychiatry and its emphasis on the "dangerousness" which persons with 
disabilities pose to society. Some authors have argued that 
With the ascendency of psychiatry, authorities became increasingly 
concerned with the relationship between insanity and violent crime. They 
found ready explanations in the bourgeoning rhetoric of the new 
profession. 'Nineteenth-century psychiatry invented an entirely fictitious 
entity, a crime which is insanity, a crime which is nothing but insanity, an 
insanity which is nothing but crime ... They justified their right to 
intervene, not by searching out the thousand little visible signs of madness 
which may accompany the most ordinary crimes, but by insisting - a 
preposterous stance- that there were kinds of insanity which manifested 
"R. Porter, A Social History of Madness: n ie  world ntrough the Eyes of the 
Insane ( London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987) at 20. 
"A. Scull, Mùseums of Madness. supra note 44 at 245. 
'8Supra note 86 at 20. 
themselves only in outrageous crimes, and in no other ~ a y ' . ' ~  
Since psychiaûy claimed a "special knowledge concerning the interchangeability of 
rnadness and violence," and an ability to predict violence, it acquired the "exclusive 
jurisdiction over the prediction of dangero~sness.' '~ At that time psychiavists portrayed 
persons with mental disabilities as a "particularly explosive brand of social dynamite. 
entirely devoid of reason or intemal control.'"' However, this association of 
"dangerousness" with persons with mental disabilities was not new; the "preventive 
confinement of dangerous persons ... who are thought to likely cause serious injury in the 
future has always been practiced, to some degree, by every society in history regardless of 
the j urisprudential rhetoric empl~yed."~' 
As a result of the growth of the asylum population, history repeated itself. Pauper 
asylurns which were intended to provided more humane treatment to persons with mental 
disabilities soon degenerated into overcrowded places of detention with living conditions 
8 9 ~ .  Menzies, "Psychiatry, Dangerousness and Legal Control " in N. Boyd. ed.. 
The Social Dimensions of Law Fcarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1986) 
at 182 at 186 & 187. 
"lbid at 1 82 cites A. Dershowitt, "the Origins of Preventative Confinement in 
Anglo-American Law. Part I.- the English Experience " ( 1  974) 43 University of Cincinnati 
Law Review 1 at 57. As previously noted above, legislation in England and Canada 
during this penod permitteci the detention of the accused persons, the "cnminal lunatics", 
based on the assumption that they were dangerous because insane and society had to be 
protected tiom them. 
that resembled those of the early nineteenth century mad-houses for pauper~.~' 
Mamrnoth asylumsgi were built or existing asylums expanded to accommodate the 
growing numbers of pauper lunatics in the 1850s and 1860s. With the increasing 
nurnbers of pauper lunatics in each asylum, al1 trappings of moral treatment- to provide a 
cornfortable environment to persons with mental disabilities- disappeared. 
The buildings themselves oRered mute testimony to the fact that the 
asylum was now 'a mere refuge or house of detention for a mass of 
hopeless and incurable cases'. Whereas it had k e n  an article of faith with 
the refonners that 'the main object to be borne in mind, in the construction 
of lunatic asylums, is to combine cheefilness with security, and to avoid 
eveq'thuig which might give the impression that he is in prison', within 
little more than a decade there were complaints that the county asylums 
were 'built externally on the mode1 of a palace, and internaily on that of a 
~ o r k h o u s e . ' ~ ~  
One aurhor chronicled a sirnilar situation in the Maritime Provinces regarding the failure 
of the asylums as follows: 
To be effective, mord treatment required a small nurnber of patients, al1 of 
whom were in the acute stage of their illness, and a large staff to work 
with them. What happened, however; was that the asylums were 
immediately and continuously overcrowded, especially with what were 
considered chronic incurable cases, and had neither the staff nor the 
facilities to be anything more than more than places of confinement. The 
heady optimism of mid-centuy evaporated into exasperation. and 
sometimes plain brutality, as asylums proved unable to fulfill their role as 
successfùl treatment centers?' 
9 3 ~ .  Scull, Museuns of Madness, supra no te 44 at 2 1 9. 
96D. Francis, "The Developrnent of the Lunatic AsyZum in the Maritime 
Provinces, " supra note 66 at 34. 
Once the moral treatment was abandoned, the asylurns went from "being an instrument of 
regeneration, [to become] the dustbin of the incurable.'"' The asylums are described as 
places where monotony and routine reigned to such a point that. according to one critic, 
persons with mental disabilities came under "a son of routine discipiine which ends in 
their passing into a state of dementia.'"' The inmates of the asylums were kept sedated 
and on a barely subsistence diet? The conditions were so poor that "many among the 
higher, and nearly al1 among the lower classes. still look upon the County Asylum as the 
Bluebeard's cupboard of the neighb~urhood."'~ 
Funding for lunatic asylums did not keep Pace with the increasing number of 
inmates, thus leading to overcrowding and deteriorating conditions in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, as chronicled by ~ c u l l . ' ~ '  The local oficials who controlled the 
97Supra note 86 at 20. 
98J.M. Granville "Lunatic Asylurns " Quarterly Review, 101 at 375-376 cited in A. 
Scull hfuseums of Madness, supra note 44 at 200. See also D. Francis, "The 
Development of the Lunatic Asylum in the Maritime Provinces, " supra note 66 at 3 7 & 
3 8. 
99 A. Scull Museums of Madness, supra note 44 at 203. 
IWj. M. Granville "Lunatic Asyiums " Quarterly Review, 101 at 353 cited in A. 
Scull Museums of Madness, supra note 44 at 195. See also D. Francis, "The 
Developmenr of the Lunutic Asylum in the Maritime Provinces, " supra note 66, who 
paints a picnire of the abuse and cruelty suffered by the inmates of the Maritime asylums 
at 35 to 37. 
'O '  A. Scull Museums of Madness, supra note 44 Scull 2 13-2 19. A similar situation 
existed in Canada where lunatic asylums were overcrowded with chronic inrnates and 
understaffed. See K. Kendall "Mental fflness- Tales of Madness: From the Asylum to 
'Oprah, " supra note 82 at 1 3 5 and D. Francis, "The Development of the Lunatic Asylum 
in the Moritime Provinces, " supra note 66 at 35 to 38. 
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funding of county lunatic asylums generally kept funding at a minimum and the managers 
of the asylurns were encouraged to econornize and reduce the maintenance costs of each 
inrnate. 
b) Adoption of insanity provisions in Canada 
In 1859, the Legislative Council and Assembly of Canada adopted An Act 
respecring the confnement of Lunafics whose being at large may be dangerous ro the 
public. 'O' It contained similar provisions to those in the British legislation, the Criminal 
Lunatics ~ c t ' "  of 1800, for the detention at the pleasure of Her Majesty of persans found 
not guilty by reason of insanity of any offence or unfit to stand trial. Much like the 
British legislation of 1800, this Act did not specie the place of detention. It simply gave 
the Govemor the power to order into safe custody accused persons "during Her Majesty's 
pleasure, in such place and in such manner as the governor seems [sic] fit."'<u However. 
asy lums had been established and accused persons were detained in them. 'O5 
Following Confederation, in 1869, the federal government adopted An Act 
respecring procedure in Criminal Case, and other matters relating to Criminal Lmv (also 
'03Supra note 1 7. 
'osBoth Lower and Upper Canada had established asylums by the 1850s. See R. C. 
Smandych & S.N. Verdun-Jones, "The Emergence of the Asylurn in W" Century 
Ontario, " supra note 52 at 17 1 - 1 77. In addition, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick has 
asylurns, see D. Francis, "The Developmenr of the Lunatic Asyfum in the Maritime 
Provinces, " supra note 66 at 28. 
known as Procedure in Criminof Cases Act)Io6 which included provisions on the 
disposition of persons acquitted by reason of insanity or unfit to stand trial that were 
similar to the Act respecting the confinement of Lunatics whose being of large moy be 
dangerouî ro the public. 'O7  However, one important change made was that these persons 
were held at the pleasure of the Lieutenant-Governor of the province where the case had 
occurred. 'O8 
In 1886, when the first revision of the Statutes of Canada took place. the 1869 
Procedure in Criminul Cases Aci was revised and entitled the Criminal Procedure Act. 'Og  
This Act was incorporated into The Criminal Code, 1892. Sections 736 to 74 1 of this 
Code re-enacted sections 252 to 258 of the Criminal Procedure Act. "O 
Part 2: Developments in the 20'' centu y 
In the first part of this century, the lunatic asylums were renamed mental hospitals 
and attempts were made to establish in these hospitals therapeutic practices similar to 
those in general hospitals since mental illness was viewed as a disease. However, it 
appears that during this period the mental hospitals were little more than places of 
detention for persons with mental disabilities. The numbers of persons detained in 
'06Statutes of Canada, 1869, c. 29, s.99-105. 
'07Consolidated Statutes of s un ad*, 1 859, c. 1 09. 
108Supro note 1 O6 at S. 100. 
'OQR.S.C. 1886, c. 174, s.252-258. 
l I0lb id. 
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mental hospitais continued to grow during this period. l ' ' Conditions in mental hospitals 
continued to detenorate and the use of medicai treatments in asylums added to the misery 
of persons with mentai disabilities.' " 
The second half of the 20" century saw the rise of the welfare state. A minimal 
social safety net was spun in Canada which encompassed an unemployment insurance 
scheme. old age security and disability pensions. social assistance prograns and 
medicare. This penod also saw the advent of civil rights movements and the stmggle for 
equality rights by various oppressed and subordinated groups in our society. The right to 
life, liberty and security of the individuai, as well as equality rights for disadvantaged 
groups, were entrenched in the Canadian Charter of Righrs and Freedoms. "' It is against 
this backdrop that the current mental health system and the mental disorder provisions 
developed. 
A. 1900- 1950: Mental Hospitals ia Canada 
a) The emergence of the mental hospital 
The medicalization of mental illness and the hospitalization of the asylum in 
Canada took place around the beginning of the 20th century in Canada. These tenns are 
used to descnbe the "various attempts on the part of asylum physicians to replace the 
' ' 'See Statistics Canada, Mental Health Statisrics, vol. 1, 1937- 1957 cited in H. D. 
Dickinson & G. Andre, " Community Psychiatr-y: The Institutional Transformation of 
Psychiotric Practice " in B .S. Bolaria & H. D. Dickinson, Sofiology of Healfh Cure in 
Canada (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Javanovitch, 1 988) at 296. 
"'K. Kendall "Mental nlness- Tales of Madness: From the Asylum fo 'Oprah " 
supra note 82 at l36-l42. 
Il3Supra note 14. 
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prison-like organization of the mental institutions with fonns and patterns of therapeutic 
practice prevaient in general h~spitals.""~ One step towards this goal was to rename the 
mental asylums as mental hospitals in the legislation goveming the asylurns.' '' Another 
\as to recognize in legislation that a disease process was king  treated in mental 
hospitals, for example by the passage of the Mental Diseases Act in 1922 in 
Sa~katchewan."~ Dickinson and Andre argue that the development of a training program 
for mental hospital attendants in 1930 in Saskatchewan and the opening of a psychopathie 
ward in a general hospital were steps towards the medicalization of psychiatry. 
Furthexmore, in the 1930s and 40s , psychiatrists began to search for a physical 
cause for different types of mental illness. They had already found one link between a 
phy sicd illness and a mental illness. This link was that third-stage syphilis caused some 
type of mental illness. I l 7  Somatic cures for mental illness such as psychosurgery, insulin 
shock therapy, metrazol shock therapy, electroconvulsive shock, and gynecological 
114 H. D. Dickinson & G. Andre, "Cornmunity Psychiatty: The Institutional 
Transformation of Psychiatric Practice" supra note 1 1 1 at 300. 
115 An exarnple was Manitoba's Insane Asyhm Act which was amended to refer to 
the asylum as a mental hospital as cited in H. D. Dickinson & G. Andre, Tommunity  
Psychiatry: The Institutional Transformation of Psychiatric Proctice" supra note 1 11 at 
300. 
I l6  H. D. Dickinson & G. Andre, "Community Psychiatry: The Institutional 
Transformation of Psychiatric Practice" supra note 1 1 I at 30 1. 
I l 7  K. Kendall "Mental Illness- Tules of Madness: From the asylurn ro 'Oprah ' " 
supra note 82 at 136. 
surgery on wornen were employed in the mental hospitals.'" As one author noted, 
[gheoretical attempts describing the treatments' rationale were so vague 
that it was often dificult to take them senously. ... Nevertheless, each 
therapy was applied enthusiastically soon after discovery, and both the 
medical profession and the press avidly promoted the treatment~."~ 
Tnese so-called treatments had severe and sometimes fatal effects. For example 
psychosurgery involved the destruction of brain tissue in the fiontal lobes of the brain. to 
eradicate mental illness. At first, it was done by drilling holes in the head of person with 
mental disabilities and absolute alcohol was injected into the front lobes of the brain. 
Later, instruments were used rather than alcohol to destroy nerve fibers of the brain."' 
Another example of harrnhl treatments were the shock therapies used to treat 
schizophrenia: insulin shock therapy , metrazol shock therapy . The idea behind these 
therapies was to cause a person to go into convulsions and coma, to improve their 
behaviour."' In the case of electroconvulsive shock, electrical currents travel to the brain 
for a few seconds and result in convulsion, loss of consciousness and memory and is used 
as treatment for a variety of mental illnesses.'" Yet another exarnple of harmful 
treatment arose from the belief that women's genital and reproductive organs were linked 
' "H. D. Dickinson & G. Andre, "Community Psychiatry: The Institutionai 
Transformation of f.+ialric fractice" supra note 1 1 1 at 301 and K. Kendall "Mental 
Ihess- Tales of Mudness: From the asyium to 'Oprah ' " supra note 82 at 136- 139. 
119 K. Kendall "Mental nlness- Tu+ of Madness: Frorn the asylurn to 'Opruh ' " 
supra note 82 at 138. 
'"Ibidat 138. 
' " Ib id. 
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to mental illness, therefore, surgery was used to remove these organs.'" 1 suggest that the 
harm to the person with disabilities was not considered in the quest for a supposed cure to 
mental illness. Furthemore, these persons were captive and these "treatments" were 
practised on them generally without their  ons sent.''^ 
B. 1951-1991: The Pursuit of Deiastitutionalization and of New Mental Disorder 
Provisions 
In the second half of the 20" century, humane concerns for the plight of persons 
confined in mental hospitals. in conjunction with the introduction of psychotropic 
medication, resulted in a shift in mental health policy."* The focus became the delivery of 
mental health services in the community rather than the hospital. In addition. concems 
respecting the rights of penons with mental disabilities arose out of the civil rights 
movement. As a result of the recognition of the rights of persons with disabilities. 
changes were made to the criteria for civil committal and the institution of procedural 
safeguards surrounding civil committal. These changes highlighted the differences 
between civil committal and the mental disorder provisions (the insanity provisions) 
I 2 ' ~ s  detailed later in this part, other explanations, such as the growing fiscal 
crisis of the state and the increased costs of mental hospitals, the expansion of  the 
psychiatric units in generd hospitals and fnental health clinics, the rise of the civil rights 
movement and the anti-psychiatry movement, have been offered in support of the shift 
fiom institutional psychiatric care to commmity psychiatry. 1 favour the humane 
treatment explanation. See for a brief explanation of the various explanations H. D. 
Dickinson. "Mental Health Policy in Canada: Mat 's the Problem" in B.S.  Bolaria & H. 
D. Dickinson, Heolth. iZZness and Health Care in Canada. Znd edition, (Toronto: Harcourt 
Brace Canada, 1 994) 466 at 468-47 1. 
which authorized arbitrary, automatic, indeterminate detention without any procedural 
safeguards such as independent review nor any criteria for release. 
a) Deinstitutionalization of persons with mental disabilities 
In the 1960s in Canada, the focus of the delivery of mental health services shified 
from provincial psychiatric hospitals to psychiatric units in general hospitals and to the 
~ornrnunity.''~ This led to a ciramatic decrease in psychiatric beds,"' a reduction in the 
number of provincial psychiatric hospitals, an increase in the number of psychiaîric units 
in general hospitals,"' and the creation of cornmunity-based mental health services. 
Different explanations have been offered for the deinstitutionalization of persons with 
mental disabilities. The most common explanaion is "the growth of medical scientific 
kn~wled~e . " "~  The advent of psychotropic or mood-aitering dmgs in 1952 is seen by 
1'6H. D. Dickinson & G. Andre, "Communify Psychiatry: 
Transformation of Psychiatric Practice" supra note 1 1 1 at 295. 
The Inst if  ut ional 
These changes in the 
delivery of mental health services were not-unique to Canada. but were seen throughout 
the Western world. Similar movements occurred in U.K. and the US. in the mid-1950s. 
For a description and statistics on the depopulation of mental hospitals and on closures in 
those countries see A. Scull, Decarceration. Znd edition (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984) 
at 66-73. 
"'D. Wasylenki, P. Goering, E. MacNaughton, "Planning Mental Health 
Services: I. Background and Key Issues" supra note 26. They note that from 1960 to 1976 
the number of psychiatric beds in provincial psychiatric hospitals declined fiom 47.635 to 
l5,O 1 1 in Canada and in psychiatric units in general hospitais increased fiom 844 to 
5.836. 
Iz8H. D. Dickinson & G. Andre, "Community Psychiatry: The Institutional 
Transformation of Psychiatric Practice" supra note 1 1 1 at 296. Table 1 provided figures 
showing the decrease in nurnber of psychiatric hospitais and increase in the number of 
psychiatric units in general hospitals. 
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some authon as the main advance in the treatrnent of mental disorder which resulted in 
the obsolescence of the psychiatric hospitai. ''O These dmgs produced "sy mptom- free" 
behaviour and manageable patients,""' allowing persons with mentai disabilities to be 
treated in the community. The focus on mental disability as an illness Ied to the 
perception that persons with mental disabilities should be treated, Iike other persons who 
suffer fiom an ilhess9 in the community.'" This was seen as more humane and more in 
step with the nghts of penons with mental di~abilities."~ Psychiatrie hospitals came to be 
seen as prisons- "antitherapeutic institutions having a detrimental impact on their inmate 
 population^."'^" 
Another explanation of the demise of the psychiatric hospital is advanced by 
13'lbid at 300 and K. Kendall "Mental nlness- Tales of Madness: From the 
Asylum to 'Op& ' " supra note 82 at 1 43. 
1 3 '  K. Kendall "Mental illness- Tales of Madness: From the asylum to 'Oprah 
supra note 82 at 143. She stated that in North Arnenca and Europe psychotropic dmgs 
were widely prescribed and their use superseded al1 other foms  of treatment for mental 
illness. 
I3'H. D. Dickinson, "Mental Health Policy in Canada: Whar 's the Problem * '  
supra note 1 125 at 468 and see also Canada, Overview of Mental Heaith Legislarion in 
Canada, 1993 (Ottawa: Minster of Supply and Services Canada, 1 994) at 5. 
13' See for example G. Robertson, Mental Disability Law in Canada, 2" ed.. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1994) at 368 and 3 69who States that " a continued shift in emphasis 
away fiom institutional care in favour of community care and a desire to fiord 
involuntary patients greater legal protection," was largely responsible for the reform in 
mental health legislation. 
1 3 4 ~ .  Scull, Decarceration, supra note 126 at 77 and Canada, Overview of Mental 
Health Legislation in Canada, 1994, supra note 132 at 5. 
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S C U I ~ . ' ~ *  He acknowledges that the conventional explanation holds some t r ~ t h ' ' ~  but 
argues that the 'de~arceration"~' of penons with mental disabilities was mainly due to the 
growing fiscal cnsis of the state.'" Mental hospitals, prisons and reformatories were 
closed to Save costs. Scull adds that the necessary pre-condition to deinstitutionalization 
was the existence of welfare programs including the "existence of welfare payments, 
guaranteeing at Ieast a minimal maintenance to the poor living outside instit~tions.""~ 
Although cntics of this argument have noted that empirical studies show no decrease in 
total state expendinires on mental health s e r ~ i c e s , ' ~ ~  they acknowledge some merit to this 
argument. In my opinion, Scull's explanation certainiy resonates in the Canada of the 
1990s where health care cuts continue to be made in the name of budget constraints and 
1 3 ' ~ .  Scull, Decarcerotion, supra note 126. 
'j61bid at 89. Scull concluded "[ait best. therefore, one is left with the conclusion 
that the introduction of psychotropic dmgs may have facilitated the policy of early 
discharge by reducing the incidence of florid symptoms arnong at least some of the 
disturbed , thus easing the problem of managing them in the community; and perhaps also 
by persuading doctors with an exaggerated idea of the dnigs' efficacy of the feasibility of 
such a policy. But that their amval can be help[sic] primarily responsible for the change 
is clearly highly implausible." Further at 170- 1 7 1, he cited a study of Peter Sedgwick on 
the timing of the m-down of institutional populations in Western Europe which 
demonstrated "rnarked variations fiom one society to another in both the timing and the 
extent of the decline in mental hospital populations." 
13'Ibid at 1. Scull coined this term to mean the "state-sponsored policy of closing 
down asylurns, prisons and refomatones.~' 
1.10 H. D. Dickinson & G. Andre, "Communi~ Psychiatry: The Instirutional 
Transformation of Psychiatrie Practice" supra note 1 1 1 at 297. 
fiscal crisis. 
Yet another explanation for the rise of community psychiatry is advanced by 
Dickinson and Anche. They argue that community psychiatry resulted fiom a 
simultaneous expansion of both the "medically dominated, general hospital-based. 
private-sector psychiatric services system and a mental clinic-based, public-sector 
psychiatric senices system increasingly dominated by non-medicaily trained 
professionals such as psychologists and social workers.""' They argue that a stniggle 
was waged between competing professionals "for control over the diagnosis and 
treatment of mental disabilities" seeing that mental disability may be both "biological and 
socio/psychological in ongin."14' They conclude that there was a trend towards de- 
medicalization of psychiatry which would continue because it was cost-effective- an 
argument similar to that of Scull for the closure of state mental hospitald4' 
In my view, another event which had an impact on deinstitutionalization in 
Canada was the exclusion of psychiatric services provided in mentai hospitals fiom cost- 
sharing agreements under the Hospital Inrurance and Diagnostic Services Act of 195 7. 
In 1968, under the national medicare program, which combined the hospital and medical 
insurance programs, cost-sharing covered medically required services provided by 
medical practitioners. This included the services of psychiatrists in general hospitals. 
'"Ibid at 295-296. 
""Ibid at 296. 
IJ31bid at 305. 
luS. C. 1957, c. 28. 
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outpatient settings in private offices. However, the federal government did not share in 
the costs of provincial psychiatric hospitals or independent mental health clinics. In 
1977, the Federal- Provincial Fiscal Arrangements ~ c t " '  blurred the distinctions in cost- 
sharing because it provided block funding for health and pst-secondary education to the 
provinces. 
Between 1957 and 1977 the number of psychiatric units in general hospitals 
increased fiom 23 to 1 6 9 . ' ~  However, the new general hospital psychiatric units "did not 
provide care for patients suffering fiom severe, major mental disorders. Rather these 
units treated patients who were less seriously il1 and who had not previously received 
inpatient psychiatric tare.“"<' The general hospital psychiatric unit provided short-term 
care to a Iarger number of easier-to-manage patients while the provincial psychiatric 
hospitals provided long-term care to more difficult-to-manage patients. '" In 
Saskatchewan, for exarnple, the growth of psychiatric services provided by physicians on 
a fee for service basis increased from about 20 services for 1 O00 of population covered in 
Id6H. D. Dickinson & G. Andre, "Communiiy Psychiarryc The institutional 
Tronsfomafion of Psychiatric Practice" supra note 1 1 1, Table 1 at 296. 
147 D. Wasylenki, P. Goering, and É. MacNaughton, in "Planning Menral Health 
Services: 1. Background and Key Issues, supra note 26 at 1 99 & 200. 
'"H. D. Dickinson & G. Andre, "Community Psychiatry: The Insiifutional 
Transformution of Psychiatric Practice" supra note 1 1 1, figure 1 at 303. 
Other factors which had an impact on deinstitutionalization were the rise of the 
civil rights movement North America and ensuing political activism of persons with 
disabilities. As noted by Bickenbach, 
It has k e n  argued, and seems reasonable that in North America political 
activism for people with disabilities becarne a viable and attractive option 
as a direct result of the civil rights rnovement in the United States. 
Political unrest, fueled by optimism fiom successes in combating racial 
discrimination, coupled with the dynarnics of politicai protest and 
persuasion, created a vehicle for the expression of discontent arnong 
people with disabilities and their advocates. ''O 
Activists claimed that disability "is a socially constnicted fom of ~ppression."~~' 
According to Bickenbach, this flowed fkom the social-scientific accounts of disability and 
"[tlhe next theoretical step was to represent people with disabilities as a minority group, a 
marginalized population experïencing systemic dis~rirnination."'~' Penons with 
disabilities struggled for empowement and inclusion in society with the support of 
advocates. The importance of the dignity and worth of persons with disabilities was 
highlighted. 
In mental health, this politicization is reflected in the events of the 1960s and 
1970s. First, the anti-psychiatry movement"' took hold. This movement compnsed 
"OJ. E. Bickenbach, Physical Disability and Social Policy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1993) at 150. 
153 Anti-psychiatry mental health professionals argue that the "primary function of 
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment is the social identification, classification, and control 
of deviance ... S l a s z ,  for exarnple, argues that the problems currently king diagnosed and 
radical mental health professionals ( such as Thomas Szasz, R D. Laing and Thomas 
Scheff), patients and ex-patients. They "chailenged psychiatry by publicizing psychiatric 
abuses. cntiquing psychiatric theones and treatment, and offering  alternative^."'^' 
Second. ex-psychiatrie patients' or consumers nghts movements emerged, seeking 
ernpowerment. They advocated for the same nghts as other rnedical patients such as the 
nght to informed consent to treatment and the nght to refuse treatment, as well as stricter 
cnteria for involuntary civil cornminal and procedural safeguards surrounding it. 
Funherrnore, these persons argued that they could help themselves or should have the 
right to choose non-medicai therapists to help them. A consumer advocacy ethic emerged 
whereby " [i]n the context of a 'service provider-consumer' relationship, the balance of 
power. at least in principle, shifts significantly toward the consumer who plays a leading 
role in the nature of the demand for services and how they are to be provided.""' These 
movements helped to sensitize Canadians to the realities of discrimination and stigma 
attached to mental illness and the stereotypes faced by persons with mental disabilities. 
treated as medical problems by psychiatry are really best understood as psycho-social 
problerns in living ... [persons with mental disabilities] should be helped to solve their 
problems in living by those more suited to doing so, namely psychologists or other types 
of non-medical psychotherapists." Another branch of this movement led by Laing argues 
that "madeness was a proto-revolutionary act that was suppressed by the counter- 
revolutionary oppression of psychiatry. The role of the radical, anti-psychiatrie therapist 
in this rebellion against conformity and oppression was to aid and abet the rebels in their 
emancipatory joumey through rnadness." k. Dickinson, "Mental Health Policy in 
Canada: Whaf 's rhe Problem? " supra note 125 at 469470. 
15"Supra note 82 at 1 44. 
"'H. Dickinson, "Mental Health Policy in Canada: Whot 's the Problem? " supra 
note 125 at 471. 
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An umbrella advocacy organization, the Coalition of Provincial Organizations of the 
Handicapped. was organized to coordinate consumer activist groups throughout the 
country and was instrumentai in advocating for the recognition of equality rights for 
persons with disabilities in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 'j6 Discrimination against pesons with disabilities15' was exposed as a social 
constnict and as a systemic problem. In my view, this sensitization contributed to a shifi 
in public opinion regarding the institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities. 
Institutionalization came to be seen as synonymous with civil committal in the context of 
persons with mental illness and disempowerment. ïhese persons were deprived of their 
liberty and isolated from the community based on their illness. As involuntary patients in 
psychiatric units of general hospitals or psychiatric hospitals, they may have been 
deprived of the right to consent to treatrnent or to refuse treatment, as well as the choice 
of their care givers. The psychiatric abuses in institutions showed the particularly 
vulnerable position of these persons. 
Another development which had a bearing on securing rights for persons with 
mental disabilities is the adberence by Canada to the United Nations' Declaration of the 
Rights of Disabied Persons. 15' The Declaration guaranteed rights to persons with 
156~upra note 150 at 150-1 5 1. 
157 For a detailed discussion of the social construction of handicapping and its 
ramifications see supra note 150. 
1589 December 1975, U.N.G.A. Resolution 347 OWI) as cited in M.D. 
Lepofse, "A Report Cardon the Charter S Guuruntee of Equaiity to Persons with 
Disabililies afrer !O Years - What Progress? Wh4r Prospects? " ( 1  997) 7 N.J.C.L. 263 at 
284. 
disabilities including, those with mental disabilities, "the inherent right to respect for their 
human dignity; ... the same civil and political rights as other human being~.""~ The 
emphasis was on the integration of the person with disabilities into society. 
Furthemore, In the 1980s. human rights codes extended protection to persons 
with mental disabilities. As noted by Lepofsky. "a nurnber of legislatures first banned 
discrimination based only on physical disability, Ieaving it legal to discriminate because 
of mental disability."'" 
b) Changes in mental healtb legislation 
Since the 1970s, numerous changes in mental health legislation have been made. 
Since involuntary hospitalization deprives a person who has not comrnitted an offence of 
her or his liberty, it represents the most intrusive step that the state can take against a 
person. Therefore, procedural safeguards and precise, unambiguous legislative criteria 
as to the conditions and types of behaviours that justiQ committal were required. A 
nurnber of jurisdictions responded by adopting stricter civil committal criteria based on 
dangerou~ness'~' and procedurai safeguards were inserted in mental health legislation. 
' 59M.D. Lepofsky,"A Report Card on the Charter S Guaranree of Equality ro 
Persons with Disabilities d e r  1 O Years - Whar Progress? Whar Prospects?" ( 1  997) 7 
N.J.C.L. 263 at 284. 
16'In the 19" and early 2oSh centuqf, statutory civil comrnittal critena referred to the 
comrnittal of persons who were "insane and dangerous to be at large." In the 1940fs, the 
scope of civil committal was "significantly expanded by the introduction of the 'welfare 
test'." Basicdly under this criteria, a person could be involuntanly hospitalized and 
treated if it promoted that person's best interests and welfare. In the 1970's, Canadian 
mental health legislation adopted the concept of "dangerousness". This test is criticized 
because the "difficulties in predicting dangerousness are notorious, and there is a wealth 
5 1 
such as rights to periodic reviews by independent Review Boards and briefer time periods 
for observation and detention. 
The advent of the Canadian Charter ofRights and FreedomsJg added impetus to 
the reform of mental health ~ e ~ i s l a t i o n ' ~ ~  and the enactment of the current mental disorder 
provisions. A few perçons with mental disabilities have been successfÙl in Charter 
challenges to mental health legislation. In Lursa v. Heaith Science Centre '- the validity 
of civil committal was challenged under the sections 7 and 9 of the Charter. At that time. 
Manitoba's mental heaith legislation did not contain a dangerousness criterion and did not 
provide for periodic reviews by a Review Board. The court did not strike down the 
legislation but ordered the release of the plaintiff because it found that "involuntary 
confinement without proof of dangerousness, and with no meaningful opportunity to 
of literature casting serious doubt on the validity and reliability of psychiatric prediction 
of dangerousness." Robertson supra note 13 3 notes that very few provinces use 
danger~usness as the sole criterion for civil committal and the rneaning of dangerousness 
varies widely across Canada. Some jurisdictions incorporated dangerousness by refemng 
to safety. The legislation in Nova Scotia is an example, see Hospitais Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, 
c.208, ss. 36(2). Robertson is of the opinion that this appears to be little more than a 
refonnulation of the "welfare test". Others, such as Ontario, N. W.T., Manitoba and the 
Yukon, adopt quite a restrictive criteria. The legislation in these provinces and temtories 
refers to a person suBering fiom mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will 
result in serious bodily harm to the person, another person or imminent and serious 
physical impairment of the person. Robertson, supra note 133, expresses the view that the 
courts have interpreted this cntena broadiy. For a M e r  discussion of civil committal 
criteria, see Robertson, supra note 1 33, at 367437. 
'6'Supra note 14. 
'63S~pra note 133 at 426 and supra note 159 at 264-265. 
16.'(1983) 9 C.C.R. 350 (Man. Q.B.). 
question it, infi=ïnged ss. 7 and 9 of the charter."I6' The finding that involuntary 
cornmittal requires proof of dangerousness as a pre-condition was in keeping with 
O 'Connor v. ~ o n a l d s o n ' ~ ~  where the United States Supreme Court declared that 
A finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's locking a person 
up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial 
confinement .... [mental illness is] no constitutional basis for confining 
such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can safely 
iive in fkeedom. '" 
A few years later, in Thwaites v. Heatth Sciences Centre Psychiatrie Facilim 16' the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal struck down the civil committal criteria. It heid that these 
provisions infkinged section 9 of the Charter, the right not to be arbitrarily detained. 
However, in a number of other cases, challenges to civil cornmittal system in mental 
health legislation invoking section 7 or 9 of the Charter were unsuc~essfûl. '~~ Re 
Jenkinîl'* dealt with the constitutional validity of the P.E.I. Mental Health Act which did 
not contain dangerousness as a pre-condition to civil cornmittal. However. the court 
'65~upra  note 133 at 427. 
'"422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
'"[1988] 3 W.W.R. 217 (Man. C.A.). 
1 6 9 ~ e  Jenkins (1986) Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 62 (P.E.LS.C.), Azhar v. Anderson 33 
A.C.W.S. (2d) 521, Ont. Dist. Ct., Locke D.C.J., Toronto No.609/85,2Sh June 1985 
(unreported), and McCorkell v. RiverviewiHospital [ 1 9931 8 W. W.R. 1 69. For a 
discussion and a critique of these cases and others for the lack of attention to the 
substantive aspects, in particular of the committal criteria, and the lack of examination of 
the legislative scheme of mental health legislation has a whole for cornpliance with the 
Charter, see supra note 133 at 429-434. 
found that a patient's confinement was not arbitraxy, capriciou or without cause, nor was 
it contrary to the principles of fundamental justice because of the availability of review of 
the comrnittal. Therefore, it ruled that the Mental Healrh Act did not violate sections 7 
and 9 of the Charter. The issue of dangerousness as a cnterion for civiI committal is not 
discussed. In McCorkell v. Riverview Hospital,'" the court ruled that the absence of 
dangerousness as a critenon for cornmittal was not an infringement of the C h e r .  
Based on Lussa. Thwaites and O 'Connor, "' 1 suggest that Re Jenkim and McCorkell 
were erroneous because they did not find that a dangerousness criterion should be 
required for civil committal. 
C. Developments Regarding the Mental Disorder Provisions 
a) Criminal Code provisions 
For over a century. the insanity provisions of the Criminal Code regarding the 
manner and place of detention remained substantially ~nchanged.'~' except for provisions 
which allowed but did not mandate the establishment of an advisory Review Board for 
each province or temtory in 1968. The purpose of the Board was to advise the 
Lieutenant-Govemor on the case of each person detained at the pleasure of the 
Lieutenant-Govemor and to make recommendations about the disposition of the person 
'"~upra  note 169. 
b 
'"Lussa. supra note 164, Thwaites. supra note 168 and O 'Connor, supro note 
166. 
'"See R.S.C. 1906, c. 146, S. 966- 970; R.S.C. 1927, c. 36, S. 966-970; R.S.C. 
1953-54, c.5 1, s.523-527; R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 s.542-547; and R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. S. 
614-619. 
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being reviewed. '" If a Review Board was established, it had to consist of at least two 
psychiatrists and at least one lawyer and had to conduct a review of each case every six 
months and report to the Lieutenant-Govemor. In 1974, this provision was amended to 
require the designation of a chairman and to change the fiequency of the review of each 
case to every 12 months afier the initial six month review. "' In the case of a person 
found not guiIty on account of insanity, the Board had to give an opinion as to "whether 
that person has recovered and, if so. whether in its opinion it is in the interest of the 
public and of that person for the Lieutenant-Govemor to order that he be discharged 
absolutely or subject to such conditions as the Lieutenant-Governor may prescribe.''Ii6 
In sumrnary, prior to the adoption of the current mental disorder provisions of the 
Criminal Code, an accused person found not guilty on account of insanity was ordered 
into strict custody in the place and in the manner ordered by the court until the pleasure of 
the Lieutenant-Governor was known. The Lieutenant-Governor had the power to order 
the detention in custody of the accused person. Where the Lieutenant-Governor was of 
the opinion that it was in the best interest of the accused person and not contrary to the 
interest of the public, the Lieutenant-Governor could discharge from custody the accused 
person, either absolutely or conditionally. These provisions were silent on the place and 
manner of detention. The Lieutenant-Govemor did not have to accept the 
recommendations of the Review Board, if one was established, and did not have to give 
-- - 
""S.C. 1968-69, C. 38,  s.48. 
"'S.C. 1974-75-76, c.93, s.71. 
' 7 6 R . S . ~ .  1970, C. C-34, para. 547(3)(d). 
reasons for accepting or refushg the recomrnendations. 
However, accused persons brought a constitutional challenge against the insanity 
provisions, l n  one under the Canadian Bill of Rights and the other under subsection 1 5(1) 
of the Charter. In both cases, as discussed later, the challenge was not successful because 
the Courts of Appeal determined that the legislative intent of the insanity provisions was 
to protect the public fiom dangerous persons and to foster the treatrnent of the accused 
person. Weatherston J. A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. S a e l l  stated 
Society has a legitimate social interest in persons who have comrnitted 
some serious social h m ,  but who have been found not to be criminally 
responsible on account of mental disorder: it is justified in subjecting those 
persons to further diagnosis and assessment, in exercising appropriate 
control over them, if necessary, and in providing them with suitable 
medical treatment. There is an underlying assumption that they have. in 
fact comrnitted some act which would have k e n  a criminal act had they 
not been insane when the act was committed. It may well be that in 
individual cases that underlying assumption is not valid, but that does not 
mean that the legislative scheme, in itself, offends the right of equality 
before the law or authorizes or effects arbitrary detention or 
impnsonment. 17'
In addition. a few accused persons attempted to obtain procedural safeguards by 
means of judicial review of the decisions of the advisory boards given the absence of any 
safeguards in insanity  provision^.^'^ Very lirnited safeguards were obtained as discussed 
?Sec R. v. SaxeZZ (1980) 59 C.C.C. (2d) 176 (Ont. C.A.) and Re Rebic and the 
Qrreen (1986) 28 C.C.C. (3d) 154 (B.C. C.A.) which are discussed in next section. 
179See Re Lingley and Hickman 119721 F.C. 171 (T.D.), Re Abel and 
Penetanguishine Mental Healrh Centre ( 1  980) 1 19 D.L.R. (3d) 10 1 (C.A. Ont.), Re 
Jollimore and the Queen (1 986) 27 C.C.C. (3d) 166 W.S. S.C.), and Grad) v. The 
Artorney General of Ontario ( 1  988) 34 C.R. 289 (Ont. C.A.). 
in the next section. 
b) The case Iaw pertaining to insanity provisions prior to 1991 
Prior to R. v. Swain, "O no constitutionai challenges of the insanity provisions 
were heard by the Supreme Court of Canada. However. a few constitutional challenges to 
the insanity provisions were decided at the appeal level. One was R. v. Saxell. "' The 
appellant argued that the disposition section of the insanity provisions contravened 
paragraphs l(b) (equality before the Law), 1 (a) (due process), 2(a) (protection against 
arbitrary detention and imprisonment), and 2(b) (cruel and unusual punishment) of the 
Canadian Bill of Righrs. In this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the insanity 
provisions did not offend the Canadian Bill of Righrs for several reasons. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal detennined that the equality rights of an accused person were not 
infringed because Parliament could legislate to affect one class of persons differently if it 
did so for a valid federal objective. It reasoned that ParIiament had a valid objective in 
adopting sections 542,545 and 547 because 
[Tlhese provisions of the Code are not designed to punish the accused; 
they are for the protection of the public and the treatrnent of the accused. 
Manifestly , the public is best protected by the cure of the accused. Indeed 
the original statute fiom which ss. 542, 545 were derived recited that 'it 
may be dangerous to permit persons so acquitted to go at large...': the 
Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800 (U K) C. 94. 18' 
It emphasized that the underlying assumption of the insanity provisions was that accused 
180~wain, supra note 17. This case will be discussed later in this chapter. 
I8'R v. SmeR supra note 177. 
'*%id at 1 86. 
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persons remain a danger to the public, but even if this assumption was not tme for sorne 
accused persons, the legislative scheme remains valid, the detention was not arbitrary and 
it was not cruel and unusual punishment. It added that there was no evidence before the 
Court that accused persons continue to be detained d e r  they no longer pose a danger to 
socisty. The Court held that the lack of a hearing before an accused person is detained in 
custody did not vioiate the guarantee of due process of Iaw. 
This case demonstrates that the Canadian Bill of Rights provided no protection to 
accused persons since Parliament could discriminate between classes of persons as long 
as it was for a valid federal objective. The Court accepted with equanimity that the 
detention in strict custody without a hearing to determine whether an accused person \vas 
a threat tu the safety of the public was not arbitrary. The Court did not even refer to the 
lack of criteria for detention. However, the requirement in the insanity provisions that an 
accused person be automatically detained in strict custody without a hearing into the 
accused person's present mental condition and the lack of standards or criteria for 
detention were the grounds on which the insanity provisions were struck down a number 
of years later, under the Charter in R v. Swain. la3 
In another pre- Swain case, Re Rebic and the Queen. '" the appellant argued that 
the equality rights of accused persons under subsection 15(1) of the Charter were 
infinged by the insanity provisions because under these provisions accused persons were 
treated differently than other persons acquitted of an offence. The Court of Appeal of 
- - 
'83Supra note 1 7. 
'"Re Rebic. supro note 177. 
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British Columbia held that the insanity provisions did not infringe the equality rights of 
accused persons. The discussion of subsection 1 5( 1 ) was very limited in the reasons for 
judgment of two of the appeal judges. Their decision is based on a narrow point that the 
appellant did not establish that an inequality based on mental condition exists between 
accused persons and other acquitted persons. They determined that the insanity 
provisions result in a distinction between accused persons and those found guilty. 
However, the reasons for judgement of Macfarlane I.A. had more of a discussion of 
subsection 15(1), who held that the distinction in treatment between accused persons 
found not guilty by reason of insanity and those found not guilty on the buis of a legal 
excuse such as automatism "was sufficiently unfair or unreasonable to cal1 for analysis 
and justification under S. 1 .""' He determined that the infnngement was justified under 
section 1 because the objective of the insanity provisions was "to protect society and the 
accused until the mental health of the latter has k e n  restored. The objective [was] to be 
achieved by treatment of the patient in hospital, rather than a prison en~ironrnent."~~~ 
The objective was sufficiently important to ovemde a constitutionally protected right. He 
added that the object was rational, relevant and necessary and that there was 
proportionality between the effects of the disposition section and the objective of the 
insanity provisions because 
Hospitalization, and a periodic review of the patient's condition ensures 
the requisite protection, treatment; and release at a proper time under 
appropriate conditions ... Freedom is restricted only so long as the patient is 
in need of treatment, and society and the patient need to be protected. Ia7 
Macfarlane J. A. found that the availability of judicial review of decisions of the advisory 
Review Board and of habeas corpus provided safeguards for accused persons. 
In this case, no argument was made regarding the arbitrariness of automatic 
detention in custody under section 7 of the Charter. However. the justification offered by 
Macfarlane J.A. that the effects of the insanity provisions were proportional to the object 
seems thin. He found that a legislative scheme that offered no hearing on whether the 
accused person was a danger to the public at the time of the verdict and that had as the 
only criterion, recovery, for release from custody offered safeguards to accused persons. 
Furthemore, he did not link the detention to the protection of the public but rather the 
need for treatment. 
nie safeguards provided by judicial review of decisions of Advisory Review 
Boards were very limited. In 1972, the Federal Court, Trial Division, held that it had the 
jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief to a person detained under a Lieutenant-Govemor's 
Warrant (LGW) who had been refûsedadis~harge.'~' Funhermore, in 1981, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal mled that the Advisory Review Board in Ontario had a judicially 
enforceable duty to act fairly in its decision-making, and in particular, the Chairman of 
the Review Board must disclose to the subject of the hearing information placed before 
' ''ibid. 
I8'Re Lingley and Hickman [1972] F.C. 1 7 1 (T.D.). 
the Board.'" In 1986, in Re Jollimore and the Queen, the court found that while the 
Lieutenant-Govemor is not bound by the recommendations of the Advisory Review 
Board, she or he is under a duty to act fairly by considering the Board's 
recommendations. Otherwise. the Lieutenant-Govemor would be preempting the 
function of the Board. In 1988, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Lieutenant- 
Governor could rely on the recomrnendations of a Review Board only to the extent that 
they resulted fiom a fair hearing. The Lieutenant-Govemor could not impose a more 
onerous restriction than the one proposed by the Board without a new hearing before the 
Lieutenant-Govemor. 19' 
Moreover, only the case of Lingley v. New Brunswick Board of Review19' dealt 
with criteria to be used by an Advisory Review Board in determining the meaning of 
"recovered" in the disposition section of the insanity provisions. The Federal Court. Trial 
Division, stated 
1 am satisfied fiom a reading of s.547(5)(d) that , in addressing itself to the 
question of whether an accused has recovered, the Board is entitled to 
interpret "recovery" as full recovery and to find if an accused can no 
longer be said to be iegally insane as defined in S. 16, he is, nevertheless, 
'hot recovered" in a case like this where there is strong evidence of 
psychopathie disorders which render the accused "dangerous" to members 
ls9 Re Abel and Penetanguishine .entai Heulth Centre (1 980) 1 1 9 D.L.R. (3d) 
IO1 (C.A. Ont.). 
'90(1986) 27 C.C.C. (3d) 166 (N.S. S.C.). 
'9'Grudy v. The Attorney General of Ontario (1 988) 34 C.R. 289 (Ont. C.A.). 
19'(1973) 13 C.C.C. (2d) 303 ( F.C.T.D.). 
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of the public were he to be released.lg3 
These decisions did not result in specific safeguards for accused penons. At most, the 
Advisory Review Boards had a duty to act fairly and the Lieutenant-Governor had to 4 
consider the recommendations. The Lieutenant-Govemor did not have to provide reasons 
for her or his decision. There was no right of appeal. There was no rights to counsel for 
accused persons, no right to be present at the hearing, or to present or cross-examine 
witnesses. More impottantly, the criterion of "recovered" for release was vague and was 
not clarified in the Lingely case.'" 
C )  Proposals for reform of insanity provisions and the influence of the criminal Iaw 
Over the years. a nurnber of reports advocating the reform of the insanity 
provisions have been presented to the fedcral governrnent. In 1969, the Report of rhe 
Canadian Cornmittee on ~orrections'~~ was the first to extensively review the situation of 
persons with mental disabiiities in conflict with the criminal law and highlighted the 
injustice resulting fiom the automatic and indeterminate detention authorized by the 
insanity provisions; and the lack of procedural safeguards for the rights of persons 
detained under these provisions. In addition, the Report noted the link between neatrnent 
and release under the insanity provisions advocating cornmunity treatment as opposed to 
detention in a psychiatric hospital. Furthemore, the Report recommended the 
195 R. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, (Ouimet 
Committee) (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1 969). The highlights of this report will be 
discussed later in this section. 
establishment of review boards to conduct hearings into the detention of accused persons 
and that procedural safeguards be inserted. ïhe  next report which focused on the 
treatrnent of persons with mental disabilities in the criminal justice system was the 
"Report to Parliament on Mental Disorder in the Criminal Process authored by the 
Law Refoxm Commission of Canada. The Report reiterated the need for refonn of the 
insanity provisions to ensure that detention was not indeterminate and used only if the 
least restrictive alternative. It d s o  called for procedural fairness in the review h e a ~ g s  
and protection of the liberty of accused persons. Subsequently, in 1982. the federal 
Department of Justice established the Mental Disorder Project to review the insanity 
provisions and make recommendations for re form. The Mental Disorder Project 
Criminal Law Review: Final ~ e ~ o r t ' ~ '  also emphasized the need for mandatory 
establishment of review boards and annual hearings including procedural safeguards and 
dispositions for accused persons.'98 In addition, the Report noted the criticisms leveled at 
the indeterminate nature of the detention under the insanity provisions and recommended 
a limit to the detent i~n. '~~ 
Prior to discussing the above-rnentioned reports in detail, two other reports. 
though not directly aimed at the situation of persons with disabilities in the criminal 
I9'Supra note 44. 
I9'G. Sharpe, Mental Disorder ~rolect  Criminal Lmv Review: Final Report 
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1985). The highlights of this report will be discussed 
later in this section. 
justice system, appear to have had an influence on the reform of the insanity provisions. 
One was The Report of the Royal Comission on the L a w  of Insanity as a De/ence in 
Criminal Case$* in 1956. The Report was the first to make suggestions regarding the 
release of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). Though it stated that 
the issue is outside its terms of reference, the Commission was of the opinion that the 
detention of these persons was a matter of provincial jurisdiction since persons found 
NGRI were not sentenced but directed to be detained "in custody pending the pleasure of 
the provincial goven~nent.'"~' However, the Commission received submissions that the 
criminal law should provide a procedure for the release of persons found NGRi who 
appeared to no longer sufTer fiom a mental disease. The Commission expressed the 
opinion that the trial judge should not be given the jurisdiction to hear evidence on the 
mental condition of the person found NGRI to determine if that person should be released 
or comrnitted to hospital. The Commission stated 
[WJe do not think that trial judges should be called upon, nor do we think 
that by their training they are fitted, to decide how persons acquitted on 
account of insanity are likely to conduct themselves in the future, nor do 
we think a court is the proper forum in which to determine such a rnatter. 
We think it is entirely a medical problem and not a question of law or fact. 
It is a matter for ver-  specialized clinical examination and opinion."' 
The Commission suggested that provincial authorities "consider some regular review of 
al1 cases where persons have been committed d e r  the verdict of the jury and, if complete 
'"Royal Commission on the Law of lnronity as a Defince in Criminal Cases 
(Ottawa: Govenunent of Canada, 1956). 
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rec overy can be estab 1 ished with assurance, provision should be made for their release 
It  added that the reviews should be at least once a year and be conducted by review 
boards and cited the example of the province of Saskatchewan which in 1946 set up a 
review cornmittee. 
The other report, the Report of a Cornmittee Appointed to lnquire into the 
Principies and Procedures Followed in the Remission Service of the Department of 
Jusrice of ~anadd''  ( the Fatew Report) may have influenced proposais for changes to 
the insanity provisions. The Report noted the shifi in criminal law fiom retributive 
justice to rehabilitative justice. Established to inquire into the system of parole. the 
Fauteux Report noted that 
" It is perhaps trite, [but] nevertheless true, to Say that in the modem 
philosophy of corrections the old cliche 'the punishrnent must fit the 
crime' has been replaced by 'the punishment must fit the ~ffender'." '~~ 
nie concem was that "no useful purpose is served by the imposition of unnecessarily 
harsh sanctions which, in the circumstances may well embitter the convicted person and 
contri bute advenely to the quality of his subsequent behavio~r." '~ The Repon stated that 
the aim of punishment was to protect the public through the reform of the offender and 
the deterrent effect on others. Furthemore, it added that there is "no place for 
'%. Fauteux, Report of a Commntee Appointed to lnquire into the Principles 
and Procedures Followed in the Remission Service of the Department of Justice of 
Canada, (Fauteux Report) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1 956). 
punishrnent which is based on nothing more than retrib~tion."'~' It expressed the opinion 
that reformation of the offender "involves training, treatment and re-ed~cation."'~~ It 
added 
Increasingly, however, society appears to recognize that if it is to be 
protected to the greatest possible extent , an increasing number of 
offenders must receive such treatment in the institution as will prornote 
their reformation and rehabilitation . Such a process assists the offender to 
resume a normal, self-directed, law-abiding life in a free s o ~ i e t y . ' ~  
Of note was the Cornmittee's opinion that "[i]n a modem correctional systern 'the first 
principle is to keep as many offenders as possible out of 
Based on the Fauteux Report?' and the Ouimet Cornmittee Report,"' 1 contend 
that the shift towards rehabilitation of an offender in the community as much as possible 
may have influenced the view that indeteminate detention of persons under the 
Lieutenant-Govemor's Warrant was unjust. Furthemore, the goals of rehabilitative 
justice. with its emphasis on social rehabilitation such as probation, suspended sentences. 
education and treatrnent, are more humane and foster the re-integration of the ofinder  
into society."' These sarne goals, 1 suggest, are reflected in the mental disorder 
"'Supra note 195. 
"lThe principles of rehabilitative justice were reiterated and adopted by the 
Ouimet Cornmitte in 1969. In addition, it emphasized the importance of including the 
provisions in section 672.54 of the Code, in that the court or Review Board must consider 
the re-integration and other needs of an accused penon in making a disposition. 
In 1969. the Reporr of the Canadian Committee on Corrections ( Ouimet 
Committee)"' highlighted the problems facing persons with mental disabilities under the 
criminal law."' The Cornmittee remarked that 
Detention under 'Executive Pleasure' is a rnost drastic legai measure. The 
duration of the detention is absolutely indeterminate. There is grave doubt 
whether, even by extraordinary legal remedy , the discretion of the 
lieutenant-govemor cm be reviewed by the courtsx6 
offender as a member of society and designing correctionai measures to achieve the social 
rehabilitation of the individual. See R. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committe on 
Corrections (Ouimet Cornmitte), ibid at 1 1 - 1 6. 
"'R. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections. ibid 
'I5On the issue of fitness to stand trial, the Ouimet Cornmittee commented that the 
"concept of fitness is ofien confused with that of 'certification' to a mental hospital." It  
noted that the Canadian practice addressed the issue of fitness as soon as fitness was in 
doubt; at times, before the prosecution has been called on to test its case against the 
accused. It emphasized that a number of persons unfit to stand trial would not be 
detained in a mental hospital if a criminal charge was not pending against them. and 
highlighted the plight of a person who has a certain degree of mental retardation [term 
used in the report] and who may always be unfit to stand trial and therefore always 
detained. The Report stated that "it is conceivable under the law for an innocent person 
who does not require hospitalization to be detained for the rest of his life." The 
Cornmittee recomrnended changes to the Criminal Code fitness provision to allow the 
postponement o f  the issue of fitness until the Crown makes a case against the accused 
person. It added that fitness should be dealt with at the preliminary inquiry stage because 
" the ordinary course of the criminal law could require severely disturbed persons to 
languish in pnson awaiting assizes" and this is '"t us, clearly unacceptable." It  M e r  
recomrnended that the assignment of cowtsel be guaranteed by law when fitness is at 
issue. These recommendations are of note because of the Cornmittee's concerns 
regarding the liberty rights of accused persons with mental disabilities and they were 
incorporated to a large extent in the present mental disorder provisions regarding fitness 
to stand trial. See ibid at 226 to 229. 
The Cornmittee estimated that about 1000 persons were detained but noted that statistics 
were not kept. 
The Committee was also concerned about the conditions of detention of persons 
held under an order of the Lieutenant-Governor. It stated that these conditions are "in 
many jurisdictions, upsetting.""' ïhe  Cornmittee added that 
Observers report that the circumstances of detention, treatment and 
programme offered to such persons vary fiom province to province. 
While we are told that some of these conditions are remarkably good in 
particular provinces, the situation- in others is no less than shocking and 
appalling in this day and age.'" 
The Comrnittee called for minimum standards respecting the conditions of detention of 
these persons to be established, but did not provide any details regarding such standards. 
The Committee recommended an amendment to the Criminal Code to allow for 
flexibility of disposition based on the merits of each case. It argued that detention in a 
maximum secure setting was not warranted in al1 cases- in fact a discharge from custody 
might be more appropriate in some cases. It added that 
The reinforcement of comrnunity psychiatric facilities is making it more 
and more possible for a greater number of individuals to be treated and 
cared for in the c~mmunity."~ 
The Committee recommended the mandatory establishment of review boards rather than 
permissive legislation because "[wlhat is required is a guarantee that every province have 
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a review mechani~rn.""~ However, the Cornmittee did not recommend that review boards 
become decision making bodies. Instead, it left the decision regarding the release of a 
person from custody to the Lieutenant-Govemor of the province. The Committee noted 
that. not many years prior to their Report, discharge fiom custody of a person detained 
under an order of the Lieutenant-Governor was a rare occurrence. but by the time of the 
Report. persons were k i n g  discharged or returned for triai throughout the country. 
However? it fowd that "properly constituted review boards with appropriate safeguards 
into their procedural functions"~' were needed to provide greater checks and balances, 
and that automatic, yearly reviews of each person under an order of the Lieutenant- 
Governor were necessary because of the unique nature of the detention. The Committee 
suggested that the review board be multi-disciplinas, in composition, to include 
psychiatrie. legal and lay members. Of note waç the suggestion that review procedures 
should take into account the civil rights of the detained persons, including right to 
counsel. These recomrnendations were for the most part ignored at that time. 
In 1976, the Law Reform Commission of Canada in its " Report to Parliament on 
Mental Disorder in the Criminal Process ""' issued a scathing indictrnent of the LG W 
system and emphasized the need for reform. The Commission stated 
Our study of the mentally il1 in the criminal process reveaied that many 
problems stem fiorn an unjustifiable fear of mentally imbalanced 
delinquents and tiom the unjustified expectation that psychiatric and . 
- -  - 
"Olbid at 233. 
'"lbid at 232. 
"' Supra note 44. 
criminal intervention can deal effectively with such individuals. These 
attitudes are largely responsible for the needlessly long terms of detention 
commonty imposed on mentally il1 offenders and the lack of development 
and the infiequency of recourse to more efficient, less restrictive no&xmal 
measures? 
Furthemore, the Commission expressed the opinion that the law reflected policies based 
on 'myth and misunderstanding as to the character and nature of the problems created by 
mentally il1 offendm in the criminal process.""" It concluded that there was a *' lack of 
positive correlation between mental disorder and crirninality or mental disorder and 
violent behaviour"'" and noted that the limitations of psychiatric assessment, treatment 
and prediction of dangerousness were well documented. On that basis, the Commission 
recomrnended that policies to deal with mentaily disordered individuals be guided by the 
following principles : 
The criminal process should be invoked when it is the best available 
alternative; ... [mlentally disordered persons are entitled to the sarne 
procedural fairness and should benefit fiom the same protections of 
personal liberty as any other person; ... [i]n those instances where some 
form of detention is deemed necessary, it must be subject to  review and in 
no circumstances should it be indetenninate."6 
In the Commission's opinion, a person found NGRI was "in fact worse off than if he had 
been convicted. ï h e  judge is required to order him 'held' in a place of 'safe custody'. 
"'Ibid at 5 & 6. 
'"lbid at 6. 
'" lb id. 
2'61bid. 
'until the pleasure of the Lieutenant-Govemor is known.""' The Commission 
recommended that the verdict of NGRI be treated as a me acquitta1 and the person be 
subject to a post-acquitta1 hearing to determine whether the person should be civilly 
detained on the basis of psychiatric dangerousness. The Commission added that this 
recornmendation "brings into practical effect what has always been the insanity defence's 
theoretical intent - to treat the 'insane' individual as a psychiatric rather than a criminal 
pro blem.""" 
On the issue of indetenninancy, the Commission noted that the objective of a 
criminal sentence is to punish and the punishment is for a pre-determined length. 
However, the objective of the LGW system was treatment. ï h e  Commission added that 
Treatment is [viewed as] intrinsically 'good', [and] therefore may go on 
forever and in far too many cases, has. For the individuai h m  the inside 
looking out, one form of detention may look very much like the ~ the r . "~  
Because of the non-reviewability of the detention, the lack of criteria for continued 
detention, and the fact that decisions to terminate the warrant were made by the provincial 
Attorney General or Cabinet who might refuse for political r e a ~ o n s , ~ ~  the Commission 
recommended the abolition of the LGW system. The recommendations of the 
Commission were not adopted. 
"'ibid. This recommendation was'reflected in subsection 3(6) of the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, Report on RecodtBing Criminal Law, v. 1 (Ottawa: Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, 1986) at 30. 
'30 Ib id. 
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Furthermore, in this report, the Law Reform Commission of Canada reiterated the 
aims of criminal sanctions 
ln our view, cnminal sanctions should m e r  underline the dignity and 
well-king of the individual, both offender and victim. They should be 
humane, proportional tu the offence and treat like cases in a like rna~er . '~ '  
Again, these aims are in keeping with a rehabilitative justice philosophy. In addition. the 
Commission stated that the scope of the cnminal Law should be limited as narrowly as 
possible and that only conduct that "represents a serious threat to society" be defined as 
criminal .'j2 
Furthermore, different reports'33 have emphasized the importance of the liberty of 
the accused person, fairness in the criminal process and the pnnciple of least restraint 
should underlie the criminal process, "@Jecause the criminal Law is society's most 
destructive and intrusive form of intervention ...[ i]t is society's last resort to be used only 
when milder methods have failed.""' In 1982, the Government of Canada stated that the 
purpose of the criminal law should be achieved having regard to the Canadian Chorter of 
Righfs and Freedoms and "in a manner which interferes with individual rights and 
fieedoms only to the extent necessary for the attainment of its purpose.""* 
L3'Supra note 44 at 2. 
'))Sec Ouimet Cornmittee supra &te 1 95 at 1 2, Mental Disorder in the Criminal 
Law Process, supra note 44 at 2&3, and Govenunent of Canada, The Criminal Lmv in 
Canadian Society (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1 982) at 24. 
"'Supra note 44 at 2&3. 
1 contend that these principles ultimately came to be reflected in the mental 
disorder provisions, which authorizes detention only if an accused person is a significant 
threat to the safety of the public. Even where detention is authorized under the 
provisions, a court or a Review Board must make the least onerous and Ieast restrictive 
disposition. Furthemore, the mental disorder provisions contain review and hearing 
provisions which ensure procedural faimess to accused persons. 
In 1982, the federal Department of Justice established the Mental Disorder Project 
to review the insanity provisions of the Criminal Code and recornmend changes. In 
September of 1985. this Project issued a final report with rec~mrnendations.~~ This 
Report stated that it was guided by the philosophy set out in The Criminal Law in 
Canadian ~ociety,"' a federal report issued by the federal government goveming the 
review of the criminal law. In particular, it cited the principle of using the l e s t  restrictive 
and least intrusive form of intervention required in the circurnstances and stated that 
procedural safeguards were needed to ensure the protection of individual nghts against 
the unwarranted intrusion of the state?' On the issue of disposition and continuing 
review of persons found NGRi, the Project recornmended that the crimuid law provide a 
wide range of dispo~itions?~ It recommended that the role of the Lieutenant-Govemor 
be abolished and that the court making the finding of NGRI be given the discretion to 
236Supra note 197. 
237Supra note 233. 
'3SSupra note 1 97 at 33. 
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make the least restrictive and least intrusive disposition, taking into account the needs of 
the individual and the protection of s~ciety.~* The Project recomrnended the 
establishment of a rnandatory, multi-disciplinary Review Board. It added that, if the court 
did not make a disposition, then the Review Board would do so."' In any case, the 
Review Board would hold a hearing within 90 days after the court made a disposition 
order."' The recommended criterion for discharge was that the person no longer suffer 
fiom a mental disorder "likely to result in a substantiai risk to the safety of ~ociety''.'~~ 
The Project provided a long list of procedural safeguards such as an annual right of 
review; a right to counsel; the right of the person king  reviewed to participate in the 
hearing and present evidence and question witnesses; a right of appeal; and a requirernent 
that the Review Board give written reasons? The Project highlighted the criticisms 
leveled at the LGW system regarding the indeterminate nature of the detention and 
recornmended that an outer Iimit be placed on the detention under the criminal law, based 
on the offence ~omrnitted.~~' The Project aiso stated that punishment is not the aim of the 
detention of those persons found NGRI? A draft bill incorporating most of the 
recommended amenciments to the Criminal Code was tabled in Parliament in June 23, 
1986, for purposes of consultation, but was never introduced."' However. mon of the 
recommendations were reflected in Bill C-30, An Act fo  amend the Criminal Code 
(mental disorder) and to amend the Narional Defince Act and the Young Ofienders Act in 
consequence thereofwhich was enacted in 199 1. 
Despite the above-mentioned reports, statements of principles and the tabling of 
a cirai? bill in the House of Comrnons, substantive changes to the insanity provisions of 
the Code did not occur until the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. S ~ a i d ' ~  struck d o m  
the disposition section of the insanity provisions. The Court held that section 542 (2) of 
the Code.'50 which required the automatic detention of a person found not guilty by 
reason of insanity, violated sections 7 and 9 of the Charte? and was not saved by 
section 1 of the Charter. Basically, the Court deterrnined that automatic detention in 
custody following the verdict of unfit to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity was 
'47E.A. Tollefson & B. Starkman, Mental Disorder in Crirninal Proceedings 
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1993) at 4-6. One of the major reasons that the bill did not 
proceed was that the provinces were opposed to the changes, in particular, because of the 
costs resulting fiom the implementation of the proposed changes. 
'i8Swain, supra note 1 7 .  
"OR. S .  C .  1970, c. C-34. At the tirne the decision was rendered subsection 542(2) 
had been changed to subsection 614(2) of the Code following the 1985 revision of federal 
statutes. 
"'Supra note 14. 
arbitmy because the provision did not provide any criteria for detention. Furthemore, 
the lack of a hearing to determine whether an accused person was dangerous to the public 
at the time of the fhding deprived an accused person of her or his liberty in a manner that 
was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The Court added that if 
an accused person was not dangerous to the safety of the public at the time of the verdict. 
she or he should not be detained in custody. The Court stated 
In the case at bar, the lack of a hearing in S. 542(2) deprives the 
appellant of his right to liberty in a way that is not in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice, thereby infringing his 
rights under s.7 of the Charter. His right under section 9 of the 
Charter not to be detained arbitrarily is restricted because there are 
no criteria for the exercise of  the trial judge's power to detain. 
... 
However, the minimal impairment component of the Oakes test 
requires that insanity acquittees be detained no longer than 
necessary to determine whether they are currently dangerous due to 
their insanity."* 
The Supreme Court of Canada permitted a six month delay before striking down the 
impugned subsection 542(2) of the Code. 
The Court did however uphold the jurisdiction of the federal government to enact 
the insanity provisions of the Criminal Code on the grounds that these provisions were a 
valid exercise of the criminal law power contained in subsection 9 l(27) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.).'-'3 The Court held that the object of the insanity provisions 
'"Swain, supra note 1 7 at 10 14 and 10 1 8. The Court, aiso, struck down the 
common law rule allowing the Crown to raise the issue of an accused person's insanity 
when the accused person did not raise it as a defence because it violated the principles of 
fundamental justice guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter. 
L53Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.),  1867, c.3. 
was "[tlhe protection of society [which] is clearly one of the aims of the crirninal ~aw".'~' 
It rejected the argument that the object of the provisions was treatment of the mentally ill. 
The Criminai Code provisions do not speak directly of the administration 
of medical treatment. They simply stipulate the procedures for a criminal 
cornminal, procedwes designed to protect society, not to treat the 
individual. Parliament has developed a scheme by which to protect 
society through the neutralization of potentiaily dangerous persons who 
have brought themselves within the crimind sphere by committing acts 
proscribed by the criminal law. ... However. the impugned provisions 
themselves deal primarily with the removal of these people fiom society 
and only relate to treatment in a secondary, ancillary way. 
The Court emphasized that treatment was only the means by which the object of the 
insanity provisions, the protection of the public, would be achieved. 
e) Adoption of mental disorder provisions 
In response to the Swain deci~ion , '~~ the federal government introduced Bi11 C-30. 
An Act to Arnend the Criminal Code(Menta1 Disorder) and to Arnend the !Vational 
Defence Act and the Young Offenders Act in Consequence Thereof, on September 16. 
199 1. The explanatory notes to this Bill stated that 
The object of these amendments is to modernize, clarify and streamline the 
law and procedure with respect to the mentally disordered accused bearing 
in mind the rights of the accused under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedorns and the need to protect ~ociety."~ 
'5'~wain, supra note 1 7 at 1 O0 1. 
157Explanatory Notes to Bill C-30, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code(Menta1 
Disorderj and to Amend the National Defence Act and the Young Oflenders Act in 
Consequence Thereof, at la. 
The Minister of Justice, in her introduction of this Bill' reiterated the problems with the 
LGW system, such as indeterminate detention, lack of  compulsory reviews by decision- 
making, independent Review Boards. and the total discretion given to the Lieutenant- 
Governor regarding release of these persons. She stated that "[tlhe situation in which 
these people find themselves is worse in a nurnber of ways than if they had k e n  
convicted of the offence charged."'J' She noted that the bill contained procedural 
requirements to ensure a fair hearing to the accused and that 
The bill creates a framework of principles which are to be applied when 
deciding what disposition should be made. They are the protection of the 
public fiom dangerous persons, the reintegration of the accused into 
society and other needs of the accused. Another guiding principie is that 
the disposition imposed initiaily and subsequently is to be the least 
intrusive or onerous option having regard to the other principles already 
n~ ted . "~  
A number of members of Parliament expressed concems that, though the intent of the bill 
was to release as many persons as possible to community based prograrns and services 
and to make "a fair degree of treatment and faciliries available"? it would not be 
realized if the government did not provide the necessary fimding to implement the Bill. 
Their view was that additional provincial mental health services- in particular, 
community-based ones- were required. Without shelter and suppon services, persons 
with mental disabilities would continue to fa11 into the criminal justice system. These 
concerns were reiterated before the Legislative Cornmittee of the House of Commons on 
"8House of Commons Debates (4 October 1991) at 3295. 
'59House of Commons Debates (4 October 199 1 ) at 3297. 
'"House of Commons Debates (4 October 1991) at 3301 and 3330. 
Justice which studied the Bill. Memben of Parliament and witnesses expressed concerns 
regarding the closure of psychiatric beds, adequate funding of the mental health system. 
and the increased demand for mental heaith services for persons who would fa11 within 
the proposed mental disorder provisions. These concerns arose tiom the consequences of 
de-institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities and the shift fiom psychiatric 
hospitals to psychiatric units in general hospitais and to the community. The perception 
was that there did not exist adequate comrnunity mental health resources, as reflected in 
the following comments: 
Unfortunately, untii recently the planning of mental health services has not 
been a priority for most provincial governments, and resources do not 
meet the current needs. In general, in the pst-institutionalization period, 
reform has been resisted, and there has k e n  littie or no evidence of real 
progress."'6 ' 
These concems did not however result in any substantive changes to Bi11 C-30 which was 
enacted on December 13, 1 99 1 and brought into force on February 4, 1 992.16' 
D. Conclusion 
1 contend that there was a common goal, which animated the movements for 
Iunacy reform in the first half of the 19" century, to attempt to provide humane treatment 
and care to persons with mental disabilities since these persons were no longer viewed as 
beasts who had lost their reason but rather as persons lacking order and self restraint. The 
moral treatment was an attempt to restorethe order which was lacking in the life of the 
'61D. Wasylenki, P. Goering, E. MacNaughton, "Planning Menrul Health 
Services: II. Current Canadian Initiatives", (1992) 37 Can. J. Psychiatry 259 at 264. 
'"However, S. 672.64 to 672.66 of the Code have not k e n  proclaimed to date. 
person with mental disabilities and to teach self restraint to the person with mental 
disabilities which would lead to a cure of that penon. The lunatic asylums as envisaged 
Dy the proponents of the moral treatment were large establishments in a pastoral sening 
with good living conditions. As discussed, others have attributed the rise of the lunatic 
asyf um to the emergence of the capitafism and the societal need for techniques to control 
deviant behaviour. 
With the nse of the state tùnded lunatic asylum and its expansion due to the 
increase of institutionalization of persons with mental disability, the seeds of the 
conternporary mental health system were sewn. In addition. the insanity provisions were 
first enacted in England to provide for the disposition of persons with mental disabilities 
who committed crimes but were found not cnminally responsible by reason of mental 
disorder or the preventative detention of persons with mental disabilities who might 
commit crimes due to their mental disorder. The insanity provisions were adopted in the 
different provinces in Canada, as was the lunatic asylurn. 
However, the lunatic asylums in the latter half of the 19" century failed to provide 
humane treatment and care envisaged by the reformers, as shown from the accounts of 
overcrowding and poor living conditions in the mammoth asylums. More and more 
persons with mental disabilities were ïnstitutionalized. Although the asylums becarne 
medicaiized in that asylums had to have a medical doctor in attendance and were 
regularly inspected, very little care or treatrnent appears to have k e n  provided. The 
inrnates were sedated, kept on subsistence rations and made to work due to Iack of 
funding. in reality, these institutions were more like warehouses for persons with 
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disabilities. 
In the first half of the 20" century, asylums were renamed mental hospitals and 
attempts were made to train the attendants empioyed in these institutions to provide care 
to persons with mental disabilities. In addition, in the quest to discover a physical basis 
for mental illness, the psychiatrists in the mental hospitals practised somatic treatments 
and experimented on the inmates, a far cry fiom humane treatment. In addition, during 
this penod the insanity provisions of the Code remained unchanged. 
The exposure of  conditions in mental hospitals by the adherents of the anti- 
psychiatry movement and mental health consurners, in the latter half of the 201h cent-, 
led to humanitarian concems about the treatrnent of persons with mental disabilities and 
their isolation from the rest of society. In addition, the discovery of psychotropic 
medication and its use to control some of the symptoms of mental illness also made it 
possible to provide treatment in the community. 1 contend that these factors for the most 
part prompted the shifi of persons with mental disabilities from mental hospitals to the 
cornrnunity. As discussed, others have suggested that deinstitutionalization was 
motivated by other factors such as Scull who argued that it resulted fiom cost saving 
measures because of the growing fiscal cnsis of the state. Furthemore, I suggest that 
deinstitutionalization was also fbeled by a shifi towards a recognition of the nghts and 
liberties of persons with disabilities. In reality, however, the outcome of . 
deinstitutionalization may have been far different for d l  persons with mental disabilities 
than envisioned by those advocating the shifl of the delivery of mental health services 
fiom psychiatrie institutions to the community. 
8 1 
The latter haif of the 20'" cennvy also saw different commissions and cornmittees 
reviewing the insanity provisions and recommending extensive refonns to these 
provisions. The indeterminancy of the detention and its arbitrariness were highlighted in 
their respective recommendations. They cailed for the establishment of multi-disciplinary 
review boards to conduct muai hearings and the provision of procedural safeguards. Of 
utmost importance was the recognition that detention was a drastic mesure and should 
only be invoked if it was the only alternative to ensure the protection of the public. 
However, the repeal of the insanity provisions and the adoption of the present mental 
disorder provisions of the Code were oniy brought about by the Swain case.'63 
'6'Swain. supra note 1 7. 
Mandate of a Review Board Established under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code 
and the Impact of Mental Health Resources on the Board and Accused Persons 
Part XX. 1 of the Criminai Code, setting out the cument mental disorder 
provisions, continues the distinctive dimension of the criminal justice system previously 
established for dealing with persons accused of a criminal offence who are believed to 
suRer from a mental disorder afTecting a person's fitness to stand trial or the person's 
criminal responsibility. This thesis f o c w s  on those sections that govem the disposition 
of an accused person once the court which has jurisdiction over the accused person 
renders the verdict of unfit to stand trial or not crirninally responsible on account of 
mental disorder (NCRMD).'" 1 restrkt my analysis to accused persons found NCRMD 
because the issues raised by my hypothesis that the availability of mental health resources 
has an effect on the length of detention of accused persons are more pertinent to these 
pers on^.?^^ 1 discuss the Coucts of Appeal decisions'" that have interpreted the intent and 
'&These are sections 672.3 8 to 672.44 respecting the establishment and 
fûnctioning of the Review Board and sections 672.45 to 672.46 and 672.8 1 to 672.85 
governing disposition hearings. Furthemore, section 672.1 states that "verdict of not 
crirninally responsible on account of mental disorder" means a verdict that the accused 
committed the act or made the omission that forrned the basis of the offence with which 
the accused is charged but is not crirninally responsible on account of mental disorder." 
'65The reason for restricting my analysis to persons found NCRMD is that a court 
or Review Board cannot grant an absolute discharge to a person who is found unfit to 
stand trial because that person once fit returns to court to continue with the criminai 
proceedings. However, if the person continues to be unfit, every two years from the 
verdict, the court must hold an inquiry at to whether the prosecution can adduce sufficient 
evidence to put that person on trial, under section 672.33. Where the court is satisfied 
that prosecution cannot adduce such evidence the person is acquitted of the criminal 
charge. Therefore, different mechanisms exists for persons found unfit to stand trial to be 
wording of section 672.54 of the Code, the mandate and powers of a Review Board. and 
legislative scheme of the mental disorder provisions. 1 analyze the effect that the various 
Courts of Appeal have had on the fùnctioning of the Review Boards and the making of 
dispositions. 
Then, I discuss the impact that the availability of sufficient mental health 
resources has on the fùnctioning of the mental disorder provisions. As noted in chapter 1. 
the mental disorder provisions are premised on the assumption that these persons are not 
to be punished but are to be treated. In discussing the previous  provision^.^^' (referred to 
as the insanity provisions), the Supreme Court of Canada States in R. v. Sivain'68 
But these provisions of the Code are not designed to punish the accused; 
they are for the protection of the public and the treatrnent of the accused. 
Manifestly, the public is best protected by the cure of the accused .... 
For humanitarian reasons, Parliament has detemined that these 
individuals will be transferred into the hands of the provincial authorities 
for treatment.. . . Rather than prescribing "treatment". the provisions 
provide for an alternative to incarceration. based on a humanitarian 
discharged kom the jurisdiction of the Review Board. Furthemore, 1 am not dealing 
tvith dual status offenders who are persons subject to both a sentence of imprisonment 
and a custodial disposition under paragraph 672.54(c) for different offences. This is a 
small category of accused persons found NCRMD. ï h e  issues discussed in this thesis 
Vary in their applicability to these persons because of their particular situation. 
266To date no Supreme Court of Canada decisions have k e n  rendered on the 
mental disorder provisions. However, the Court has heard the appeals in the cases of 
Winko and Lepage, supra note 17, on June 15 and 16,1998 and reserved its decision 
'67Sections 542-547 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C.3 which became 
sections 6 14-6 19 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46. 
'68Swain. supra note 1 7. 
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concern for persow acquitted by reason of in~anity. '~~ 
These statements are applicable to the current mental disorder provisions. As discussed 
in chapter 1. the underlying philosophy for the establishment of a mental disorder system 
wi th distinctive dispositionai alternatives has not changed. Speci fically , I focus my 
analysis on the impact of the Court of Appeal decisions respecting the availability of 
mental health resources. 
A. The Composition and Jurisdiction of a Review Board 
Section 672.38 of the Code States that each province shall establish or designate a 
Review Board consisting of at least five members to make or review dispositions of 
accused persons found NCRMD or unfit to stand trial. Section 672.39 of the Code 
specifies that a Review Board must include at least one psychiatrist and at least one other 
mernber with expertise in mental heaith and entitled to practice medicine or psychology. 
The chairperson of a Review Board m u t  be a judge, a retired judge, or a person who 
qualifies to be appointed as a judge, as required by section 672.4 of the Code. A quorum 
of a Review Board is constituted by a chairperson. a psychiatrist and any other member. 
according to section 672.41 of the Code. The chairperson is given the powers of a 
commissioner appointed under Part 1 of the federal Inquiries  AC^.^" under 672.43 of the 
Code. A Review Board has been recognized in various Courts of Appeal decisions"' as 
"'See Dmiakon, supra note 23, R. v. Peckhurn. (1994) 19 O.R. (3d) 716 (Ont. 
C.A.) and Winko and Lepage, supra note 17. 
having a specialized expertise in mental health and the mental disorder provisions. In 
Dovidion v. A. G. of British Columbia." the Court of Appeai of British Columbia 
descnbed a Review Board as follows: 
As its composition and powers indicate, a Board of review set up under 
Part XX. 1 of the Code is a specialized administrative tribunal, the skills of 
whose members provide institutional insight into the legal and medical 
probhms of mental health. It is given inquisitorial powers to summon 
witnesses and compel them to give evidence.'" 
B. Dispositions and Powers of a Review Board 
a) Disposition Hearing Provisions 
Once a court has rendered a verdict of NCRMD or unfit to stand trial, a court may 
hold a disposition hearing and make a di~~osi t ion"~ respecting a person whom it found 
NCRMD, under section 672.45 of the u ode."* If the court makes a disposition. other 
'"Supra note 23. 
'731bid at 277. The task of a Board is the same when making a disposition for a 
person who is to stand trial, other than that the Board cannot gant  an absolute 
discharge. However, in those cases, the Board must first deal with the issue of fitness 
because, if the person is fit, the person is retwned to court and the Board does not make a 
disposition. 
'"Section 672.1 of the Code states that a "disposition" means an order made by a 
court or Review Board under section 672.54 or an order made by a court under section 
672.58." 
'75Courts do not usually make dispositions because they are not generally satisfied 
that they " c m  readily do so" as dictated by subsection 672.45 (2) of the Code. In 
addition, section 672.47 states that a dispesition made by the court is in force until the 
date set out in the order but no later than 90 days after which it was issued. Therefore, a 
Review Board must still hold a disposition hearing and render a disposition for a person 
found NCRMD and in respect of whom a court made a disposition, udess the court 
granted an absolute discharge. Furthemore, since the courts have recognized the 
expertise of the Review Board in making disposition, as stated in R. v. Peckham, supra 
note 271 at 778, they may be reluctant to exercise their jurisdiction in these cases. These 
than an absolute discharge, it is in effect for a maximum penod of 90 days, as specified in 
subsections 672.47 (3) and 672.55 (2) of the Code , and accused persons are placed under 
the jurisdiction of a Review Board which must hold a hearing and make a new disposition 
within those 90 days, under subsection 672.47 (3) of the Code. Othenvise, a Review 
Board must hold disposition hearings within 45 days of the verdict and make a 
disposition, under section 672.47 of the Code. A Review Board must review annuaily the 
disposition of  each accused person, in accordance with section 672.8 1 of the Code, untii 
it grants an accused person found NCRMD an absolute discharge. 
A Review Board is required to give a notice of hearing to each of the parties to the 
hearing, in accordance with subsection 672.5 (5) of the Code. The parties are defined in 
section 672.1 of the Code as the accused person, the person in charge of a hospital where 
the accused person is detained or is to be detained under a disposition, the designated 
Attorney ~eneral.'" and any other interested person designated under subsection 672.5 
(4) of the Code. At each hearing, an accused person who is the subject of the hearing or 
any other party has the right to be represented by legal counsel, in accordance with 
subsection 672.5 (7) of the Code. The Review Board must appoint counsel for an accused 
person who is unrepresented and unfit to stand trial and may appoint counsel where it 
determines that it is in the interests of justice to do so, under subsection 672.5 (8) of the 
comments are based on conversations with the chairpersons of the Ontario Review Board 
and British Columbia Review Board who stated that courts render very few dispositions. 
'76Subsection 672.5 (3)  of the Code States that on application the court or Review 
Board shali designate as a party, the Attorney General of the province where the 
disposition is made or, in the case of a transfer fiom another province, the Attorney 
General of that province. 
Code. Each party at the hearing has the right to adduce evidence and make written or oral 
submissions, under subsection 672.5 (1 1) of the Code. The Review Board must forward 
to each party a copy of any written information or assessrnent report relevant to making a 
disposition under section 672.5 1 of the Code. 
In making a disposition, a Review Board, or the court under section 672.45 of the 
Code. must consider the factors set out in section 672.54 of the Code which States: 
672.54 Where a court or Review Board rnakes a disposition pursuant to 
subsection 672.45(2) or section 672.47, it shdl, taking into consideration 
the need to protect the public fiom dangerous persons. the mental 
condition of the accused person, the reintegration of the accused person 
into society and the other needs of the accused person, make one of the 
following disposition that is the least onerous and l e s t  restrictive to the 
accused person: 
(a) where the verdict of not cnminally responsible on account of mental 
disorder has been rendered in respect of the accused person and. in the 
opinion of the court or Review Board, the accused person is not a 
significant threat to the safety of the public, by order, direct the accused 
person be discharged absolutely; 
(b) by order, direct that the accused person be discharged subject to such 
conditions as the court or Review Board considers appropriate; or 
(c) by order, direct that the accused penon be detained in custody in a 
liospital, subject to such conditions as the court or Review Board considers 
appropriate. 
Section 672.54 of the Code is the key substantive provision respecting dispositions and 
the powers of a Review Board. It sets out the criteria on which a disposition must be 
based and the type of disposition orders that are possible under the mental disorder 
provisions.'" A Review Board, or a court, in the fim instance, must determine whether 
L77Dispositions made following an annual review are made pursuant to section 
672.54 as a result of the reference in section 672.83 to the Review Board making a 
disposition it considers to be appropriate in the circurnstances and of section 672.1 
defining a disposition as "an order made by a court or Review Board under section 672.54 
or an order made by a court under section 672.58." Section 672.58 does not apply to 
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an accused person poses a significant threat to the safety of the p~blic.'~' In making a 
decision, a Review Board or court must consider the opening words of section 672.54 of 
the Code. In fact, a Review Board is cailed upon to predict the dangerousness of the 
person under its jurisdiction based mainly on psychiatric evidence about the mental 
disorder, treatment, prognosis and past history. If a Review Board or court concludes that 
the person is not a significant threat, then it must gant  an absolute discharge. Otherwise. 
it must consider whether a conditional discharge or a custodial disposition is warranted. 
However, a Review Board or court in the first instance cannot order treatment as a 
condition of a disposition under subsection 672.55 (1) of the Code. In short, in a 
disposition, a Review Board or the court must balance the protection of the public and the 
interests of an accused person. 
Once a Review Board or court has made a decision to detain a person or release 
the person on conditions, it delegates the powers to camy out the disposition to the person 
in charge of the hospital where the person is detained or reports, in accordance with 
section 672.56 of the Code. The person in charge of the hospital then may delegate the 
day-to-day supervision and care to the treatment team within the hospital where the 
person is detained in c u ~ t o d ~ . ' ~ ~  The person is integrated into the mental health system. 
annual reviews because it deais with treatment orders to render unfit persons fit to stand 
trial. 
, 
'780rlowski v. A.G. British Columbia, (1992) 75 C.C.C. (3d) 138 (B. C. C.A.); 
Davidson v. A. G. British Columbia, supra note 23. 
'79This is generally the practice in British Columbia and Ontario as explained by 
the Chairpersons of the British Columbia and Ontario Review Boards. 
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but cannot be discharged from care without the approval of the Board. Under section 
672.56 of the Code, the person in charge of a hospital is granted the power to restrict the 
liberties that a person may exercise; however. if the restrictions are to last for more than 
seven days, a penon in charge of a hospital has to give notice to the Review Board which 
triggers a new hearing by the Review Board. 
C. Case Law on Disposition and Disposition Hearings 
Case law "O has considered a number of facets of section 672.54 of the Code 
including the circumstances in which an absolute discharge can be made; the "meaning of 
significant threat to the public"; the appropriate interpretation of the requirement that the 
least onerous and least restrictive disposition be made; and the nature of Review Board 
hearings. In this section, a number of Court of Appeal decisions which have had the most 
impact on clarifj-ing the criteria for making dispositions are exarnined. 
'80~rlowski,  supra note 278; Davidson supra note 23 ; R. v. Jones, ( 1  994) 87 
C.C.C. (3d) 350 (0nt.C.A.); R. v. PecWlam, supra note 271; Lujoie v. Québec (Procureur 
général) (1994) 61 Q.A.C. 50 (Qué. C.A.]; D.H. v. British Columbia (Attorney Generul) 
( 1 3 September 1 994) Vancouver CA0 1 845 1 (B. C.C.A.) [unreported]; British 
Colurnbia(Forensic Psychiatric institute) v. Johnson, (1995) 66 B.C. C.A.C. 34 (B. C. 
C.A.);  R. v. Pinet, supra note 35; McGillis, supra note 16; Winko, supra note 17; 
Chambers v. A.G. of British Columbia and the Director of the Forensic Psychiatric 
Institute (25 June, 1997) Vancouver CA022614 (B.C.C.A.) [wueported]; and Lepage, 
supra note 1 7. 
a) Meaning of Usignifïcant threat to safety of the public" and absolute discharges 
Orlowski v. British Columbia (~ttorne~-General)"' which was subsequently 
followed by other Courts of Appeal and applied by Review Boards"' was one of the first 
cases to interpret section 672.54 of the Code. This case laid out the rnanner in which a 
Review Board must make its decision. The Court of Appeal of British Columbia 
interpreted section 672.54 in the context of the legislative scheme of Part XX. 1 of the 
Code. 
In my judgment the Board must, in the first instance. consider the 
'preamble' factors, not just in deciding whether an accused person is a 
significant threat, but also in deciding what disposition it will make of 
eac h case. 
In addition, however, the Board must also struggle with other questions, 
and it is not possible to say that any of the factors are free-standing and 
independent of each other. The legislative objective is to decide what 
disposition should be made that is the least onerous and the least 
restrictive upon considering the 'preamble' factors and the language of 
~.672.54?~ 
In addition, the Court stipulated the circumstances under which a Review Board 
'8'Supra note 278. 
"'The Ontario Review Board and the British Columbia Review Board generally 
set out in their reasons whether the Board is of the opinion that an accused person is a 
significant threat to the safety of the public or not; or that it does not have the opinion that 
the accused person is not a significant threat. Generally, this opinion wilI be based on the 
nature of the "index" offence, past history- in particular of violence, insight into the 
mental disorder, prognosis, available treatments, whether an accused person is cornpliant 
with treatment, present mental condition, 'prospects of reintegration into the community 
and behaviour in the comrnunity. For a more detailed study see 1. Grant, "Canada 's New 
Mental Disorder Disposition Provisions: A Case Study of the British Columbia Criminal 
Code Review Board" (1997) 20 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 4 19. 
'8'Supra note 278 at 146. 
should gram an absolute discharge. It stated 
[I]n my view, the Board need not order an absolute discharge when it bas 
doubts as to whether the accused is a significant threat or not. The Board 
must afinnatively have an opinion that the accused is not a significant 
threat before S. 672.54(a) applies. It seems to me , with respect, that if the 
Board is concemed that an accused with an appropriate history is not a 
present significant threat and will not become one if he continues with 
prescribed medication, but the Board also has the opinion that he may be a 
significant threat if he does not take his medication, then the Board cannot 
be said to have an opinion that the accused is not a significant threat. The 
word 'threat', in my view, has a future co~o ta t i on . ' ~  
The Court M e r  added that a Review Board. out of faimess to the accused person. 
should expressly declare, in the reasons for the disposition, its conclusion as to whether 
the accused person is a significant threat to the safety of the public or declare that it 
cannot arrive at such a conclusi~n.'~~ 
In a subsequent decision, D.H v. British Columbia (A.G.).'~~ the Court of Appeal 
of British Columbia agreed with Orlowski that the phrase "significant threat" implies a 
consideration of hture events, although, "the evidence must take the Board beyond mere 
speculation."'" In this case, the Court found that 
[Tlhe evidence was overwhelming that nothing more could be done to 
ease the appellant back into society ; . .. he suffered fiom no major iltness; 
and , apart fiom the index offence [the offence that brought him under the 




'MD.H.. supra note 280. 
'87Cited in Winko, supra note 17 at 1 1. 
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oîhers ."* 
A subsequent Ontario Court of Appeal decision. R . v. ~eckharn'"~ elaborated on 
the issue of the granting of an absolute discharge under section 672.54 of the Code. 
Finally, the section as worded by Parliament mandates absolute release 
only where the Board is of the opinion that the accused is not a significant 
threat to the safety of the public. It must follow that the section 
contempiates, in al1 other cases, further restraints on the liberty of an 
accused either by way of conditions attached to a release order or M e r  
confinement in hospital. The nature and extent of that deprivation does 
not depend on the continued existence of the mental disorder which led to 
the finding of not ctuninally responsible on account of mental disorder, 
but must be determined using the approach dictated by s-672.54?' 
The impact of these decisions on the liberty interest of an accused person is 
significant. As a result of these cases, unless an accused person, or any other Party. can 
provide evidence that will convince the Review Board that the accused person is not a 
significant threat to the safety of the public, the accused person remains under the 
jurisdiction of the Review Board. Therefore, it is not just a question of showing that the 
accused person does not s d e r  active symptoms of a mental disorder. The expression. 
-'mentai condition" has k e n  interpreted as the "overall mental state of the accused 
without limiting itself to a detemination of whether that condition, or at least some 
aspect of it, continue[s] to fit within the confines of the legal concept of mental 
di~order."'~' The current stable mental condition of an accused person is not the 
'89Supra note 27 1 . 
'901bid at 776. 
-9' lb id. 
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determinhg factor in the granting of an absolute discharge. The Review Board in making 
a determination under section 672.54 of the Code is "essentially looking fonuard and 
making an assessrnent of füture nsk.'"' The Orlowski decision held that past medication 
cornpliance may be considered in assessing future behaviour. Other factors, such as 
nature of the mental disorder of the accused person. the available treatment, the accused 
person's insight into her or his mental condition and the accused person's willingness to 
comply with treatment, may be considered in assessing future risk to the safety of the 
p~blic. '~' Concrete evidence as to the fùnctioning of the accused person in the community 
and continued mental stability while in the community is required by a Review Board for 
it  to be satisfied that the accused person is not a significant threat to the safety of the 
public. It is not sufficient for an accused person to demonstrate that she or he is 
undergoing treatment which has stabilized her or his mental condition. Without the 
necessary mental health resources and supports, in particular community resowces. an 
accused person will be unable to demonstrate that she or he can function in the 
community and does not pose a significant threat to the safety of the public.'94 One 
example of such a situation is found in the McGillis case.'95 The Ontario Review Board 
was not satisfied that Mr. McGillis who had been detained in hospital for a number of 
. 
'9'Lepage, supra note 17 at para. 76. 
'93 lbid at para 69. 
'94Supro note 16 at 243-244 
'95Supra note 16. No further appeal was taken in this case. 
years could "safely reside outside the hospital"'% without supervision. The Board granted 
Mr. McGillis a discharge on condition that he reside in approved accommodation in the 
community. However, the evidence before the Board was that the supervised 
accommodation which Mr. McGillis needed was not available because of a lack of 
adequate cornrnunity mental hedth resources, The Court of Appeal of Ontario quashed 
the disposition of the Board on the b a i s  that the lack of such accommodation resulted in 
Mr. McGillis continuing to reside in hospital. The Court held that the Board should have 
made a custodial disposition. The Court of Appeal did not comment on the requirement 
that the Board must make the Ieast restrictive disposition. Similarly, In the Matter of 
Robert Allen Mitchell2'/' where the British Columbia Review Board felt that Mr. Mitcheli 
could oniy [ive safely in the cornrnunity in a stnictured supervised accommodation. the 
Board continued his detention in custody because of a lack of appropriate community 
housing which would have been the less restrictive alternative. 
Of note is a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Chambers v. 
A. G. of British Columbia and the Director of the Forensic Psychiatrie 2nstiture2" 
clarifying the meaning of "significant threat". In this case, Ms Chambers, an accused 
'96S~pro  note 22 at 243. 
'97Supra note 36. Of note is the fact that neither the British Columbia Review 
Board nor the Ontario Review Board pubbsh their decisions. However, access to 
decisions is permitted on request since the disposition hearings of the Board are open to 
the public and the hearings are a continuance of the criminai proceedings, according to 
the respective Chairpersons of the British Columbia Review Board and the Ontario 
Review Board. 
29gSupra note 280. 
person, appealed the British Columbia Review Board decision which had revoked her 
conditional discharge and ordered her to be detained in custody. While in the cornmunity, 
Ms Chambers had breached her conditional order by using drues and alcohol and the 
Board based its decision on its concern about the effects of Ms Chambers' use of drugs 
and alcohol on her mental condition.. ï h e  Board was concemed that while disinhibitrd by 
alcohol. Ms Chambers, who uias HTV positive and worked as a prostitute while in the 
community, posed a threat of passing the HIV virus. Therefore, the Board was of the 
opinion that Ms Chambers had to be detained in custody to rnitigate the risk she posed to 
the community. The appellant argued that the "significant threat" in section 672.54 of the 
Code m u t  refer to a threat of an act that constitutes an offence under the Criminal Code 
and it was not a crime to be a prostitute who was HIV positive. The Court mled as 
1 am persuaded that 'significant threat' must refer to criminal conduct or 
activity as the review procedure is part of the Criminal Code. In rny 
opinion, Parliament never intended to deal with (detain) persons with 
physical (health) problems which are neither mental conditions nor mental 
disorders within these sections of the Criminal Code.'99 
The Court allowed the appeal and granted Ms Chambers an absolute discharge. 
Therefore, in determining whether an accused person poses a significant threat to the 
safety of the public, the Board must assess whether the person is likely to engage in 
criminal activity or conduct as a result of a mental disorder. 
b) Least onerous and least restrictive disposition 
A number of cases30 including Orlowski have emphasized that section 672.54 of 
the Code requires that a Review Board grant an accused person the least onerous and least 
restrictive disposition. The Court of Appeal of British Columbia stated 
The requirements of s- 672.54 direct that the Board put into perspective the 
mental condition, goals and needs of the mentally disordered person with 
the interests of the public, and where an absolute discharge is not 
warranted, to choose the least restrictive and least onerous conditions on 
the liberty of that person's liberty [sic].30' 
However, in R v. Pinet."' the Ontario Court of Appeal gave the words "least 
onerous and least restrictive" in section 672.54 of the Code a unique interpretation. 
McKinlay J.A. for the Court expressed the view that these words were only relevant to 
choosing the type of disposition and added that 
"D]t is not necessary for the Board, in imposing conditions under (b) or 
(c), (sic) consider whether the type of hospital or the conditions 
contemplated under (6) or (c) would be the least onerous and least 
restri~tive."'~~ 
In my opinion this interpretation is contrary to the principle espoused in R. v. SwainjW and 
the other Courts of Appeal decisions cited above that the person's liberty interests should 
jo0see Orlowski, supra note 278 at 146. Davidron, supra note 23 at 278, Winko. 
supra note 17 at 52, Lepage, supra note 17 at para. 66, and Peckham, supra note 2 71 at 
774-775. 
'"Supra note 23 at 278. 
"'Supra note 35 .  No m e r  appeal was taken in this case. 
3mSwain, supra note 17. 
not be unnecessarily restricted. A Review Board must consider the type of hospital or 
name the hospital in which an accused person should be detained under a custodial 
disposition. Othenvise, it would be shirking its duty in that it would not necessarily be 
rendering the least onerous and least restrictive disposition as emphasized in the Or/ows&i 
and the Peckham decisions. A Review Board has a duty to consider the needs of the 
accused person in fashioning a disposition appropriate to the accused person. For 
example, if a Review Board made a generic order stating that the accused person be 
detained in any medium security hospital, again it would not be carrying out its duties 
outlined in section 672.54 of the Code. My argument is fiirther supported by R. v. 
Lep~ge"~ where the Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized that detention in custody causes 
harm to an accused person if it is not the least restrictive and least onerous disposition. 
The Court stated : 
At the same time the scheme recognizes the ham done to accused (sic) 
who are unnecessarily detained in a psychiatrie facility . The scheme limits 
detention to situations where it is the ' lem onerous and restrictive' 
position available. Finally, the scheme permits the court or Review Board 
to tailor orders to the specific needs of each case and to make those orders 
sufficiently flexible to respond quickly where circumstances warrant a 
variation of a disposition.306 
Furthemore, the legislative scheme clearly provides that a hospital must be 
narned in an order for the following reasons. First, as previously stated, the definition of 
"party" in section 672.1 of the Code clearly contemplates the designation of a specific 
person in a particular hospital. Second, a hospital must be named in a disposition because 
'OsLepage, supro note 17. 
jo61bid at 37. 
the Review Board may only order a party to the hearing to implement the custodial order 
or a conditional discharge, where the accused person is placed under the supervision of a 
h~spital.'~' If a person in charge were not specified, the task of implementing the order 
would not fall on any one person. Third. section 672.56 of the Code permits a Review 
Board to delegate its powers to the person in charge of a hospital. It States: 
672.56(1) A Review Board that makes a disposition in respect of an 
accused under paragraph 672.54 (b) or (c) may delegate to the person in 
charge of the hospital authority to direct that the restrictions on the liberty 
of the accused be increased or decreased within any limits and subject to 
any conditions set out in that disposition, and any direction so made is 
deemed for the purposes of this Act to be a disposition made by the 
Review Board. 
(2) A person who increases the restrictions on the liberty of the accused 
significantly pursuant to authority delegated to the person by the Review 
Board shall 
(a) make a record of the increased restrictions on the liberty of the 
accused; and 
(b) give notice of the increase, as soon as is practicable to the accused 
and, if the increased restictions remain in force for a period exceeding 
seven days, to the Review Board. 
This section contains the supervision mechanism which ensures the protection of the 
public and the exercise of liberties by an accused person. Since the mental condition of 
an accused person may fluctuate, subsection 672.56 (1) of  the Code permits the person in 
charge of a hospital to respond where the mental condition of an accused person 
deteriorates or improves by resmcting liberties or increasing them within the limits 
specified by the Review Board. . 
' 0 7 ~  Review Board has no other meaw to make the disposition enforceable other 
than the delegation to the person in charge of a hospital under section 672.56 of the Code. 
The mental disorder provisions of the Code do not grant a Review Board any contempt 
powers or any powers to enforce their disposition orders. 
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Fourth, under subsection 672.56 (2) of the Code, a person in charge of the hospital 
who increases the restrictions on the liberty of the accused person is obligated to notify 
the Review Board. Since givhg of the notice under subsection 672.56 (2) of the Code 
triggers a hearing by a Review Board under subsection 672.8 l(2) of the Code to 
determine whether the restrictions were warranted, it is important to identiQ the person 
who may impose restrictions and is obliged to give notice. 
Fifih, based on the factors set out in section 672.54 of the Code and the case 
law.jo8 if the Review Board does not address the specific issue of where a person can 
receive appropriate mental health semices or be more easily reintegrated into the 
community, it would not be considering the mental condition of the person and that 
person's other needs. When the evidence before a Review Board warrants certain 
conditions or the parties are requesting them, in fairness, the Review Board must address 
in its reasons why it grants or refises those conditions since it must make the least 
restrictive and lest  onerous d i s p o s i t i ~ n . ~ ~  
In R. v. Pinef. ' ' O  McKinley J.A., writing for the court, opines that a genenc order. 
rather than one which sets out the terrns of pnviteges or conditions, would be more 
308 Supra note 280. 
'OgSubsection 672.52 (3) of the Code requires that a Review Board state its 
reasons for making a disposition. Furtherinore in Orlowski, supra note 278 at 147, the 
Court of Appeai of British Columbia ruled that "faimess requires [that] the accused . . . be 
given a specific finding [respecting whether she or he is a significant threat] with 
explanatory reasons." 1 suggest that fairness would also require that the Board address in 
its reasons why it has made certain conditions or refused to do so. 
"OSupra note 35. 
practicai. She states that '' [ilndeed, it would Iikely be appropriate in most situations to 
leave details of detention to the professional care-givers.""' 
it is important to keep in mind, in interpreting the various new statutory 
provisions, that health care professionais are the ones who have the day-to- 
day responsibility for the care and treatment of individu& involved, and 
undue interference with that responsibility may not be in the interests of 
society or of the ac~used.~" 
This position permits a broad delegation of the powers fiom the Review Board to the 
person in charge of the hospital, allowing a person in charge of a hospital to determine 
such things as the level of security that the accused person needs (therefore deciding on 
transfers fkom one hospital to another), and the accused person's access to the 
community. Such a mode1 would rely solely on the discretion of the person in charge of 
the hospital if there were no parameters set by a Review Board within which the person in 
charge of the hospitai was to exercise his or her discretion. Though section 672.56 of the 
Code permits the Review Board to delegate to the person in charge of the hospital. it 
clearly states that the person in charge of a hospital can only increase or decrease the 
restrictions within the limits and subject to any conditions set out by the Review Board. 
In my view, this wording suggests that a Review Board should set specific conditions or 
erant specific privileges to protect the liberty interests of the accused person. Without 
Ci 
such conditions or privileges, a hearing would not be triggered under section 672.56 of 
the Code, and a Review Board would lose its oversight on the person in charge of the 
b 
hospital. Therefore, the Review Board would be unabie to protect the liberty of the 
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accused which would be contrary to the legislative scheme of the mental disorder 
provisions. In suppon of my views that a Review Board cannot delegate its powen as 
suggested by McKinley J., I cite the findings of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in 
Forensic Psychiutric imfifufe(British Columbia) v. Johnson. The Court mled that. in 
the case where a Review Board grants a conditional discharge. 'rhe Review Board is 
charged with the responsibility of crafting conditions which are relevant to the special and 
differing needs of each accused per~on."~" On the question of delegation under section 
672.56 of the Code, the Court stated 
The discretion which may be delegated to the director under section 
672.56 is an important vehicle through which the Review Board can 
achieve its mandated purpose ... Nor m u t  it be used as a means by which 
the Review Board c m  delegate to the director its paramount responsibility 
for ensuring that a proper balance is maintained between the liberty 
interests of an accused and the safety interests of the public. '" 
In my opinion, the Pinef case3I6 and the Johnson case3" cannot be reconciled. Based on 
the arguments advanced abuve, 1 suggest that the Johnson case3'* is more in keeping with 
the legislative scheme of the mental disorder provisions. 
Furthemore, the type of generic order suggested in the Pinef casesi9 is contrary to 
313Johnron, supra note 280. No funher appeal of this case was taken. 
''%id at 47. 
ISlbid. 
'I6Supra note 35. 
"7Johnson, supra note 280. 
3181bid 
''9Supru note 3 5. 
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the practice of the Ontario Review Board and the British Columbia Review B~ard .~"  
In a disposition, the Ontario Review Board sets out the privileges granted to or the 
conditions imposed on the accused person; and delegates to the Administrator of the 
specified provincial psychiatric hospital the powen to gram or restrict the privileges 
outlined in the disposition."' Where a custodial order is made. the Review Board also 
specifies the narne of the hospital and the levei of security in that hospital. The Review 
Board may under a custodial order permit an accused person the privilege of living in the 
cornmunity where the person's mental condition is stable. However, the Administrator of 
a hospital may order the accused person to return to live in the hospitai where an accused 
person's mentai condition becomes unstable and the safety of the public is at risk. 
Where the Review Board gants a conditiond discharge and an accused person is placed 
"'AS explained in the introduction, I am using the Ontario Review Board and the 
British Columbia Review Board and the mental health system in Ontario and British 
Columbia as examples to support and illustrate my arguments. This practice is descnbed 
in the various decisions of the Courts of Appeal, for example R. v. Lepage, supra note 17: 
R. v. Peckham, supra note 27 1 ; R.. v. Jones, supra note 280; Orlowski, supra note 278; 
Davidson, supra note 23; Peckham, supra note 27 1 ;  Johnson, supra note 280. As well. a 
reading of dispositions of the Ontario Review Board and British Columbia Review Board 
shows that this is the practice, see for example In the Matfer of the accused Frederick 
IMeZvin McGilZis, Disposition, Ontario Review Board (May 1 1, 1998) [unreportedl or In 
rhe Marrer of Robert Allen ~tiitchell, supra note 36. 
'"The practice of the Ontario Review Board is evident from the orders of 
disposition of the Board. In Ontario, the Minister of Health designated as hospitals, 
under section 672.1 of the Code, the 10 provincial psychiatric hospitals which are the 
Brockville Psychiatric Hospital, Hamilton Psychiatric Hospital, Kingston Psychiatric 
Hospital, Lakehead Psychiatric Hospital, London Psychiatric Hospital, Mental Health 
Centre, Penetanguishene, North Bay Psychiatric Hospital, Queen Street Mental Health 
Centre, St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital and Whitby Mental Health Centre, as well as, the 
Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, Royal Ottawa Hospital and the Thisletown Regional Centre 
for Children and Adolescents (Syl Apps Campus). 
under the supervision of an administrator, the Administrator cannot order the penon to 
retum to hospitaL3" Where the Ontario Review Board grants a conditional discharge, but 
does not order the accused person to report to an Administrator of a specified hospital and 
does not delegate any powers to the Administrator, the supervision of the accused person 
is lacking and psychiatric evidence about the person's mental condition is sparse.'" 
rn British Columbia, al1 dispositions delegate powers to the Director of the 
Forensic Psychiatrie Institute. In a custodial order, an accused person is detained at the 
Institute while under a conditional discharge, an accused person is placed under the 
supervision of the Director of the Institute. The limits of the liberties accorded to the 
accused person or conditions are set out in the disposition order? The British Columbia 
Review Board does not specie the level of security within the institute in a detention 
order. This raises the issue of whether the delegation in this respect is too broad, in that a 
higher level of security generally means more restrictions on the liberties of the accused 
person. i believe that such a delegation is open to challenge for the reasons set out above. 
In addition, under a conditional order, the Director may order the involuntary detention at 
3"However, the Administrator may, if the accused person meets the criteria for 
civil cornmitta1 in that the person is a danger to self or others, detain the accused person 
under the authority of the Ontario Mental Health Act. R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7. 
'"~ccording to the chairperson of the Ontario Review Board, the anending 
psychiatrists who are in private practice generally refuse to provide reports on the mental 
condition and other needs of the accused 'prson for the previous year because they are 
not paid to provide reports or to testifi before the Board. In these cases, the Board has 
ordered the Crown to obtain the information fiom the attending psychiatrist. 
"'This is evident from the dispositions rendered by the British Columbia Review 
Board. Examples are found In the Matter of Robert Allen Mitchell and In rhe Marrer of 
Anthony Florence, supra note 36. 
the l nstitute of an accused person, contrary to the practice in Ontario. 
c) Nature of Review Board hearings 
In Davi&on v. A. G. of British ~olumbid" and R. v. Pe~kharn"~, the Courts of 
Appeal of Ontario and British Columbia respectively expounded on the nature of Review 
Board hearings. The appellant argued that section 672.54 of the Code placed a burden on 
the Crown to prove that an accused person was a significant threat. In addition. the 
appellant asked the court to mie that the standard of proof should be "beyond a 
reasonable doubt". The Court in each case held that a Review Board hearing was not 
"strictly adversarial in the same sense that a criminal or civil trial is strictly 
adversanal""'. The hearing was characterized as an inquiry into the cnteria idenrified in 
section 672.54 of the Code, as had been ruled in Orlowski v. British Columbia (A trorney- 
Generaf,)"' . Therefore, none of the parties bore the burden of proof. In R. v. Peckharn. 
the Ontario Court of Appeal M e r  held that the function of a Revisw Board was 
"analogous to a judge passing ~entence""~. The Court made it clear that in these cases an 
accused person's liberty interests require a "high level of procedural pr~tection.""~ 
The characterization of the disposition hearing as inquisitorial in nature and the 
- --- 
3Zs~upra note 23.  
3'6~upra note 2 7 1 . 
'"lbid at 773. 
"*supra note 278. 
3'9~upra note 27 1 at 774. 
'jOlbid at 773. 
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finding that no Party had the burden of proof have had an important impact on the role of 
a Review Board. This emphasis on the inquisitorial nature of a Review Board downplays 
the reality that the Review Board must rely on the parties to bnng fonvard the necessary 
evidence for it to make a just and fit disposition and that the hearings are somewhat 
adversarial depending on the position taken by each party at a hearing. However. the 
courts have stated that when making a disposition, a Review Board need not rely ody on 
the evidence adduced by the parties at the hearing and may require the parties to bring 
additional information necessaxy for it to make a disposition. In addition, when the 
question of availability of mental health resources has arisen, the courtcc have noted that 
the Review Board has the power to adjourn the hearing and require additional information 
or to make a disposition and hold an early hearing. An example of such a case is that of 
Mc~ilZid~' which will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
D. Impact of Mental Health Resources On Mental Disorder Scheme 
a) The link between treatment and release 
Although treatrnent cannot be imposed in a disposition,'" the availability of 
treatment and other mental health resources is crucial in the legislative scheme set out in 
the mental disorder provisions of the Code. As noted by Larner C.J.C. in R. v. Swain:"' 
'"Supra note 16. 
33'~ubsection 672.55(1) of the Code clearly States that treatment cannot be ordered 
in a disposition under section 672.54 of the Code. However, a condition regarding 
treatrnent may be included in a disposition if the accused consents and the Review Board 
is of the opinion that the condition is reasonable and necessaiy in the interests of the 
accused person. 
'"Swain, supra no te 1 7. 
As our understanding of mental illness has grown through the years, 
providing treatment for persons held under L.G. W. has corne to be 
accepted, indeed expected, for both humanitarian and pragmatic reasons. 
However, this treatment is not prescribed by the impugned provisions; 
rather. it constitutes the means to achieving their end, the protection of 
society.'" 
In making dispositions under section 672.54 of the Code relating to the mental condition 
of the accused person, a Review Board must consider the availability of treatment: 
whether the accused person is undergoing treatment, and if so, the likelihood that the 
accused person will continue in treatment. The following passage in R. v. Lepage'-" 
illustrates this: 
The mental condition of the accused is but one of four factors to be 
considered by the court or Review Board in determining whether it is of 
the opinion that the accused is not a significant threat to the safety of the 
public and should, therefore, be discharged absolutely. The significance of 
the accused person's mental condition to that determination will depend 
on many variables, including the nature of the mental disorder, if any. 
fiom which the accused person suffers at the time of inquiry, the available 
treatment, the accused person's understanding of his mental condition. and 
the accused person's willingness to conform to any proposed course of 
treatment.jj6 
The link between treatment and the mental disorder provisions is M e r  
emphasized in W i n b  v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatrie Institufe)."' In this case. 
McEachem J. opined that the objective of a custodial order under section 672.54 of the 
Code was to commit an accused person to hospital for treatment. He charactenzed 
- - - - - - - - - 
3341bid at 1005. 
335Lepge. supra note 1 7. 
'j61bid at para. 3 8. 
'j7 ~ i n k o .  supra note 23. 
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paragraph 672.54 (c) of the Code as establishing a "regime for treatment and relea~e"''~ 
of an aecused person found NCRMD. However. McEachem J. was not suggesting that 
treatment could be ordered but that the only reason to confine an accused person to 
hospital was to  make treatment available. 
b) Availability of Mental Health Resources 
The above mentioned decisions highiight the importance of the availability of 
mental health resources such as psychiatric beds, treatment and inpatient prograrns for 
those that a Review Board detennines must be detained in custody and community mental 
health resources to support accused persons in the comrnunity. Since health is a 
provincial matter, there are differences in the availability and delivery of mental health 
services in each province. For the purposes of this thesis, I examine the mental health 
system in Ontario and British Columbia to illustrate and argue that there is an insufficient 
supply of psychiatric beds. In addition, 1 use the experience of persons found NCRMD 
within these mental health systems to argue that the community mental health services are 
inadequate because accused persons are not being reintegrated into the community as 
intended by the mental disorder provisions. 
1. Ontario 
i) Ovecview of Mental Health Reform in Ontario 
To better understand the factors that have fueled the present climate of closure of 
b 
psychiatrie hospitals and cutbacks in psychiatric beds and concerns respecting community 
mental health resources, a brief review of mental health refonn in Ontario is necessary. 
As noted in chapter 1, in the 1960s and 1 970s, the phenornenon of deinstitutionalization 
swept Canada with its emphasis on providing mental health services in the community. 
However. the necessary community mental health resources were not in place or 
envisioned to implement the community-based mental health philosophy. The discussion 
paper. Towardr a Bheprin f for Change: A Mental Health Policy and Program 
Perspective, emphasized that &'the early period of deinstitutionalization was not 
accompanied by a suflïcient emphasis upon the provision of alternative support services. 
including accommodation, with the result that many patients discharged into the 
comrnunity experienced d i f f ic~l t ies ."~~~ Mental health planners had assurned that 
"[clhanges in terrns of the development of social services and welfare programs, universal 
health care and the development of  psychiatric services in general h~spitals""~ would 
provide services to mentally il1 persons previously provided by the psychiatric hospitals. 
The discussion paper challenged these assumptions for the following reasons. First. the 
general hospital psychiatric units were usually treating "populations that were non- 
C 
disruptive and who could be quickly discharged.""' Second, the number of persons using 
'39G.F. Heseltine, Towarak a Blueprinfjor Change: A Mental Health Policy and 
Program Perspective: Discussion Paper, (Toronto: Mini stry of Health, 1983) at 205 as 
cited in Provincial Community Mental Health Cornmittee, Building Comrnuni!y Support 
For People: A Plan For Mental HeaZth in Ontario (Toronto: July, 1988) at 30. 
'40Provincial Community Mental Health Cornmittee, Building Cornmuni& Support 
For People: A Plan For Mental Health inBonfario (Toronto: July, 1988) at 26. 
""G.F. Heseltine, Towarak a Blueprintfor Change: A Mental Heafth Policy and 
Program Perspective: Discussion Paper. supra note 3 3 9, as cited in Provincial 
Community Mental Health Commi ttee, Building Communiiy Support For People: A Plan 
For Mental Health in Ontario supra note 340 at 26. For a more detailed study see D. 
Wasylenki, P. Goering, and E. MacNaughton in "PIanning Mental HeaZth Services: I. 
1 O9 
mental health services increased because of a number of factors, including the creation of 
universal health care insurance which made mencal heaith services available to persons 
who would not have previously used a psychiatrie hospital; a downturn in the economy 
which resulted in additional life stresses; and changing public attitudes toward emotional 
problems, psychotherapy and p~~choanalysis."" Therefore. even though mental health 
resources increased oved l ,  it was not enough to meet the demand for services and 
"communities became less abIe to support persons with mental illness in the community. 
AS a result, the rate of re-hospitalization of persons with serious mental illness 
in~reased."~'~ Hence, the need for establishing mental health priorities in keeping with a 
community-based philosophy was brought to the fore and Ontario embarked on the road 
to mental heaith refonn. 
In 1979, the Cornmittee on Mental Health Services in Ontario reviewed mental 
health services and in its report. Agenda for Action: A Report of the Ontario Council of 
Health, '" concluded that there was a clear lack of government policy or priority 
respecting mental heaith services in cornparison to other provinciai prograrns. It noted 
that rnany aspects of  the mental health system needed attention. The Report proposed a 
Background and Key Issue," supra note 26. 
342Supra note 340 at 27. 
b 
3431bid. 
3UCommittee on Menial Health Services, Agendafir Action: A Report of the 
Ontario Council of Healrh, (Ontario: Ontario Council of Heal th, 1 979) ci ted in Provincial 
Community Mental Health Cornmittee, Building Community Support For People: A Plan 
For Mental Health in Ontario supra note 340. 
two-prong approach to the planning and delivery of mental health services. It suggested 
that the provincial governrnent continue with "overall responsibility for ensuring 
adequate funding. availability and equitability of services that meet detined standards"345 
and a decentralized system of deIivery of mental health services. However, it would 
appear that little was done to implement a cornrnunity-based mental heaitb system since 
in t 983, the Ministry of Health in Ontario released a discussion paper, Towards a 
Bheprint for Change: A Mental HeaZth Policy and Program Perspective, which again 
emphasized the need for cornmunity-based mental health services. It stated that 
It is important to strive toward a mental health system which emphasizes 
non-institutionaiization, which directs energy and resources toward 
providing services outside the hospital so that hospitalization occurs only 
when dictated by treatment or behavioral needs. 
... An essentiaf coroilary of deinstitutionalization and non- 
institutionalization is the provision of alternative settings for treatment and 
care in the least restrictive and disruptive settings which are as close to the 
patient's or client's home as pra~tical."~ 
This discussion paper led to the establishment of district health councils. local advisory 
Boards, development of plans for provincial psychiatric hospitals and community mental 
health plans. 
By 1988 there existed over 400 community-based mental health prograrns. 
"%.F. Heseltine, TowordF a Blueprintfor Change: A Mental Health Policy and 
Program Perspective: Discussion Paper, (Toronto: Ministry of Heaith, 1 983) at 205 as 
ci ted in Provincial Communi ty Mental Health Cornmittee, Building Community Support 
For People: A Plan For Mental Healrh in Ontario supra note 340 at 30. 
increased fùnding for cornmunity mental heaith programs,Y7 and an increased awareness 
of local mental health planning; however the Provincial Auditors' 1987 Report still noted 
the following probIems with the mental health system in Ontario: 
E]ven given (this) significant increase in fimding, there is still a serious 
lack of adequate community services in the province ... better information 
(fiom both psychiatrie hospitals and community-based programs) is 
needed to plan and manage mental heaith ser~ices.~" 
The Provincial Community Mental Health Committee was established to develop "a 
h e w o r k  for the delivery of community mental health services in on tari^."^'^ This 
Committee concluded, has had previous reports, that mental health care should be 
focused in the community within an integrated mental health system and that additional 
funding was needed for community mental health services. It established targets: 
development of locai mental health pIans by 1991, and the establishment of an integrated 
mental health system with services focused in the community by 1995. Although some 
additional funding was subsequently provided for community mental health services. the 
mental health systern was not refocused on cornrnunity mental health services as 
"'Between L 985 and 1987, there was a 65 % increase in hinding for cornmunity 
mental heaith programs. However, community mental health spending accounted for 
4.5% of the total spending for mental health services. This meant that fimding for 
community mental health services has declined in relation to other areas ofspending 
including mental health spending in general. These figures and comrnents were stated by 
Provincial Community Mental Health Committee, Building Cornmunis, Support For 
People: A Plan For Mental Healrh in Ontario supra note 340 at 2,3 and 27. 
348D. F. Archer (Provincial Audi tor), annual Report of the Provincial Auditor for 
the Year Ended March 31, 1987, (Ontario: Office of Provincial Auditor, 1987) as cited in 
Provincial Community Mental Health Committee, Building Communiry Support For 
People: A Plan For Mental Health in Ontario supra note 340 at 1 5. 
3'9S~pru note 340 at 1. 
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recommended by the report. 
In 1993, the Ministry of Health released yet another report respecting the reform 
of the mental health system in Ontario,3so the goal again being a balanced and integrated 
mental health system which shifted the focus from institutional care to comrnunity. 
Responding to the fact that consumers continued to expenence difficulties in linking up 
with appropriate community-based services or consumer initiatives and that there 
continued to be a shortage of case management, crisis intervention, housing and other 
support services, the Report highlighted the need to adopt a definition of mental health 
needs to include broader determinants of health such as supportive housing, income 
support and employment opportunities. This report stated that "[wlithout adequate 
services in their communities, people with mental health problems are too often 
readmitted to hospital."'*' The report noted that spending on community mental health in 
1 99 1-92 was 10% of the total mental health spending and in 1 992-93. about 80% of the 
mental health budget was spent on institutional services and 20% on comrnunity-based 
prog~ams.~~' It stated that by 2003,40% of the mental health budget would be spent on 
institutional care and 60% on comrnunity services. To achieve this goal, it proposed to 
reduce the number of psychiatric beds fiom an average of 58 psychiatric beds for every 
100,000 people to 30 psychiatric beds for every 100.000 people. By 1996-97, 70% of the 
mental health budget was spent on hospital based expenditures and 30% on cornmunity . 
3"S~pra note 26. 
35'~bid at 7. 
j5"bid at 7 and 28. 
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expenditures3" and there existed on average 56 beds for each 100,000 people.35' 
The goal of mental heaith reform in the 1st  20 years has been to shape an 
integrated mental heaith system that provides a continuum of services and supports that 
assist persons with mental illness to Iive in the community and avoid hospitalization. 
This lengthy mental health reform process in Ontario has not to date yielded adequate 
community mental health services- Persons with severe mental ilhesses have "ken  
poorly served by past poiicy initiatives and, as a result, have consumed a disproportionate 
share of expensive inpatient and treatment services with Little benefit to themselves or 
their fami~ies."'~' Concerns expressed by academics, health service providers, consumers 
and their families, and the media respecting the inadequate community mental health 
services demonstrate that in 1998 the goal of "comprehensive and integrated system that 
puts people fint" is not at hand.js6 
ii) Current Mental Health System 
Concerns continue to be expressed that the mental health system is underfunded 
and that community mental health services are inadequate and insufficient to respond to 
"'Figures provided by the Ontario Ministry of Health dated 13/08/97. 
'%This average was calculated usihg provided in Health Services Restructuring 
Commission, Discussion Paper, Rebuilding Ontario 's Healrh System: Inferim Planning 
Guidelines and Iinplementa f ion Sfra fegies, supra note 3 at 54 and 5 5 .  
"'Supra note 26 at 1. 
3 5 6 ~ ~ P r a  note 26 at 14. 
the needs of penons with senous mental illness which include accused p e r ~ o n s . ' ~ ~  For
instance, the report. The Mentally III and the Criminal Justice System: Innovative 
Comrnunity-Based Programs 1995, stated that "the reality of mental health service 
delivery remains problernati~."'~~ The report observed that peaons with severe and 
c hronic mental illnesses ofien cannot gain access to mental health resources while in the 
community, are unable to fmd adequate housing, are soçially isolated, lack community 
acceptance and continue to be stigmatized. This report reflected the often-voiced concem 
that the severely mentally il1 are 'falling through the cracks' of the mentd health system 
and into the criminal justice system. Similady, the study of D. Wasylenki. P. Goering. 
and E. MacNaughton in " Pianning Mental Health Services: I. Background and Key 
Issues" in Ontario, concluded that by 1990, many of the comrnunity mental health 
p rogras  in Ontario had drifted away fiom their original role, which was to care for those 
with severe mental i l l n e ~ s e s . " ~ ~ ~  
GiIbert Sharpe, editor of HeaZth Larv in Canada, stated: 
'S7~ccused persons found NCRMD are included in the the class of persons with 
serious mental illness. In the Ministry of Heaith, Forensic Parienr Darabase 1996 Annual 
Report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Heaith, September, 1997) at 10, it states that --[tlhe 
majority of forensic clients [who are primarily accused persons] (76%) meet the 
diagnostic criteria for classification as the seriously mentally ill." 
j5'Heal th Canada, The Mentally IZZ and the Criminal Justice System: Innovarive 
Community-Bused Programs 1995 ( Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 
1995) at 13. . 
js9Supra note 26 at 200. ïh i s  is supported by the finding of a 1992 s w e y  of 
cornmunity mentai health services in Ontario that "most crisis, day treatment and 
counseling programs available in Ontario communities do not provide these services to 
people with severe problems" which is cited in the Ministry of Health, Putting People 
First: rhe Reform of Mental Health Services in Onturio supra note 26 at 23. 
M i l e  the deinstitutionalization has been a trend for some time, few 
governments have followed through on promises to provide ample fhding 
for cornrnwiity senices. Indeed, most efforts at integration of health 
services have accorded a low pnority to services for the mentally iII in the 
c o r n m ~ n i t y . ~ ~  
A proposal of the Coalition of Ontario Psychiatrists reiterated these concerns: 
Any reasonable person must today acknowledge that in the context of 
mental hedth reform, 'community' is a rubric for neglecting or 
abandoning the ill, and that it is immoral to attempt a M e r  
deinstitutionalization without fm establishing a well-hctioning 
cornmunity mental health system.'" 
Carol Roup, Director of Operational Planning, Metropolitan Toronto District Health 
Council noted that "a significant number of consumers and families are still 
di~satisfied."'~' The concem about the lack of mental health resources is echoed again and 
again in the media and in a recent coroner's rec~rnmendations.~~' 
'60(1 997) 17:4 Her7lrh Law in Canada 10 1 .  In the same issue of Healrh L a w  in 
Canada at 1 10. Dr. Paul Garfinkel, president and psychiatrist-in-chief of the Clarke 
Ins titute of Psychiatry , stated " Recently, the Ontario Health Supplement reported that 
about 16 per cent of people in Metro require psychiatric care and three out of four of 
these don? receive any help. Any survey data of mental disorder demonstrates astounding 
findings: close to 20 per cent of the adult population suffer fiom a mental disorder within 
any six-month period; schizophrenia will affect over 250,000 Canadians; major 
depression and manic depression affect one in ten; at least 25 per cent of the medically il1 
have a treatable psychiatric disorder; 40 per cent of the 12.000 homeless in Ontario have 
an Axis 1 diagnosis; the Ontario child survey found almost 20 per cent in need of care and 
only a tiny minority receiving it." 
36'Cited in T. Boyle and D. Vincent, " Madness: First of seven parts on how we 
are failing the mentally ifl, " supra note 1 at 5. 
j6Liupra note 25. 
editorial, "Have we abandoned the mentally ÏZI?", supra note 1, reiterated 
the concerns of community groups in Metropolitan Toronto about the lack of resources in 
the mental health system as follows: "Last month, the hostels wamed that a growing 
number of mentally il1 people were using their services by default 'because there is no 
Concerns about the sufficiency of psychiatric beds were heightened when the 
Health Services Restmcturing Commission established in 1 996ja issued reports 
recornmending the closure of five provincial psychiatric hospitals: Lakehead Psychiatric 
H~spital'~', Brockville Psychiatric Hospital366, St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospitalj6', 
London Psychiaûic Hospitals6' and Hamilton Psychiatric ~ o s p i t a l . ' ~ ~  These hospitals 
where else for them to turn.' ... 'Workers report that de-institutionaiization has been 
carried out without developing the necessary community-based support and transition 
services,' the report said. 'Many horneless people, without necessary mental health 
supports, end up using the shelter system'." 
In early January, 1998, the Toronto Star ran a seven part series on "Madness: 
How we are failing the mentally iU ''supra note 1. It stated " [dlecades of closing 
psychiaûic beds,budget cutting and a failure to establish community supports for the 
mentally il1 have taken their toll on society most vulnerable" January 10, 1998, first of 
seven Parts at 2. 
In November, 1997 a coroner's jury in Ottawa inquiring into the death of a local 
television personality caused by a person suffering fiom paranoid schizophrenia 
recomrnended the establishment of a community mental health program and an end to the 
closure of psychiatric hospitals, reported on the CBC radio program, "As It Happens". on 
November 26.1997. 
'"Established under the Savings and Restructuring Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 1. The 
Health Services Restnicnuing Commission has the mandate to restructure hospitals. 
including the provincially-operated psychiatric hospitals, through arnalgarnations. transfer 
of programs or closure. 
j6'Health Services Restructuring Commission, Thunder Bay Health Services 
Resrructuring Report. supra note 3 at 9. 
366Health Services Restrucnuing Commission, Ottawa Health Services 
Resrructuring Report, supra note 3 at 5 5. 
367 Health Services Restructuring Commission, Kent Counîy Health Services 
Restructuring Report, supra note 3 at 9. 
'68Health Services Resmicturing Commission, London Health Services 
Restructuring Report, supra note 3 at 16. 
'69Health Services Restructuring Commission, Hamilton- Wentworth Health 
Services Restructuring Report, supra note 3 at 44. 
had forensic beds and sorne of this capacity was to be transferred; for example a number 
of the beds in the Brockville Psychiatric Hospital were going to be transferred to the 
Royal Ottawa Hospital and to the Kingston Psychiatric Hospital. In addition, by the year 
2003, as a result of this restnicniring, a large number of psychiatric beds, in psychiatric 
and generai hospitals, would be closed. Usine the figures set out in various reports of the 
Heaith Services Restnicniring Commission, 1 have calculated that 1109 beds will be 
c i~sed"~  between 1998 and 2003. These closures are in addition to the psychiatric bed 
cuts that have been made From 1993 to 1 99637'. The Health Services Restnicturing 
Commission noted the following concems about its tirnetable and magnitude of bed 
closures: 
M i l e  there is widespread agreement of the goal to shift provision of 
mental health from hospital settings to community based services, many 
continue to express concerns that the planning target is too arnbitious and 
does not allow sufficient time and flexibiiity to achieve this shifi without 
"'If the current total beds of 4992 represent 45 beds for 100,000 of population and 
the interim target by 2003 is 35 beds for 100,000, it means that the total beds in 2003 will 
be 3883. However, the Health Services Restructwing Commission still maintains that the 
ultimate bed target is 30 beds for 100,000 which would result in 3328 beds and a loss of 
1664. The figures for the number of beds and the target figure of 30 beds/100.00 people 
are set out in the Health Services Restructuring Commission, Discussion Paper. 
Re b uilding Ontario S Heulth System: lnrerim Planning Guidelines and Implementation 
Slrategies, supra note 3 at 54; the interim target for 2003 of 35 beds for 100,000 is found 
in Health Services Restnichuing Commission, Change and Transition supra note 3 at 59: 
and the ratio that at present there are 45 beds/100,000 people is found in Health Services 
Restmcturing Commission, Ottawa HeaM Services Restructuring Report, supra note 3 at 
45 as being the Ministry of Health estimate. 
371 1 note fiom the Health Services Restructuring Commission, Discussion Paper, 
Rebuilding Ontario 's Heulth System: hterim Planning Guidelines and Implernentation 
Straregies, supra note 3 at 53 that in 1993 the provincial average for psychiatrie beds was 
58 beds /100,000 which by 1997 had been reduced to 491 00,000. 
putting access and quality of care at riskS3" 
These concems arose fiom the fact that insufficient community mental health services 
exist and that beds will be closed before necessary community services are i n  place."' 
The Health Services Restnicturing Commission has dearl y indicated that it 
continues to support the original planning rate of 30 beds/100,000 if the 
appropriate shift occurs in the provision of services fiom institutional- 
based services to community based-services- However, the Commission 
wants to ensure that the Pace of change is appropriate to ensure an orderly 
restructuring of mental health services and that the right level of 
community-based services and supports are established before beds are 
~ l o s e d . ~ ' ~  
The HeaIth Services Restnicturing Commission and the District Health Councils have 
stressed to the Minister of Heaith that "[r]esources fieed up fiom the downsizing of 
psychiatrie inpatient services will be reallocated for the development of community 
mental heaith services. .."375 
The Health Services Restnicturing Commission stated that two major concerns 
about the funding of the mental heaith system were expressed by persons making 
submissions. One was that "the curent [mental health] system is significantly 
'%id at 53 and 54. 
'''This is an example of these types of recommendations. It is from Ottawa- 
Carleton Regional District Health Council and is set out in the Health Services 
Restructuring Commission, ''Ottawa H e d h  Services Resrrucruring Report " (Toronto: 
Health Services Restnicturing Commission, February 1997). However, neither the Health 
Services Restructuring Commission nor the district health councils can direct financiai 
resources from hospitals to cornmunity mental health programs. 
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~nderfunded."~'~ The other concem was that, after restnicturing, mental health funding 
may be reassigned to other areas of health services. These persons suggest that the 
mental health funding envelope created in 1993 should continue to be protected, 
increased and used oniy to fund mental health seervices.'" The Health Services 
Restructuring Commission has recommended that funding for mental health "should be 
pooted into a funding envelope, adjusted for equity in terms of population needs, and 
administered by a central agen~y."~" 
The Heal th Services Restnicturing Commission in its report, Changes and 
~ransition,"~ reiterated the concems about the lack of comrnunity mental health resources 
and recornmended that "the Ministry of Health, working with other ministries, enhance 
supports for the development of community mental health services . and that this support 
precede downsizing of acutellong term inpatient services."'" ï h e  Report recognized that 
"access to safe and affordable housing is essential to maintainhg clients in the 
'76Health Services Restructuring Commission. Change and Transition: Pianning 
Guidelines and Implementation Strategies for Home Care. Long term Care, Menrai 
Health. Rehabilitation, and Sub-acute Care, supra note 3 at 5 1. 
"%upra note 25. See also Health Services Restructuring Commission, Discussion 
Paper, Re building Ontario 's Health System: In ferim Planning Guidelines and 
Implementation Smegies, supra note 3 at 20. 
378S~pro  n te 375 at 56. . 
379Health Services Restructuring Commission, Change and Transition: Planning 
Guidelines and implementarion Strategies for Home Care. Long term Care. Mental 
Healrh, Rehabiliiation, and Sub-acute Care supra note 3. 
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c~rnmunity,"~~'  and recommended that government support programs be reviewed. In 
addition, the Report recommended the establishment of transitional agencies at the 
regional level to ensure the planning, coordination and funding of the mental health 
system and to build an integrated system of institution and cornmunity based services. It 
has stated that '' the restructuring of mental health and addiction services is an urgent 
matter, requiring the oversight and management of an independent body during the 
transition to an integrated health ~ystern."'~' The need for such agencies arose fiom the 
fragmented and diverse nature of mental health program delivery and iack of consistent 
standards for mental health programs. If the psychiatric bed target ratios endorsed by 
Health Services Restnicturing Commission are to be met by 2003. such transitional 
agencies need to be established without delay. As of August, 1998, the Minister of Health 
in Ontario has only established a pilot mental health agency in Thunder Bay. 
In Ontario, accused persons under the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board on 
the whole suffer from severe mental illne~ses."~ The majority suffer fiom schizophrenia 
and a smaller number suffer fiom addictions, affective psychosis, and semai and other 
non-psychotic disorders.'" Therefore, the concem that the mental health system in the 
past has not served those suffering fiom severe mental illnesses is very pertinent to the 
'''Health Services Restnicturing Commission, Frontenac, Lennox and Addington 
Health Services Restructuring Report, supra note 3 at 49. 
js3Supra note 357. 
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situation of accused persons. Furthemore, the adequacy and availability of mental health 
resources has an impact on accused persons within the mental disorder provisions who 
also require mainstream mental health services. 
The question of the sufficiency of the number of forensic bedsJas came to the fore 
in 1996 and 1997 because an increasing nurnber of persons detained under orders of the 
Ontario Review Board remained in jail, awaiting a bed in the hospital designated in the 
order. According to the Chairperson of the Ontario Review Board,'& as of March 15. 
1997. 13 accused persons who were unfit to stand mal were in the Toronto Jail awaiting a 
transfer to the Queen Street Mental Health Centre where the Board had ordered that they 
be detained. One of these accused persons had been waiting since October, 1996. The 
Chairperson noted that, on average, it took 128 days before an accused person was 
transferred from the Toronto Jail to the Queen Street Mental Health Centre. He added that 
the medium security unit at the Queen Street Mental Health Centre had a waiting penod 
of 18 months when it opened in May, 1996; the wait had increased to 30 months as of 
March, 1997. As of April, 1997, the average wait for a transfer to the medium security 
unit was three months at the Brockville Psychiatric Hospital, up to a year at the St. 
Thomas Psychiatric Hospital, and up to six months at the North Bay Psychiatric Hospital. 
The Chairperson stated that, in general, the wait for a transfer from a jail to a minimum 
'*'In 1997, there existed 5282 adult psychiatrie beds in Ontario out of which 628 
were designated as forensic beds. 
jg6The statistics are cited above are contained in D.H. Carnithers, "Pinel and 
McGiZh and rhe Cutback: Some Views, Comment& and Opinions on How They A@ci 
The Ontario Review Board, " supra note 22 at 37 and 38. 
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security facility of a hospital, ranges fiom one to three months. The wait is considerably 
longer for those being transferred fiom one hospitd to another. In addition. service 
providers have expressed considerable concern "about the insufficient supply of forensic 
beds available provincially..."387 The concern about the supply of forensic beds is 
cornpounded by the fact that since the corning into force of the mental disorder provisions 
of the Code in 1992, the nurnber of accused persons under the jurisdiction of the Ontario 
Review Board increased by 10 % every year and that 'rhere is no reason to believe that 
this trend will not ~ontinue."~" The increase in accused persons will place more stress on 
the ability of the mental health systern to respond. 
The concem that forensic beds were in short supply and that the "shortage of 
forensic beds, [was] resulting in long periods of incarceration for those awaiting for 
access to these services"389 were expressed to the Health Services Restnicturing 
Commission. In response to these concerns, the Health Services Restnicturing 
Commission clarified that "forensic beds were not included as part of the acute or longer 
'87~ealth Services Restructuring Commission, Discussion Paper, RebuiZding 
Ontario 's Heaith Sysiern: Interim Planning Guidelines and implernentation Straregies, 
supra note 3 at 56. 
j8'D.H. Carnithers, "Pinet and McGillis and the Cutbacks: Some Vie ws, 
Cornmenfs, and Opinions on How They Aflect The Ontario Review Review Board" supra 
note 22 at 1 3. He also noted that as of Mdrch 3 1, 1 997,754 accused persons were under 
the jurisdiction of the Review Board, 88 of whom were women and in the previous 
twelve months , the Review Board held 920 hearings. 
389 Health Sc wices Restniciuring Commission, Change and Transition: Planning 
Guidelines and Irnpiementation Strategies for Home Care. Long term Care. Menral 
Healih, Rehabilitation. and Sub-acure Care, supra note 3 at 52. 
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terni bed planning targets but are intended to be in addition to those b e ~ l s . " ~ ~  The 
Commission recornmended that more research was needed on forensic mental hedth 
services and stated that the Ministry of Health was undertaking a provincial review of 
forensic services and setting planning targets for forensic ser~ices.'~' The Commission 
huther added that explicit direction was needed hom the Ministry of Heaith regarding 
support to the forensic population and the restnicnuing of this system. Furthemore, the 
reform of forensic services should ensure that "action is taken to increase accessibility to 
borh inpatient and community-based forensic ser~ices."'~' 
As part of the forensic reform initiative, which began in 1993, the Ministry of 
Health intended to develop a plan for forensic services that ensures that " mentally 
disordered off en der^'^^ who do not require secure or specialized care would have easy 
access to the services they need (access to programs that serve other people with severe 
mental illne~s). '"~~ In 1997, in a discussion paper, the Ministry of Health declared that it 
j9'tt appears that, in response to the recomrnendations of the Heaith Services 
Restmcturing Commission, the Ministry of Health has prepared a draft discussion paper 
"The Distribution of Foremic Beds in Ontario " dated August 6, 1997 (unpublished). 
The paper deals oniy with tertiaq beds capacity but States that "[tlhere is also a need for 
forensic resources to support patients in integrated mentai health settings and in the 
cornmunity which has not been quantified and will be addressed through follow up 
analysis" at 1. 
393Mentally disordered offenders are accused persons and those with mental 
disabilities serving sentences in the correctional system. 
'"~inistry of Health, Putting People First: the Reform of Mental Health Services 
in Ontario. supra note 26 at 26. 
b]as recently adopted strategic directions for the forensic system (The 
Provincial Forensic System : Slrategic Directions). Central cornponents 
of this strategy include the establishment of a provincially coordinated, 
dedicated forensic system (compnsed of a provincial forensic hospital and 
regional forensic services), and a protected strearn of general mental health 
resources to serve forensic clients in integrated mental health settings. The 
goals of interministerial and health forensic policy are to decrirninalize 
people with mental illness who come into conflict with the law; to prevent 
where possible antisocial behaviour arising fiom mental iliness through 
the provision of appropriate community supports; to treat forensic patients 
as close to home as possible and econornically feasibfe; and to integrate 
low risk forensic patients with the general psychiatric population."395 
In 1997, Ontario adopted a provincid strategy as "the policy blueprint for al1 
operational and policy initiatives for people with a mental disorder a d o r  developmental 
disability who come into conflict with the law."'% This strategy, developed in response to 
"a recognized need to better coordinate, resource, and plan services'"97 within the forensic 
system. calls for a redesign of the mental health forensic system and enhancements of 
community supports. In Ontario, there does not seem to exist a continuum of care for 
persons with mental disorders that focuses on supporting these persons in the community. 
The result for accused persons is that 
Under present circumstances the chances of any proposed disposition 
being capable of k i n g  implemented at the tirne it is k i n g  made are 
j9'~inistry of Health of Ontario, "Discussion Paper: n e  Distribution of Forensic 
Beds in Ontario, " supra note 39 1 at 1 & 2. 
396 This statement is made in a letter of Deputy Ministers of Community and Social 
Services, Health, Correctional Services and Deputy Attorney Generd and Solicitor 
General enclosed in Human Services and Justice Coordination Project, A Provincial 
Strafegy to Coordinute ffuman Services and Criminal Justice Systems in Ontario supra 
note 42. 
397 Human Services and Justice Coordination Project, A Provincial Strategy tu 
coordinate Xuman Services and Criminal Jusiice Systems in Ontario supra note 42 at 1. 
. S .  
[A]ccuseds will remain in jail longer than would othenvise be the case, 
and therefore be denied an opportunity to be treated at their required time. 
It is accepted that the longer a person goes without required treatment the 
more difficult it becomes for that person to respond positiveiy to that 
treatrnent when it is eventually received. In dl probability this will mean 
that such a person will remain in hospital longer than wouId have been the 
case had treatment started earlier.'98 
2. British Columbia 
i) An Overview of Mental Health Reform in British Columbia 
As in Ontario. British Columbia experienced "critical service shortages in mental 
healdi  are''^'^ arising fiom the deinstitutionalization of persons with mental disabilities. 
As a response to these problems, in 1984, the Ministry of Health began a 
provincial consultation on mental hedth refonn which culminated in the 1987 Mental 
Health Consultation Report: A Dra@ Plan to Replace Riverview H~spital.'"~ In I W O .  the 
govemment adopted the Report, proposing to shift mental health seniices away fiom 
institutiona1 care to a decentraiized. integrated mental health system. To achieve this 
goal. Riverview Hospital was to be replaced by regional tertiary care facilities, enhanced 
acute care services, and expanded community mental hedth services, including housing 
and C ~ S ~ S  intervention. Implementation of thïs plan began in 1992 and $53 million was 
398Supra note 22 at 54 & 55. 
, 
'"~uditor Generai of British Columbia, fW3/W: Report 5: Value-for-Money 
Audits, Ministry of HeaZth, The TraMer of Patients flom Riverview Hospital to the 
Cornrnrrnify, Psychiairist Services (Victoria: Office of the Auditor Generai, 1994) at 1 1. 
ritis h Columbia MiMstry of Health, Mental Health Consultafion Report: .l 
Drap Plan to Replace Riverview Hospital (Victoria: Ministry of Health, 1 98 7). 
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injected to improve mental health services. However, $17 million of this was required to 
offset inflation and fûnd an increase in the demand for mental heaith services resulting 
from a growth in population. Only $36 million was left "to develop new services in the 
areas of housing, emergency response. rehabilitation, clinical services. consumer/family 
services. child and youth services, and alcohol and drug services for aboriginal people.'40' 
While this funding did provide additionai community mentai health services. 'Oit did not 
address the inadequate supply of services relative to the needs of the most disabled 
individu al^.'*^' Furthemore, additional pressures were placed on cornrnunity mental 
health services due to psychiatrie bed closures at Riverview Hospital. Between 1992 to 
1995, 163 beds were closed at Riverview H~spital .~ '  Additional pressures resulted from 
"a continuing migration of people with mental illness to the Lower  mainl land for services. 
a lack of admission and discharge planning between Riverview Hospital. acute care 
hospital and community services'u0* and a lack of policy coordination between rninistries. 
Furthemore, the Ministry of Health had not developed a long range plan for the shifi in 
services to be implemented."' By 1996, it became more obvious that adequate 
community mental health resources were still lacking. As a result, the reduction of 
'O 1 Supra note 3 at ii. 
"'~ccording to the Adult Mental Health Services Division in L992/93 Riverview 
hospital had 971 beds and in 199996 it had 808. 
'oISupra note 3 at ii. 
'"For a discussion on the planning requirements see Auditor General Report of 
British Columbia, supra note 399 at 34-41. 
hospital beâs at the Rivemiew Hospital was halted and the Provincial Mental Health 
Advisory Council Working Group was asked to review the community mental health 
system. The Working Group recommended an additional injection of $34 million into the 
community mental health system for emergency response services, housing, corn muni^ 
clinicd staff, rehabilitation and other p r ~ g r a r n s . ~  Subsequently, the Ministry of Health 
and the Ministry Responsible for Seniors released a consultation document, Developing a 
New Mental Health Plan for British Col~rnbia.'~' In response to this document a large 
number of stakeholders and some advocacy groups expressed the view that the planning 
ratio of 37 psychiatric beds for each 100.000 of population (15 acute beds and 22 tertiary 
beds) was problematic because a "fùlly resourced community care system is currently not 
in place and that [mental health] planning needs to include beds necessary for treating 
children. youth and elderly people with mental illnes~.'"~ In particular. there was 
concem that acute hospital psychiatric beds were unavailable because inadequate 
comrnunity mental health resources led to an inappropriate use of many of these beds. 
Another major concern expressed by stakeholders and advocacy groups related to 
the unavailability of safe and afYordable housing for persons with mental disorders. 
Persons with mental disorders involved in the cnminal justice system were identified as 
particularly difficult to house. In addition, many respondents reiterated the need for a 
significant change in the mode of service delivexy, shifiing fiom an office-based mode1 to 
'"Supra note 3 at 43. 
4071b ici. 
'O8Ibid at 58. 
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an outreach community based system. The Working Group also made the interesting 
point that a shifi in attitude was needed from "a system where individuals must comply 
behaviorally or face discharge fiom a program to a 'no reject' system that flexibly 
responds to individuai needs.'"" The respondents made clear that adequate community 
mental health services and support must precede or parallel the Riverview Hospital 
replacement process. 
ii) Current Mental Health System 
In 1998, the govemrnent of British Columbia adopted The 1998 Mental Health 
Plan.'" reiterating the govemment's cornmitment to community based mental heaith 
services. The PIan established that the highest priority in allocating mental health 
fimding shall be given to persons with the highest level of fûnctional impairment. It 
recognized the need to improve interministerial policy coordination to address support 
services to persons with mental disorders such as housing, income security, training. 
employment and other social supports. 
Funding of The 1998 Mental Health Plan will be spread over a seven year period. 
The Plan stated that more than $34 million in additionai fimding will be needed to bring 
mental health services up to the current provincial guidelines. The listing of required new 
mental health services outlined in the Plan speaks volumes of the present lack of 
comrnunity mental health resources and of regional psychiatrie beds: for example, 2,600 
* 
supported, independent living units are required; assertive or intensive case management 
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for 8,200 persons with mental illness at a ratio of 2011 are needed; crisis services are 
needed in over 30 communities 1 13 additional tertiary beds are needed; and planning and 
facility acquisition is required for 663 cornmunity-based tertiary treatment beds in the 
regions. The goverment has proposed to ailocate % 125 million to increase community 
mental health services and the decentralizaîion of mental health services. Funding for 
mental health services will be in a protected mental health fûnding envelope. 
While in British Columbia accused persons are not k ing detained in jail to await 
hospital beds,'" similar issues regarding the suficiency of community mental health 
resources and the supply of forensic beds have been raised. In a briefing note last year' a 
Ministry of Health official stated that the "community does not have sufficient resources 
in terms of housing, supervision and medical support to be able to cope with many 
discharges fiorn the Institute,'"" and m e r  that most of the accused persons found 
NCRMD who occupy the 203 beds4" at the Forensic Psychiatric hstitute are unable to be 
gradually reintegrated in the community because of lack of resources. In addition. 70% of 
'"Both the Chairperson of the British Columbia Review Board and the Clinical 
Director of the Forensic Psychiatric Institute declared that accused persons under the 
mental disorder provisions were not detained in jail to await a bed at the Forensic 
Psychiatric Institute. Furthermore, the bed capacity of the Institute was increased to 203 
beds in 1997 because a new Institute was built. 
"'Ministry of Health and Ministry Responsible for Seniors, "Briefing Document: 
Reaction of the Criminal Justice System to a Delay in admissions caused by a Bucklog at 
rhe Forensic Psychiatric institute " dated 'Apnl2 1, 1997 at 2. 
'"'This figure was provided by Dr. Derek Eaves, Clinical Director of the British 
Columbia Forensic Psychiatric Institute. These beds consist of 90 maximum secure beds. 
70 medium secwe beds and 43 minimum secure beds. The Institute has 6.5 regionai 
forensic clinics to supervise and provide treatrnent and support to persons under the 
jurisdiction of the British Columbia Review Board. 
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these persons return to the Forensic Psychiatric Institute afier k ing  discharged because of 
insufficient community mental health resources.'" 
In British Columbia, the forensic mental health system is administered and co- 
ordinated by the Forensic Psychiatric Services C~mrnission,''~ part of whose mandate is 
to provide forensic psychiatric services to persons held under the mental disorder 
provisions of the Criminul Code. Because the forensic mental health system has operated 
separately fiom the mainstream mental heaIth system, a "canyon" has developed between 
forensic and mainstrearn mental health ser~ices,"~ such that persons within the forensic 
system have had dificulty in accessing services in the mainstream mental health 
system.'" Therefore, the 1998 iUentai Health Plan'" proposes to integrate forensic 
mental health services within the mainstrearn mental hedth system; the Forensic 
Psychiatric Institute will be placed under the governance of the British Columbia Mental 
'"'See the discussion in the Adult Mental Health Division, Ministry of Health and 
Minis~y Responsible for Seniors, Revitalizing and Rebalancing British Columbia S 
1Menfal HeaZth System: The 1998 Mental Health Plan, supra note 3 at 30-3 5 on 
community mental health services required to assist a person with severe mental illness to 
remain in the community. In addition see Best Practices, Discussion Paper, supra note 
4 1 at 6 and 7 regarding programs required to support the individual in the community. 
'"The Commission was established under the Forensic Psychiatry Act, R.S.B.C. 
1996, c.  156. 
"%s description suminarizes the lack of integration between forensic mental 
services and mental health services. This comment is cited in The Adult Mentai Health 
Division, Ministry of Health and ~ i n i s 6  Responsible for Seniors, Revitalizirzg and 
Rebalancing British Columbia S Mental Health System: The 1 998 Mental Health Plan, 
supra note 3 at 24. 
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Health Society which operates the Rivewiew Hospital, and the forensic community 
clinics will be transferred to the health authorities. 
As in Ontario. the shift fiom institutionai care to community mental hedth 
services has resulted in an "inadequate supply of services relative to the needs of the most 
disabled individu al^.'^'^ Lack of funding of community mental health services, as well as 
lack of coordination and planning between R i v e ~ e w  Hospital, (the main psychiarric 
hospital in British Columbia), acute care hospitais and community mental health services 
and of coordination among relevant social services ministries have contributed to the 
current state of the mental health sy~tern. '~~ This situation was compounded by additional 
pressures on the mental health system such as an increase in the nwnber of persons 
requinng mental health services in ernergency departments of hospitals in the Lower 
Mainland and of person with more acute levels of mental illnesses which necessitated 
longer stays in acute care hospitals. 
c) The Impact of InsufTicient Mental Health Resources 
The lack of adequate mental health resources, coupled with the decisions in 
McGillis and  ine et^" (discussed below). result in a significant impact on an accused 
person and the jurisdiction of a Review Board. The legislative scheme of the mental 
disorder provisions outlined in sections A and B is undermined because a lack of 
4'91bid at ii. 
"'These factors are identified in Adult Mental Heaith Division, Ministry of Health 
and Ministry Responsible for Seniors, Revitalking and Re balancing British Colurn bia 's 
Mental Heaith System: The 1 998 Mental HeaZth Plan, supra note 3. 
"" McGillis. supra  note 16 and Pinet, supra note 35.  
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resources results in the orden of a Review Board not king implemented. Furthemore, if 
a Review Board must consider the implementation of the order and the mental health 
system does not provide the necessary resources, the Review Board is unable to gant  the 
least restrictive or least onerous order. Therefore, it cannot protect the liberty of the 
accused person. 
In Brockville Pg)chiatric Hospiral v. McGillis. '" the hospitai appealed a deci sion 
of the Ontario Review Board. In April 1996, the Ontario Review Board had ordered the 
conditional release of Mr. McGillis, an accused person found NCRMD. The Board 
stipulated as one of the conditions that Mr. McGillis reside in accommodation outside the 
hospital approved by the Administrator of the Brockville Psychiatrie Hospital. ï h e  Board 
had issued the same conditional order in May, 1995 fotlowing Mr. McGillis' annual 
review. As well, in 1994, the Board had made a custodial order with a condition that Mr. 
McGillis could be permitted to reside in the community if suitable accommodation were 
found. The Cornart of Appeal of Ontario found that the evidence before the Board was that 
no suitable accommodation was available in May, 1995 or April 1996. As a result of this 
situation, the Court concluded that the Ontario Review Board should have made a 
custodial order rather than a conditional discharge. The Court relied on British Columbia 
(Forensic Psychicztric Institute) v. ~ o h n s o n ~ ~ ~  to find that the order of the Board was a 
"hybrid of the two separate orders contemplated by S. 672.54(b) (conditional discharge) . 
4" --Supra note 1 6 .  
"3Johnron, supra note 280. 
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and S. 672.54(c) (detention order) and is not contemplated by the statutory scheme in Part 
XX. 1 of the Criminal Code.'""' In this situation, the Court stated that the Board should 
have issued a custodial order and "given the hospital adrninistrator the discretion to 
permit the respondent to reside outside the hospital if suitable accommodation could be 
f* und .'"''5 As well, the Court added that since 
[Tfhe proceedings before the Board are not adversarial put  inquisitorial in 
nature] ... if the Board felt that M e r  steps should be taken to explore the 
availability of suitable accommodation outside the hospital, it should have 
directed the hospital and/or counsel for the respondent to take those m e r  
~ t e ~ s . ~ ' ~  
The order of the Board was quashed and a new hearing ordered. 
The Johnson case referred to above is easily distinguished from McGilZis because 
the wording of the orders was different. In McGilZis. the Ontario Review Board ordered 
the Administrator of the Brockville Psychiatric Hospital to carry out the conditions of the 
conditional discharge order, one of which was to discharge Mr. McGiliis to live in the 
cornmunity in accormodation approved by the Administrator. In Johnson. however. the 
British Columbia Review Board granted a conditional discharge which contained 
"conditions which give the Director authority to confine her to the Forensic Psychiatric 
Institute.'*" The British Columbia Court of Appeal determined that such conditions 
[I]n effect gives the Director the power to convert the conditional 
. 
'"Supra note 16 at 243. 
'"Ibid at 243. 
4261bid at 244. 
"'Johnson supra note 280. 
discharge order into a custody order under S. 672.54(c), without any 
attendant requirement that such a direction be reviewed by the Review 
Board. Such a power is inconsistent with the concept of a conditional 
disc harge orded2' 
In the McGiflis case, the Ontario Review Board ordered the release of Mr. McGillis on 
condition that he live in accommodation approved by the Adrninistrator. The 
Administrator could not choose to designate the hospital as approved accommodation. 
Nothing in Mr. McGillis' order pennitted the Administrator to detain Mr. McGillis in 
hospital. Rather it placed the onus on the Administrator to discharge Mr McGillis from 
detention and assist him in finding appropriate living accommodation in the cornmunity. 
In effect, Mr. McGillis continued to live in hospita! because the Administrator did not 
implement the conditional discharge order since no suitable accommodation in the 
community existed. 
Furthemore, even if a Review Board made an order adjourning a hearing or 
continuing the status quo and directing the person in charge of a hospital or the accused 
person to gather additional information for an early hearing, neither the person in charge 
of a hospital nor the accused person would be any further ahead, if the m e n t .  health 
system did not provide adequate mental health resources to reintegrate the person in the 
community. The parties cannot create the necessary rnentai health resources. The 
1C.lcGilfi.s case is the perfect illustration of this point. From 1994 to 1996, the 
Administrator of the Brockville Psychiatrie Hospital was unable to find suitable 
accomodation for Mr. McGillis in the community and no amount of direction fiom the 
Board was able to change this. Without mental health resources, disposition orders are 
not implemented, as shown by the nurnben of persons that were detained in jail in 
Ontario or not transferred expeditiously fiom a higher level of security to a less restrictive 
environment. 
The British Columbia Review Board decision, In the Matrer of Robert Aflen 
MitchelP" also demonstrates the impact of hadequate mental health resources. In this 
case the British Columbia Review Board noted that the Director of Adult Forensic 
Psychiarric Services has recommended a custodial order and conceded the possibilil of a 
conditional discharge if a 24 hour supervised community placement were found. The 
Board noted that since July 2, 1996, it had expressed concerns about the lack of progress 
in finding a supervised and stnictured community placement. At a hearing in June 1997 
the Board was informed that the system was not designed to deal with Mr. Mitchell. At 
that time the Board rendered a custodiai order and set a date for a new hearing by January 
1998 (which was adjoumed) to permit the appropriate action to be taken to remove the 
bureaucratie obstacles to finding an appropriate community placement for Mr. Mitchell. 
When the next hearing was held in Febniary 1998, the Board determined that 
Given the Director's strong views as to the potential threat posed to public 
safety by the accused, and the absence of any current less restrictive 
alternative, the Review Board was constrained to continue Mr. Mitchell's 
custodial 
However, the Review Board ordered a new hearing by April30,1998 (which was 
4'9Supra note 36. 
'jOIbid at 4. 
adjoumed). The next heaing was held May 20, 1998. In the Reasons for Disposition of 
this hearing, the Board emphasized the lack of community resources and the effect of this 
situation on Mr. Mitchell and the powers of the Board. It stated: 
A11 parties agree that Mr. Mitchell does not need to reside in a hospital 
setting, and he could fùnction in the community if there were available an 
appropriate community facility that would provide the khd of structure 
and supervision that he requires in order to ensure public safel. In the 
absence of this, the default position is a custodial disposition in a hospital: 
Brockville Psvchiatric Hosbitd v. McGillis (Ont. C.A., Oct. 4, 1996). 
. . . Like previous panels of the Review Board, the membea of this panel 
are v e v  concemed that the effect of the shortage of supervised comrnunity 
placements in British Columbia is to prevent many mentally disordered 
accused, like Mr. Mitchell, Eom being granted the least onerous and least 
restrictive appropriate disposition on the basis of  considerations set out in 
sec. 672.54.43' 
The Board continued the detention in custody of Mr. Mitchell and ordered another early 
review in this case. 
In addition, the McGillis decision appears to be contrary to the position taken by 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in an earlier decision, R. v. pinetd3'. In that case, it decided 
that the Board erred because it had determined that Mr. Pinet could be detained in a 
medium secure facility but made an order detaining him in a maximum secure facility 
until the Administrator made the arrangements for the transfer. The Court stated: 
1 am of the view that once the Board determines the appropriate type of 
facility in which to detain an accused person, it must make a disposition in 
conformity with that determination.'"' 
J3'lbidat 8. 
"'Supra note 35. 
'j31bid at 102. 
Using this reasoning, the Board in the McGillis case determined that where a conditional 
discharge was warranted, it could not order him detained in hospital; however this 
approach was rejected by the Court. 
In my opinion, the McGifZis decision goes against the legislative scheme of the 
mental disorder provisions, whose objective is to reintegrate a detained person found 
NCRMD into the cornmunity. as quickiy as the accused person's mental condition 
permits. I do not think the Ontario Review Board had any other choice but to make the 
least onerous and least restrictive disposition once it considered the factors set out in 
section 672.54 of the Code. The mental disorder provisions do not require a Review 
Board to enquire into the implementation of its order. The Chairperson of the Ontario 
Review Board supports this view that the d i n g  in the McGiUis case is contrary to the 
legislative scheme of the mental disorder provisions. He stated that 
To require that the Review Board. over and above those factors 
specifically outlined in the Criminal Code, be satisfied that its proposed 
disposition can be irnplemented at the time it is k i n g  made. strikes at the 
heart of the Review Board's jurisdiction. 
. . . 
If the Review Board is prevented from doing what it finds 'to be the least 
onerous and least restrictive for the accused', then in my opinion the 
accused is denied the benefit of the legislated scheme?' 
The Chairperson of the British Columbia Review Board has stated similar concems. He 
has declared that 
Having heard that the plan is in faft practically achievable, we believe that 
for the Board to primarily concern itself with or be constrained by matters 
of administration, such as the allocation of b d s  or resources, would be 
inappropnate. To do so would enlarge the Board's statutory duties under 
"'Supro note 22 at 53 & 54. 
S. 672.54 by importing the additional criterion or dimension of 
imvlementation. It would also render s.672.54 which directs îhe Board to 
make the least onerous and least restrictive disposition, an empty 
admonition. (ernphasis in the original)"" 
The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v.  ine et^'^ made comrnents on the question of 
resources which are womsome when coupled with the decision in the McGillis case. 
Counsel for the Administrator argued that in Mr. Pinet's case insufficient evidence was 
adduced before the Ontario Review Board that there was a medium secure facility with 
space and appropriate facilities and treatment for Mr. Pinet. Therefore, the Ontario 
Review Board should not have ordered the transfer of Mr. Pinet to a specific hospital. 
Rather, it should have made a generic order for the adrninistrator to transfer Mr. Pinet to 
an appropriate medium secure hospital. McKinley J.A. noted in obirer that this raises the 
potential conflict that exists between the 'Ltraditional care-givers of accused persons and 
the persons now charged with protecting their liberty rights.'"" However. she adopted the 
position of the Administrator because 
It would be of no assistance to anyone to have an accused person arrive at 
a hospital where there was no room, inadequate security, and inappropriate 
treatment facilities to deal with him. This is a practicaf type of problem 
which can be dealt with best by CO-operation developed between hospital 
'"B. C. Review Board, In the Matter ofGeorge Michael Peters, Reasons for 
Disposition dated March 1 5, 1998 (unrepbrted) at 8. Similar comments were made in the 
In the &farter of Anthony Florence, Reasons for Disposition dated February 12, 1998 
(unreported) at 1 5 & 16. 
436S~pra note 35. 
administrators and the Board.'j8 
In response to dus obiter, frst, 1 would point out that if a hospital bed is 
unavailable because of lack of resounies. CO-operation between hospital administrators 
and a Review Board is unlikely to create a bed. In practice, in Ontario, an accused person 
is not transferred from one hospital to another uniess a bed is available in the receiving 
hospital which results in lengthy waiting lists.*j9 Furthemore. a Review Board cannot 
enter into a dialogue with just one part .  to the proceedings. The mental disorder 
provisions are clear that a Review Board may only decide issues at a hearing with al1 the 
parties present. Second, a Review Board has specialized expertise which makes it 
knowledgeable about facilities and programs in the psychiatrie hospitals in their 
respective provinceu0, and it hears evidence fiom the parties on these issues. Third. as 
previously discussed. the obirer would place a Review Board in a quandary because "the 
court appears to have introduced for the first time a factor of implernentation into the 
scheme into which the Review Board is bound to operate.'"*' A Review Board must 
consider the mental condition and other needs of an accused person, as specified in 
section 672.54 of the Code and determine a fit disposition. Considerations such as family 
and other supports and the appropriate cornmunity for reintegration of the accused person 
')'lbid at 1 O3 and 104.1 would note that these comments affect the independence 
of the Review Board. 
'j9Supra note 22 at 24. 
440 This expertise is recognized in DovidFon supra note 23; Peckham supra note 
27 1 ; D. H. supra note 280 and Winko supra note 1 7. 
U'Supra note 22 at 29. 
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enter into the decision Therefore, if a Review Board cannot order an accused person 
transferred to a specific hospital, it would be remiss in its duties. Fourth, where a person 
found NCRMD is detained in jail prior to an initial hearing by the Review Board, U' a 
Review Board could not detain an accused person in jail even if neither a bed nor 
treatment was a~ailable."~ 
E. Conclusion 
In conclusion, at present, some accused persons in Ontario and British Columbia 
who might othewise be able to live in the community are unabte to do so because of lack 
of supervision, appropriate housing and other community supports, and other accused 
persons are detained in a more restrictive environment because of an insuficient supply 
of psychiatric beds. Although 1 cannot give a precise number of persons found NCRMD 
who have been directly affected by the lack of adequate r e s o u ~ e s , ~  1 suggest that 
'"This is the case in Ontario. However, in British Columbia persons found 
NCRMD are not detained in jail while awaiting their initial Review Board hearing. 
*'However. a Review Board may detain dual status offender in jails , section 
672.68 of the Code. Until recently, in Ontario, the provincial corrections authorities 
would not deliver an accused person to the specified hospital as ordered by the Review 
Board unless the hospital informed the jail that a bed was available. However, in 
conversation with Ministry of Health offkials, 1 was informed that a directive had been 
issued that persons under the jurisdiction of the Review Board had to be delivered to the 
psychiatric hospital named in the order of the Board within 48 hours. This followed a 
habeas corpus application by a number of persons detained in jails even after the Board 
had issued an order, see T. Boyle, "Jailing mentally il1 accused iilegal: Lawyer Accused 
should be in hospital. bur no beds availa8le " The Toronto Star Article February 24. 1998 
at AS. 
JJJ There are no statistics kept on this topic by the Ontario Review Board or the 
British Columbia Review Board and 1 could not ascertain any other source that would 
keep such statistics. To ascertain the numbers of persons found NCRMD affected since 
1992, a review of al1 the disposition reasons of both Boards would have to be done fiom 
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numerous persons have not received the least onerous and least restrictive disposition as 
mandated by section 672.54 of the Code. Consequently, they are held under the 
jurisdiction of a Review Board for a longer period than if adequate mental health 
resources were available. 
The question remains whether mental health reform will provide the necessary 
mental health resources to ensure that persons who do not need to be detained in a 
psychiatric hospital or at a certain security level are given the l e s t  restrictive alternative. 
Seeing the past track record of mental health reform and its pace. I am doubtful that 
adequate mental health resources will be available. Furthermore, more pressure will be 
brought to bear on the strained mental health resources if the number of persons with 
mental illnesses who commit minor offences and who are deait with under the mental 
disorder provisions continues to increase. Accused persons whose liberties are affected 
by the lack of mental hedth resources cannot f i o r d  to wait. In the next chapter. 1 




In this chapter, 1 examine whether a Charter remedy is available to accused 
personP whose rights have been infkinged. As argued in chapter 2, the lack of adequate 
community mental health resources in both Ontario and British Columbia and the 
inadequate supply of forensic beds in Ontario, result in some accused persons k i n g  
detained longer in custody than required to ensure the protection of the public. The 
reasons are that a Review Board may not grant the least restrictive or the l e s t  onerous 
disposition due to inadequate mental health resources, or, if it does, Iengthy delays occur 
in the implementation of the dispositions or these dispositions are not implemented at all. 
As  previously stated, the lack of data on the timetiness of implernentation of disposition 
orders by the Ontario Review Board, the British Columbia Review Board, or provincial 
or federal governments makes it difficult to ascertain the nurnber of accused persons 
whose detention has been lengthened because of the inaction on implementing disposition 
orders. However, the basis of my argument that accused persons' nghts have been 
infringed rests on the concerns raised by the Chairperson of the Ontario Review Board 
and those of the Chairperson of the British Columbia Review Board that inadequate 
mental health resources result in delays in the implementation of dispositions of the 
Review Board or act as a restraint in the Board granting the least onerous and least 
restrictive disposition. These are in addition to the concerns of advocates, ministry of 
44s As previously explained, "accused persons" refers to persons who were found 
not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and are under the jurisdiction of 
a Review Board established under the mental disorder provisions of the Code. 
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health O fficials and the Health Services Restructuring Commission regarding waiting lists 
and inadequate mental health resources for the senously mentally ill, as detailed in 
chapter 2.  In addition, accused persons in Ontario have had on occasion to reson to 
mandamus or habeas corpus applications to get a psychiatrie bed? That, in itself. 
suggests that problems exist with the implernentation of the disposition sections of the 
mental disorder provisions. 
1 argue that the problem does not lie with the mental disorder provisions 
themselves. Instead 1 contend that the inhgements  of the nghts of accused persons- for 
example by the lengthening of the detention or more restrictive detention- result from the 
delays in implementing Board disposition orden or from disposition orders which 
themselves do not represent the least restrictive or least onerous disposition. 1 argue in 
turn that these situations occur because the provincial governments do not provide 
adequate mental health resources to accused persons.u7 Therefore, I argue that decisions 
by provincial public officiais regarding the allocation of mental health resources infnnge 
the nghts of accused persons guaranteed by two provisions of the Canadian Charter of- 
4461n discussions with legal counsel to the Ontario Review Board, Mr. Richard 
Schneider, and legal counsel on a recent habeas corpus application, Mr. Joseph Kenkel. 
in June and September, 1998,I was informed that there have only been a few rnandamus 
or habeas corpus applications issued. ~Ôwever,  following the service of a rnandamus or 
habeas corpus application on the person in charge of a hospital named in the disposition 
and within the two-week notice period required by the d e s  of court, the accused person's 
disposition is implemented and therefore the application is not heard. The Ontario 
Review Board does not keep copies of these applications. 
'"~his argument will be dealt with more fùlly below. 
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Righrs and Freedoms:";" section 7 (the right to life, liberty and security of the peaon and 
not to be depnved of these rights except in accordance with the principles of hindamental 
justice) and subsection 15(1) (the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination). 
Before proceeding with an analysis of section 7 and subsection 15(1) of the 
however. there are a number of preliminary issues to be addressed. Fi- an 
understanding of the h e w o r k  of the Chorter is necessary to situate the arguments 
advanced in this chapter. Therefore, in the first part of this chapter. 1 set out a bnef 
explanation of the framework of the Charrer to guide the discussion. Then. 1 discuss the 
preliminary issues raised by advancing the proposed Charter challenge. I examine the 
possible Charter remedies available to accused persons and explore the reasons for 
proposing a remedy under subsection 24(1) of the Charter. The next question which 
needs to be addressed is how such a Charter challenge might be advanced given the 
cross-jurisdictional issues involved and possible overlap of jurisdiction. Both levels of 
govemment are involved: accused persons are governed by the mental disorder 
provisions of the Code, enacted by ParIiament under subsection 9 1 (27), the criminal 
power, of the Constitution Acf, 1867450 while the provincial govemment has jurisdiction 
over health under its jurisdiction over hospitals and asylums (subsection 92(7)). property 
and civil rights (subsection 92(13)), and matters of a merely local or private nature 
& 
'"'Supra no te 1 4. 
4491bid. 
"'Supra note 253. 
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(subsection gS(l6)) including the allocation of mental health resources. The federal 
govenunent does not provide fimding to the provinces for the implernentation of the 
mental disorder provisions of the C ~ d e . ~ "  
The rest of the chapter focuses on specifics of the proposed Charrer challenge. 1 
argue that where. because of inadequate mental health resources, an accused person does 
not receive the Ieast onerous or least restrictive disposition or the disposition is not 
implemented, her or his liberty and equality rights are infnnged contrary to section 7 and 
subsection 15(1) of the and that these infringements cannot be justified under 
section I of the Charter. 
Part 1- Settïng the Context 
A. Charter Framework 
a) Subsection 52(1)- Constitutional Supremacy and the Churîer 
With the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982,'53 the Canadian Constitution 
'"'In a discussion in September, 1998 with an officia1 of the Ministry of Health of 
Ontario, 1 confirmed that the federal government does not provide any specific funding 
for the implementation of the mental disorder provisions of the Code. The only funding a 
province receives with respect to health is the federal contribution to the provincial health 
insurance plan under the Canada Health Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-6. Section 3 of this Act 
States: "It is hereby declared that the primary objective of Canadian health care policy is 
to protect, promote and restore the physiqd and mental well-being of residents of Canada 
and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or other barriers." 
The Act requires that to qualifj for a cash contribution the health insurance plan of a 
province has to be, amongst other thiags, comprehensive and accessible. 
"'Supra note 1 4. 
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underwent a fundamental change. Subsection 52 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.'5' 
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law 
that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent 
of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. 
The Constitution went "fiom a system of Parliamentary supremacy to constitutional 
supremacy."" With the inclusion of the Charferad in the Constitution the individual 
and group rights set out in the Chorter are given constitutional pr~tection.'~' The 
Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Therem,"' held that the constitutional character of the 
Charter is "a new affirmation of rights and fieedoms and of judicial power and 
responsibility in relation to their prote~tion.'"'~ Furthemore, in the recent case of Vriend 
v. the Supreme Court of Canada emphasizes the interpretive role that the 
Charter places upon the courts. Iacobucci J. States that "[ilnevitably disputes over the 
meaning of the [Charter] rights and their justification would have to be settled and here 
'sSDickson CJC cited in Vriend v. Alberta supra note 38 at para. 13 1. 
4 5 6 ~ ~ p r a  note 14. 
457 See P. Macklem et al., Canadian Conîtimtional Law, 2" edition (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1997) at 1 146. See also P. W. Hogg in 
Constifutionai Law in Canada, 3rd edition ( Toronto: Carswell, 1 992) at 789 & 790. 
'"[1985] 1 S.C.R. 613. 
4S9/bid Le Dain J .  at 638. 
'@'Supra note 38. 
the role of the judiciary enters to resolve these  dispute^.'^^' Two early Charter cases, 
Hunter v. Southam Inc. and R. v. Big M Drug Mart ~ f d . ~ ~ '  discuss the nature of the 
Charrer and the approach which should be taken to its interpretation. In Hunter, Dickson 
CJC, for the Court, states that the Charter is 
[A] purposive document. Its purpose is to guarantee and to protect. within 
the limits of reason, the enjoyment of the rights and fieedoms it enshrines. 
It is intended to constrain govemental action inconsistent with those 
rights and fieedoms; it is not in itself an authorization for governrnental 
action? 
With respect to the approach, the Supreme Court of Canada determines that a purposive 
approach must be used in interpreting the Charter. As the Court states in R. v. Big !tl 
Drug Mart Ltd? 
The meaning of a right or fieedom guaranteed by the Charter [is] to be 
ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it [is] to be 
understood, in other words, in light of the interests it lis] rneant to protect. 
... This analysis is to be undertaken, and purpose of the right or fieedom in 
question to be sought, be reference to the character and the larger objects 
of the Charter itself. .. The interpretation should be ... a generous rather 
than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and 
securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection? 
'6'lbid at para 13 1. 
*'[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
'6'[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. 
Dickson CJC cited in P. ~ a c k l é m  et al., Canadian Constitutional Law, supra 
note 457 at 629. 
46SSupra note 463. 
'66Dic kson C JC cited in P. Macklem et al., Canadian Constitutional L m  supra 
note 457 at 674-075. 
Therefore, the purposive approach to Charter interpretation separates the Charter 
argument into two stages: "the fim stage being the daim of infringement and the second 
stage being the govemment's limitation arg~rnent.'"~~ 
b) Application of the Charter 
Subsection 32 (1) of the Charter states 
32. (1 ) The Charter appiies 
(a) to the Parliament and governrnent of Canada in respect of ail 
matters within the authority of Parliament including al1 matters 
relating to the Yukon Temtory and Northwest Temtories; and 
(b) to the legislature and govenunent of each province in respect of 
al1 matters within the authority of the legislature of each province. 
The Supreme Court has held that subsection 32 (1) of the Charter applies to the 
legislative, executive and administrative branches of government and their actions.468 
Furthermore, the Court states that the Charter applies to the common Iaw other than 
between private parties because the language of subsection 52 (1) of the Constitution Ac?, 
1982.469 In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada mled that the actions of the executive 
even when exercising a prerogative power are subject to the Charter?" In subsequent 
cases, the courts have determined that different forms of delegated legislation are subject 
to the Charter, for example municipal by-laws or rules of professional conduct of 
- - -- 
467P. Macklem et al. supra note 457 at 630. 
468 See Retail, Wholesale, and Depariment Srore Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin 
Delivery Ltd. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. 
469S~pra note 453. 
"'Sec Operation DismantIe Inc. v. The Queen [1985] 1 S.C.R. 44 1. 
different professional b~dies, '~' as well as persons and bodies exercising decision-making 
authority pursuant to l eg i~ l a t i on .~~  A number of cases have raised the issue of whether 
bodies that are established by legislation such as universities, hospitals. community 
colleges are subject to the Charter. In McKinney v. The University of Guelphdi3 the 
Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that the Charrer applies only to govemment and 
stated that the rnere fact that an institution is created by legislation or even that it carries 
out a public function is not sufficient to make it "govemment" for the purposes of section 
32. La Forest J. in McKinney determined that the focus is on the control exercised by 
government on the institution. If the institution was substantially controlled by 
government then it falls into the definition of 'government" under the McKinney test and 
the Charter applies to ail its activities.'" However. in Eldridge v. AG of Brirish 
'7'See P. Macklem et al., supra note 457 at 1 126 and 1 1 27 and R. Tassé and L. 
Tassé. Vpplicarions de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés " in G.-A. Beaudoin & 
E. Mendes, eds., The Canadian Charter of Righrs and Freedoms, Third Edition 
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1996) at 2-27 and 2-28. 
'"See Slaïght Communications lnc. v. DavidFon [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038. 
"'[l99O] 3 S.C.R. 229. See also Harrison v. University of British Columbia. 
Cl9901 3 S.C.R. 45 1, Stoman v. Vancouver Generul Hospital, [ l  9901 3 S.C.R. 483, and 
Dougfus/KwanrZen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [199v 3 S. C. R. 5 70. In these cases 
the Court was asked to decide whether the mandatory retirement policies adopted by the 
various institutions were subject to Charrer review. In McKinney, Harrison, and 
Stofman, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada decided that these institutions were 
autonomous bodies and not subject to the Charter. However, in Douglas the majority of 
the Court found that the comrnunity college was an emanation of government because it 
was a Crown agency established to implement government policy. 
4741n Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Ernployees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 2 1 1 the 
Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that when an institution is found to be a part of the 
"fabric of government", the Charter applies to al1 its activities, including those 
considered private. 
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~oiumbia~"' the Supreme Court of Canada determined that there may be situations where 
one function of an entity may be found to be a govenunent fûnction, although the entity, 
as a whole. would not be considered governent under the McKinney test.'76 then the 
Charrer applies only to that b c t i o n .  
c) Specific Charfe~ Rights and Freedoms Infringed 
Section 7 and subsection 1 S(1) are the two most iikely to be used by accused 
persons who wish to challenge that the disposition or the implernentation of a disposition 
made under section 672.54 of the Code? Section 7 States 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprîved thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fùndamental justice. 
The word "everyone" in section 7 refers to any person whose life. liberty or security is 
infiinped in Canada478 and encompasses  corporation^.'^^ Section 7 contains three rights: 
"'Supra note 38. 
'"Supra note 473. 
477Though there are other possible $rounds of infnngement of rights under section 
9 (the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned) , paragraph 10(c) (the right to 
have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be release if 
detention not lawfiil), and section 12 (the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment) of the Charter, these are not'germaine to the proposed Charter challenge 
which attacks the allocation of resources as opposed to the mental disorder provisions. 
"'sec Singh v. Canada (Min. Cf Emp foyment and lmrnigration) [ 1 9851 1 S .C. R. 
177. 
' 79~ee  supra 462. 
narnely, the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to sectuity of the person:" to the 
extent that these rights cannot be infnnged except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamentai justice; "[flor ail practicai purposes. then, section 7 creates a right to 
fundamental justice?"' In R. v. Swain J'2 the Supreme Court of Canada reiterates that to 
invoke section 7 of the Charrer, "an individual must establish an actual or potential 
deprivation of life, liberty or security of the p e r ~ o n ' ~ ' ~  and show that the deprivation of 
liberty or security is not in accordance with the pnnciples of fundamental justice. 
Subsection 1 5(1) of the Charter states 
Every individuai is equal before and under the law and has 
a right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination and, in particular without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colow, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
Cory J. in Vriend v. ~ l b e r t a ~ ~  states 
The rights enshrined in S. 15(1) of the Charter are fundamental to Canada. 
They reflect the fondest dreams, the highest hopes and finest aspirations of 
Canadian socie ty... Canada by the broad scope and fundamental faimess of 
the provisions of S. 15(1) has taken a finthet step in the recognition of the 
fundamental importance and the imate dignity of the individ ual... In order 
"'Sec Wilson J. in Singh v. Canada (Min. Of Employrnenr and Immigration) 
supra note 478 at 204; Lamer J. in Reference re S. 93(2) of the Motor VehicZe Act (British 
Columbia) [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 500; and Dickson CJC in R. v. Morgantaler [1988] 1 
S.C.R. 30 at 45. 
'"P. Garant "Fundamental Rights, Fundamental Justice " in G.-A. Beaudoin & E. 
Mendes, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 47 1 at 9-3 6. 
'8'S~pra note 1 7 .  
IWSupra note 3 8. 
to achieve equality the intrinsic worthiness and importance of every 
individual mut  be recognized regardless of age, sex, colour, origins or 
other characteristics of the person? 
In subsection 15(1), the emphasis is on equality before and under the law and equal 
protection and benefit of the law without discrimination. 
d) Limits to Charter rigbts and freedoms 
The rights and fieedoms protected by the Charter are not absolute. Section 1 of 
the CharteSM sets out the following limits: 
The Canadian Charter of Righfs and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedorns set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a fiee and democratic society. 
The reasons for stating that a limit to a Charter right or fieedorn must be prescribed by 
Iaw "' are two-fold. First, it is to "preclude arbitrary or discriminatory action by 
eovernment officiais'*" which is not authorized by law. Second, individuals must -'have " 
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited by Law so they can act 
'8Slbid at para. 67. 
486~upra  note 1 4 .  
"'For a more detailed discussion of the term "limits prescribed by law" see P. W. 
Hogg in Constitutional Law in Canada. supra note 457 at 86 1-863. The case law has 
held that the term "prescribed by law" includes a statute, regulation or a nile of comrnon 
law, see R. v. Therens supra note 41 4,  R WDSU v. Dolphin Delivery supra note 468, lnvin 
Toy W. Quebec [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, Swain supra note 1 7. However, Professor Hogg 
states that "directives or guidelines which, although issued by govemment department or 
agencies, faIl outside the class of officialry published delegated legislation, will probably 
not quaiifjf' as a limit prescribed by law. Furthemore, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
held in Therens supra note 458 at 645 that a limit on a right need not be express but can 
result "by necessity fiom the ternis of a statute or a regulation or from its operating 
requirements." 
."'P. W. Hogg, supra note 457 at 862. 
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accordingly.'*" Therefore, d e s s  an action of the government is authorized by law. the 
government cannot use section 1 to justify a Charter violation. 
In a few cases, the courts deai with only the requirement that the lirnits be 
prescribed by law.Igc However, in the majority of cases, the courts adopt a broad 
interpretation of a limit "prescribed by law" because of 
" [A] concem that an excessive emphasis on precision in language may 
unduly restrict legislatures in accompiishing their objectives and a concem 
that a stringent application of prescribed by law will circumvent the entire 
balancing process contempiated by S. 1 ."' 
R. v 0akes4" sets out the framework for analysis for determining whether a law 
qualifies as a reasonable limit on a right or fieedom in a free and democratic society. 
First. the objective of the law must be sufficiently important to justie infnnging a 
Charter right. Second, there must be a rationai comection between the law and its 
objective. Third, the law must minimally impair the right. Fourth, the effects of the 
infringement on the Charter right must not outweigh the legislative objective. 
e) Remedies 
Where the Charter rights and fieedoms of a person or groups are infringed and the 
infringement cannot be justified, the court may grant a remedy under subsection 52 (1) or 
I9'See P. Macklern et al., s u p  note 457 at 635. The authors note that the Thetem 
case and the cases that followed it are the exceptions where the court did not proceed to 
the justification argument in section 1 of the C ' t e r .  
' lb id. 
'92[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
24( 1 ), depending on the circumstances. 
i) Subsection 52(1) 
Under subsection 52( l )  of the Constitution Act, 1982.'" where legislation 
infiinges on a Charter right and is not saved by section 1 ,  the court may make a 
declaration that the legisiation as a whole is invalid. In addition, it may grant a temporary 
suspension of a declaration of invalidity to permit the governrnent in question to fiIl the 
legislative void. In cases where only some provisions of the legislation in question or 
some of its applications result in a violation of the Charter, the courts rnay use '' the 
techniques of severance, reading down and comtitutionol e~ern~t iom. '"~  so as to 
invalidate only those parts or applications and may also grant a temporary suspension of 
the invalidity to give the govemment time to act. Lamer C.J.C. notes in Rodriguer v. 
British Columbia (Attorney Gener~i)~" that 
[TJhis Court has recognized that an imrnediate dectaration of invalidity is 
not always advisable, especiaily where, as here, the provision pursues an 
important objective but is over-inclusive: were this Court to strike down 
the provision effective irnrnediately, those whom the govemment could 
protect constitutionally with a more tailored provision, and who indeed 
should be protected , would be left unprotected. This would clearly pose a 
'potential danger to the public' as understood in Swain and Schachter.'" 
Where the legislation is underinclusive because it provides benefits to some individuals 
'93Supro note 453. 
494P. Macklem et al., supra note 457 at 1 149. 
' 9 5 [ 1  9931 3 S.C.R. 5 19. 
4961bid at 570. 
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but not to othen, as in Schachter v. Canada'" or VriendJW the court may read in an 
extension of benefits. 
While it is clear that courts are competent to enforce the Charter under subsection 
52(l)? the question has arisen as to whether administrative tribunals and other arbiters 
have a similar power. The answer to this question lies in the statutory scheme which 
created the administrative tribunai or empowered the decision-making body4* The 
Supreme Court of Canada in Cuddy Chich Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations B ~ a r d ) . ' ~  
found that the Board had the authority to determine questions of invalidity under section 
52(1) of the Charter. as did the arbitrator in Douglas/Kwantlen Facuity Assn v. Douglas 
College, because the Board and the arbitrator respectively were granted the authority to 
determine questions of law by their enabling legislation and therefore. were required to 
detemine if a law was constitutionally  ali id.'^' However. the Court ruled in Tétreault- 
497[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679. 
'98Supra note 38. 
'"AS far as 1 could ascertain, there has not k e n  a detemination by a court of 
whether a Review Board established under the mental disorder provisions c m  be 
considered a court. However, the majority of the Ontario Review Board in a Pre- 
disposition Ruling In the Mutrer of the accused, James Peter Lappin dated October 24, 
1994 (unreported), detemined that it had jurisdiction to deal with the application of the 
Charter because it had the power to consider questions of law. But, the Board could not 
deal with a Charter challenge to the validity of sections 672.47 and 672.54 of the Code 
because it was limited to matten incidentpi to and within the ambit of disposition 
hearings. The rninority decided that it had the jurisdiction to determine the constitutional 
validity of these sections. However, the Board unanimousty d e d  that it was not a "court 
of competent jurisdiction" under subsection 24(1) of the Charter. 
5W[1991] 2 S.C.R. 5 .  
50'S~pra note 473. 
Gadoury v. Canada (Employmenr and Immigration C~rnmission)~" that the Commission 
did not have the authonty to decide questions of invalidity because it did not have the 
power to interpret iaws. 
ii) Subsection 24(1) 
While subsection 52(1) provides remedies where legislation, or a portion of it. is 
found to be invalid, subsection 24(1) of the Charter ptovides rernedies where a Charter 
right or freedorn is infringed by the actions of a decision-rnaker in applying the 
legislation. It is the actions taken pursuant to legislation that are unconstitutional, rather 
than the legislation itself.503 Subsection 24 ( 1 )  of the Charter States 
Anyone whose rights or fieedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have 
been infnnged or denied rnay apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to 
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
c ircumstances. 
A person whose Charter rights are infnnged may seek a remedy under this section. If a 
remedy is being sought in the public interest, it is in the discretion of a court of first 
instance to determine whether the person is granted ~tanding. '~ 
Section 24 does not create a particular court with jurisdiction to grant a Charter 
remedy; indeed the courts have interpreted the reference to "court of competent 
jurisdiction" to mean any court which aiready has jwisdiction independent of the Charter 
50L[1991] 2 S.C.R. 22. . 
'03See Eldridge supra note 38 at para. 20. See also P .  Macklem et al. Canadian 
Constifutional Law, supra note 45 7 at 1 146- 1 1 69. 
IMSee n>orson v. Canada (A. G) (No. 2) LI9751 1 S.C.R. 1 38, Nova Scotia Board 
Of Censors v. McNeil[1976] 2 S.C.R. 265, Canada (Minister of Justice) v. Borowski 
[ 198 11 2 S.C.R. 575, and Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R.. supra note 470. 
to grant the remedy sought . 'O5 Given that the "normal remedial amaments" of the 
superior courts are "virtually unlimited," in granting a remedy under subsection 24(1) 
supenor courts are Iimited only by "the need for the remedy to be 'appropriate and' just; 
and the breadth of judicial imagination."" Also, given the requirement that the 
jurisdiction to g a n t  a particular remedy must exist "extemal to the Charter itself, "'" 
iower courts would be somewhat h i t e d  as to the kinds of remedies that these courts 
could grant. Under subsection 24(1), a court might make a declaration of rights. issue an 
inj unction or writ of mandamus, or award monetary da mage^.'^^ 
B. The Appropriate Charter Remedy 
Given that the Constitution Act, 1982 provides two possible remedies where a 
person's rights have been infiinged under the Charter and the infnngement cannot be 
justified under section 1, an accused person wodd have to decide whether to seek a 
declaration of invalidity of al1 or part of the mental disorder provisions of the Code. under 
'05See Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), supra note 
478 at 222 where Wilson J. States that "[slection 24(I) of the Charter provides remedial 
powers to a 'court of cornpetent jurisdiction.' As 1 understand ihis phrase, it premises the 
existence of jurisdiction from a source external to the Charter itself." See also D. Gibson 
& J. Gee, "Enforcernent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms " in G.-A. 
Beaudoin & E. Mendes, The Canadian Charter of Righrs and Freedoms, supra note 47 1 
at 19-20 & 19-2 1 who points out that some authors argue that administrative tribunals are 
included in the expression "court of competent jurisdiction" and notes a few cases of the 
lower courts or Boards which adopt this view. 
507Wilson J. in Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employmenr and Immigration), supra 
note 478 at 222. 
'OsSee D. Gibson & J. Gee. "Enforement of the Canadian Charter of Righrs and 
Freedoms " supra note 47 1 for a more detailed discussion at 1 9-29- 19-47. 
subsection 52(1), or seek a remedy under subsection 24(1) of the Charter by challenging 
the action taken pursuant to the mental disorder provisions and provincial hedth 
legistation. However, in cases where the court grants a declaration of invalidity but 
temporarily suspends its effect, the court may grant an individual remedy under section 
24(1) in conjunction with a suspended declaration of invalidil. Lamer C.J.C. in 
Rodriguer v. British Columbia (Attorney Gener~l')'~ reiterates his reasoning in Schachter 
v. Canaddlo on the relationship between subsections 24(1) and 52(1) remedies. 
An individuai remedy under S. 24(1) of the Charter will rarelx be available 
in conjunction with an action under S. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 .... 
It follows that where the declaration of invalidity is temporarily 
suspended, a s.24 remedy will not often be available either. To allow for 
S. 24 remedies during the period of suspension would be tantamount to 
giving the declaration of invalidity retroactive effect. [emphasis in the 
original]" ' 
The other option is to seek both remedies as alternatives. in that if the mental disorder 
provisions were found to be constitutional then a remedy couid be sought under 
subsection 24(1). 
a)  Remedy under subsection 52(1) 
An argument can be made, based on the appeal decisions in Winko5" and 
'WSupra note 495. 
'lOSupra note 497. 
'"Supra note 497 at 572. In this dase, Lamer CJC. and Cory .J. who were 
dissenting would have granted Ms Rodriguez a constitutional exemption with specific 
conditions as a personal remedy in conjunction with the suspended declaration of 
invalidity. 
"'Supra note 1 7. The Charter challenge to section 672.54 of the Code was heard 
in conjunction with appeals on the same issues in Bese v. Forensic Psychiatrie Instifute 
~ e ~ a g e , " ~  that the disposition sections of the mentai disorder provisions. specifically 
section 672.54 of the Code in Part XX. 1 of the Code, are constitutionally valid because 
they do not infnnge an accused person's rights under section 7 and subsection 15(l) of 
the ~hor<er.~" Whko is an appeal from a disposition of the British Columbia Review 
Board where the appelIant argued that section 672.54 of the Code infringed his Charter 
rights under section 7 and subsection 15(1) and sought a declaration of invalidity of 
section 672.54. In ~ e ~ a ~ e , " ~  Mr. Lepage, an accused person detained in custody, was 
charged and convicted of criminal charges (four counts of threatening hospital staff). 
(British Columbia) 129 W.A.C. 12 and Orlowski v. Forensic Psychiatrie lnstiture (British 
Columbia) 129 W.A.C. 16. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted 
in al1 these cases on May 8, 1 997. The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeals in 
Winko and Lepage jouitly on June 15 and 16,1998. 
13Supra note 1 7. 
"'In Winko, supra note 17. the Court of Appeal of British Columbia was asked to 
rule on whether section 672.54 of the Code violated sections 9 and 12 of the Charter in 
addition to section 7 and subsection 15(1). Under section 9, it was argued that the test of 
"not a significant threat to the safety of the public" in section 672.54 of the Code does not 
detail the type of threat or harm contemplated and is therefore arbitrary. The Court 
rejected this, stating that "[ulnder the impugned section, however, criteria do exist: that 
is, whether or not an accused is a significant threat to the safety of the public." at 37. The 
Court added that it was also clear fiom the other provisions in Part XX. 1 of the Code that 
arbitrariness had been eliminated to a large extent by the requirement of periodic reviews 
by an independent Board, the provision of specific time Lines for review, the requirement 
for a Review Board to give reasons for its disposition, and the provision of a right of 
appeal. In short, the mental disorder provisions provide "a good deal of flexibility and 
discretion capable of king exercised by the Board and Court of Appeal." at 38. The 
Court gave short shrifi to the section 12 argument that the effect of section 672.54 of the 
Code subjected the appellant to cruel and unusual punishrnent because "[nleither the 
wording nor the effect of s.672.54 could possibly be characterized as outraging the 
standards of decency or grossly disproportionate treatment." at 38. 
5'5Supra note 17. 
Prior to his sentencing, Mr. Lepage raised the issue of the validity of Part XX. 1 of the 
Code before the sentencing judge and sought relief under section 52 of the Constitution 
Act. 1982"~ and subsection 24(1) of the Charter. 
i) Section 7 Argument 
In Winko,"' the British Columbia Court of Appeal, applying the reasoning in R. v. 
H e , ~ v o o d , ~ ~ ~  rejected the argument that the phrase "sigaificant threat to the safety of the 
public" was so vague or overbroad as to infnnge section 7 of the Charter. With respect 
to vagueness, the Court found that section 672.54 of the Code contains a sufficient 
framework to guide legal debate.'I9 On the issue of overbreadth, the Court determined 
that 
The legislative object is and must be to protect the public with as Iittle 
intrusion as possible into the Iives and liberty of those who are so 
unfortunately afflicted. Section 672.54 requires the Board to choose the 
least onerous and restrictive disposition, and requires it to schedule 
periodic reviews not only once a year. but under S. 672.82, the Board may 
hold a hearing at the request of the accused or any other part.. In my 
view, such a regime could not be said to be overbroad in these 
c i rcumstance~ .~~~ 
The Court added that even though the word '?hreatW has a future connotation, it is the 
-'only way unpredictable behaviour can be dealt with", but that the "potential threat -must 
-- 
5'6S~pra note 453. 
"Supra no te 1 7. 
518[1994] 3 S.C.R. 76 1. 
5'9This is the test set out in R. v. Nova Scotia PharmaceuticaZ Society 119921 2 
S.C.R. 606 and discussed above in the section on the Charrer fiamework. 
S20~upra note 17 at 4 1. 
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take the Board beyond mere speculation.""' Therefore, the Coun concluded that section 
672.54 of the Code does not "curtail liberty anymore than necessary in achieving the 
legislative objective."'" 
However, the Court of Appeal was split on whether section 672.54 of the Code 
infinges section 7 of the Charter by placing a reverse onus on an accused person to 
establish that she or he is not a significant threat before king granted an absolute 
discharge. The majority of the Court reafirmed the niling in Duvidson v. British 
Columbia (Attorney Get~eral)''~ that section 672.54 of the Code. by its tenns, does not 
impose a burden on any of the parties to a disposition hearing; rather it establishes an 
inquisitorial process. The majority of the Court in Winko reasoned that an inquiry 
FIS usually designed for less specific questions, and anticipates that a 
specialized tribunal will not be passive but will participate more actively 
in the process and will reach conclusions based not just on what the parties 
advance, but also on the ba is  of information the tribunal requires.'" 
On the other hand, "one of the hallmarks of adversarial proceedings" was the concept of 
onus whose purpose is usually to decide, on the evidence adduced by the parties whether 
.-a specified conduct has or has not oc~urred."~" However, a conclusive answer on 
questions as subtle as dangerousness rnay not be possible in some cases. A Review Board 
'"Ibid at 42. 
si21bid 
*"~upra note 23. 
'"supra note 17 at 52 & 53. 
S''lbid at 52. 
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must have the opportunity for M e r  inquiry before it can f o m  the opinion as to whether 
an accused person is not a significant threat to the safety of the public. The majority of the 
Court was of the opinion that, if a Review Board were required when in doubt to apply an 
onus, this could result in an ovemde of the ''the instructions of Parliament to protect the 
public fiom dangerous pers on^."^^^ Furthermore, as a result of the inquiry approach. the 
Review Board is expected to seek out information to detennine whether an accused 
person presents a significant threat to the safety of the public. The majority of the Court 
reiterated that the Review Board m u t  make the ieast onerous and les t  restrictive 
disposition taking into account the factors stipulated in section 672.54 of the Code and 
the protections afforded by early and periodic reviews and by the appeal provision and by 
the remedy of judicial review. On this basis, the majority concluded that section 672.54 
of the Code did not infnnge section 7 of the Charter because the "provisions leading to 
absolute discharge strike a fair balance behveen the state and a personfound 
iVCRMD.""' (Emphasis added.) 1 contend that the finding of the majority of the Court in 
WinkoS2', that section 672.54 of the Code does not infringe the accused person's rights 
under section 7 of the Charter because it does not impose a reverse onus on the accused 
person, is correct. Furthermore, this decision is in keeping with the earlier decision in 
163 
~ a v i d r o d ~ ~  and Pe~Wtarn~~'. There fore, 1 disagree with the dissenting opinion of 
Williams J.A. that, in reaiity, for an accused penon to gain an absolute discharge, she or 
he must acquire the necessary information to convince the Review Board that she or he is 
not a significant threat to the safety of the public. Williams J.A. attempted to distinguish 
the IVÏnko case fiom Davidson v. British Columbia (Attorney Get~eral)~" by stating that 
the Davidson decision does not deai with the question of onus, irrespective of the 
standard of proof, placed on the accused person. However, as the majority of the Court 
States. Duvidron generally deals with the issue of onus and is binding authority. In 
addition. Williams J.A. detemines that PecWlam v. Ontario (Attorney Ger~erol)~" does 
not apply in that it does not deai directly with the issue of whether a reverse onus in 
section 672.54 of the Code infnnges section 7 of the Charter. It is tnie that Peckham 
does not deal with a section 7 argument. However, it did rule that section 672.54 did not 
impose a reverse onus on an accused person and therefore the case was applicable to 
Win ko . 
In ~ e ~ a ~ e - " '  in the first instance it was argued that the failure of the govemment to 
5'9Supra note 23. 
530Supra note 27 1 .  
'"Supra note 23. 
S3'Supra note 27 1 .  
"'(1995) 40 C.R. (4') 43 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
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proclaim the capping provisions"" violated section 7 of the Charter. The judge rejected 
the section 7 argument on the grounds that a failure to proclaim a legislated provision in 
force is not an abuse of process that a court is capable of remedying. On appeai, Mr. 
Lepage abandoned the section 7 argument, and so it was not dealt with by the Court of 
Apped of Ontario. 
ii) Section 15 argument 
On the issue of subsection 15(1) of the Charter, the majority of the Court of 
Appeal in Winko mled that section 672.54 is not discriminatory and does not impose an 
irnpermissible burden, disadvantage or obligation. It reasoned that the deprivation of 
liberty of an accused person is based on the significant dangerousness an accused person 
represents and not on her or his mental disorder. The Court pointed to the fact that the 
Iegislation provides that an accused person who continues to suffer fiom a mental 
disorder must be given an absolute discharge if not a significant threat to the safety of the 
In my opinion, the Court of Appeal in ~ i n k o ~ ) ~  appears to be correct in its finding 
that section 672.54 of the Code does not infnnge subsection 1 S(1) of the Charter. As 
emphasized by the Court, the object of the mental disorder provisions is the protection of 
the public from dangerous persons based on the presumption that some accused persons 
53"Section 672.64 of the Code sets' a maximum number of years that an accused 
person c m  be detained in custody depending on the offence committed. 
53sWilliams LA., in the minority judgment, does not deal with the subsection 
1 5( 1 ) argument because of his fmding on section 7 of the Charrer. 
who come under the mental disorder provisions continue to be dangerous as a result of 
their mental illness? as stated by Lamer C.J.C., writing for the Court, in Swain."' 
[I]t is reasonable to assume that some insanity acquittees will continue to 
represent a danger to the public. While 1 recognize that not every 
individual will pose a continued threat to society, 1 do agree that this 
assumption, while certainly not irrefutable, is reasonable .... 
It seems reasonable to assume that these individu& could still be legally 
"insane" and that this incapacity to appreciate the nature and quaiity of 
their actions or their amoraiity could result in future dangerous conduct. 
[emphasis in the original]"* 
If an accused person is not a significant threat to the safety of the public, that person must 
be granted an absolute discharge even though the person may continue to suffer fkom a 
mental d i ~ a b i l i t y . ~ ~ ~  The mentai condition of an accused person is only one of the factors 
in determining whether the person is a significant threat. In my opinion, the purpose of 
the legislative scheme of the mental disorder provisions is "to humanely treat those 
suffering mental disorder, and to limit their liberty only to the extent necessary to ensure 
public ~afety.""'~ 
In Lepage "' the majority of the Court of Appeal of Ontario used R. v. Swain'" 
537S~pra note 1 7. 
5381bid at 1014. 
, 
5 3 9 ~ h e  question of significant threat was discussed in chapter 2. 
5MSupra Winko note 1 7 at 60. 
54 I Supra Lepage note 17. 
54'Supra Swain note 17. 
and Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatrie imtitute)"' to reiterate that the 
NCR verdict is not discriminatory in and of itself. Then, the Court considered whether 
the disposition hearing resulted fiom stereotypical assumptions about the mentally 
disabled or fiom an individualized assessment based on the merits of each case. The 
majority of the Court found that the disposition hearing is an inquiry into risk posed by 
each person found NCRMD to determine the danger. if any, an accused person poses to 
the community. The Court stated 
The risk assessment scheme contemplated by Part XX. 1 recognizes that 
proven past dangerousness, combined with present uncertainty as to the 
mental condition of the accused, warrants inquiry to determine what risk, 
if any the NCR accused poses to the community. At the same time, Part 
XX. 1 demands that any restraint on the accused's liberty pending 
assessment be justified under statutory criteria which require an 
individualized assessment of the accused and the circumstances of the 
offence. None of these criteria make any asswnption about the 
dangerousness of a NCR accused at the time of the verdict. Part XX. t also 
demands that the eventual disposition be the product of an inquiry which 
looks at the circumstances of each case and each accused individually. In 
doing so, it avoids the shortcomings of the previous systern which was 
found unconstitutional in Swain, supra. In short, the inquiry requirement 
in Part XX. 1 'treats individuals as individu al^'."^^ 
Furthemore. the majonty of the Court of Appeal of Ontario cited the Peckhom"' 
decision with respect to the disposition hearing being an inquiry and not an adversarial 
process, and reiterated the views of the Court expressed above in the CVi~ko case on the 
effect of this characterization of a disposition hearing. It emphasized that 'Wie scherne 
"'Supra Winko note 17. 
Susupra Lepge  note 17 at para. 5 8. 
545S~pra  note 27 1 .  
limits detention to situations where it is the 'least onerous and restrictive' position 
available ."'" The Court adopted the findings in Winko v. British Colunbicr (Forensic 
Psychiatric ~mtitute)"' that although the mental disorder provisions are ='engaged by the 
presence of mental disorder, which remains a relevant factor, the depnvation of liberty 
continues not because of mental disorder, but only because of significant 
da~~~erousness. ' '~~'  Therefore, a majority of the Court of Appeal of Ontario in Lepage 
ruled that a distinction based on dangerousness did not attract Charier scrutiny under 
subsection 1 3 1 )  of the Charter because it was not a distinction based on mental disability 
and because dangerousness cannot &be regarded as an anaiogous category to mental 
di~ability.""~ The equality rights of accused persons were not infringed. 
Goudge J.A., in the minority in Lepage, found that section 672.54 of the Code 
infnnged the equality rights of accused persons but was saved under section 1 of the 
Charter. He was of the view that the mental disorder provisions treat a person found 
NCR differently than any other person under the criminal law. Therefore, the provisions 
create a legislated distinction based on a personal characteristic. namely mental disorder. 
because "it cannot be said that the respondent's continued subjection to the procedures of 
s.672 is due to his dangerousness rather than his mental di~ability."'~ He M e r  found 
5'6Supra Lepage note 1 7 at para. 66. 
" " ~ u ~ r a  W i n h  note 1 7 .  
'481bid at 58.  
'%id at 60. 
'SO~upra Lepage note 1 7 at para. 1 04. 
that the legislated distinction constitutes discrimination based on the particular 
disadvantage sufîered by persons with mental disabilities. He added that the 
discrimination is confirmed by the fact that section 672.54 results in a burden on accused 
persons because of the adoption of a negative test which "presumed possible 
dangerousness of those in his situation, al1 of whom share the charactenstic of mental 
disability. This stereotypicd outcome is at odds with the purpose of S. 15 (1)."55i 
1 agree with the majority judgment in Lepage in that it characterizes the mental 
disorder provisions as a nsk assessrnent scheme to determine an accused person's 
dangerousness to the public. The British Columbia Appeal Court in Winko.j5' and earlier 
in D a v i dr~n,~~~ made the sarne fmding. Furthemore, the Court in Lepage unanimously 
agree that the mentai disorder provisions are sensitive to the rights of accused persons. 
Howeve- the Court in Lepage added a warning that 
There is always a concern that the actual operation of a statutory scheme 
does not accord with the spirit of the law it is intended to implement. In 
adjudicating constitutionai challenges, a court must always be concerned 
with the reality faced by those who assert denial of their rights. Section 
15(1) demands more than 'paper equality'. The words of the Criminal 
Code would offer cold comfort to persons caught in a scheme which 
lacked the will, expertise or fiscal resources needed to give effect to the 
statutory scheme. *" 
The Court specified that in this case, the record contained extensive evidence on the day- 
'' ' ~ b i d  at para. 1 09. 
Winko note 1 7. 
553S~pra note 23. 
5 54 Supra Lepage note 17 at 45. 
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to-day operation of Part XX. 1 in Ontario and that nothing in the record suggested that 
accused persons are subject to de facto discrimination based on their mental disabilities. 
However, the specific issue of fiscal resources was not raised by any of the parties in the 
appeal. No evidence appears to have been provided regarding the adequacy or 
availability of mental health resources for accused persons. 
Despite the approach taken in Winko and Lepage, an argument can be made that 
the disposition sections, in particular section 672.54 of the Code, are constitutionally 
invalid because they infnnge the Charter rights of an accused person under section 7 and 
subsection 15(1) and the sections are not saved by section 1 of the Charter on the grounds 
that the actual operation of the disposition sections of the Code do not accord with the 
intent of the mental disorder provisions. If a Review Board cannot grant an accused 
person the les t  restrictive and least onerous disposition because the Board has to take 
into consideration the lack of resources, then the provisions are not being applied as the 
appellate case law, for the most part, suggests they should be and a plain reading of 
section 672.54 makes clear. Furthemore, lengthy delays due to inadequate mental health 
resources in the irnplementation of some dispositions results in lengthier detention for 
some accused persons. The lack of resources infnnges on an accused person's right to 
liberty under section 7 of the Charter because the deprivation of liberty is not in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.ss5 An accused person could also 
, 
use the reasons of the minority in Winko to argue that section 672.54 of the Code 
contravenes section 7 of the Charter on the grounds that it places a reverse onus on an 
555This argument is discussed more fully later in this chapter. 
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accused person to prove that she or he is not a significant threat to the safety of the public 
and that the infnngement is not justified under section 1. In addition, the lack of mental 
health resources deprives an accused penon of equal benefit of the law on the grounds of 
mental disability, contrary to subsection 15(1) of the ~ h a r t e r ?  The fiat part of the 
minority judgment in Lepage which recognizes a subsection 15(1) infringement can be 
used by an accused person to argue that the mental disorder provisions contravene 
subsection 1 5(1). 
It could aiso be argued that a Review Board's inability to direct the 
implementation of dispositions or to censure the non-implementation of dispositions 
contributes to a contravention of the spirit of the legislative scheme, and that this renders 
the provisions invalid. 
Since section 672.54 of the Code is the provision under which dispositions are 
made. if it is declared invalid, the whole of the legislative scheme of the mental disorder 
provisions would fall. This was the case in ~wain,"' where the previous mental disorder 
provisions were struck down, although the effect of the dechration was temporarily 
suspended to permit the government to act. Without a suspension of the dedaration of 
invalidity, a legislative vacuum is created until new provisions are enacted. The Supreme 
Court of Canada States in Mahe v. Alberta:S58 
[Tlhe effect of a declaration of invalidity should be considered. In this 
s 
- 
""This argument is discussed more fidly later in this chapter. 
"'Supra note 1 7. 
'"(1 990) 68 D.L.R. (4' ) 69 (S.C.C.). 
case, as it is impossible for the court to rewrite the impugned legislation, 
the result would be to create a legislative vacuum. This resdt would not 
help the position of the appellants. Indeed, the appellants might be worse 
off: because if the above legislation is invalidated the public authorhies in 
Alberta would presumably be temporarily precluded from exercising their 
powers so as to change the existing system in order to comply with S. 
23 .559 
1 suggest that, based on R. v. S w u i p  and R. v. Lepage, j6' if a court did fmd the mental 
disorder provisions to violate the Charter, the court would not attempt to rewrite the 
provisions but would suspend the declaration of invalidity for a certain period. The result 
might be that public officiais would wait to see the terms of the new legislation rather act 
to ensure that adequate h d i n g  is allocated for mental health resources. In addition. 
accused persons would continue to need adequate mental health resources under whatever 
mental disorder scheme was in place and on this score might not be any M e r  ahead in 
attaining adequate mental health resources, unless the mental disorder provisions 
addressed the issue of the provision of mental health resources directly. 
The advantage of a declaration of invalidity of the mental disorder provisions is 
that new provisions might contain critena more weighted in favour of accused persons. 
might provide for the provision of mental health services to accused persons or empower 
the Review Board with additional powers to direct the implementation of the mental 
disorder provisions or to sanction persons in charge of hospitais who do not implement 
the dispositions. In addition, new provisions might clarify the issue of onus, whether the 
, 
- 
S591bid at 105. 
5WSupra note 17. 
56'Supra note 533. 
172 
burden of proof lies with the Crown or the accused person to demonstrate that the 
accused person does not present a significant threat to the safety of the public, or whether 
a Review Board m u t  be of the opinion that an accused person is not a significant threat 
to the safety of the public before she or he cm receive an absolute discharge. As well. 
new provisions might clarim the meaning of "significant threatWin section 672.54 and 
specie that impIementation concems should not impinge on the making of the least 
restrictive and least onerous order. 
While one could make arguments that the mental disorder provisions violate the 
Charter, 1 argue that Winku and Lepage are correctly decided and that the mental disorder 
provisions themselves wouid withstand Charter scrutiny. 1 suggest that a stronger 
argument can be made that the mental disorder provisions and provincial heaith 
Iegislation do not result in the Charter infiingements, rather the infnngements arise out of 
the decisions regarding the allocation of mental health resources. Therefore, as discussed 
in the next section, subsection 24(1) is the more appropriate remedy for accused persons. 
b) Subsection 24(1) remedy 
An accused person seeking a remedy under subsection 24(1) of the Charter might 
argue that the infigement of her or his Charrer right arose from actions or inaction of 
provincial or federal oficials under the provincial health legislation and the mental 
disorder provisions, rather than out of the mental disorder provisions or the provincial 
b 
legislation. An accused person rnight aiso argue that inadequate h d i n g  of mental health 
services is the reason that they are k i n g  detained longer than they would be if the mental 
health system was adequately funded, A declaration of rights of accused pesons could be 
sought to order the appropnate level of govenunent to provide adequate mental health 
resources to remedy the Charter infkingements. 
~Mahe v. ~ l b e r t d b '  and ~ldridge" suggest that where it is the decisions of public 
officiais that cause the breach of the Charter right, then a remedy under section 24(1) is 
the appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court of Canada in Mahe declares: 
fl]t is not clear that the existing legislation in Alberta is a bar to the 
realization of the appellant's rights. The real obstacle is the inaction of the 
public authorities. The govemment could implement a scheme within the 
existing legislation to ensure that these S. 23 parents and other S. 23 
parents in the province receive what is due to them. The problem is that 
they have not done so. 564 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Mahe opts for a declaration of rights which describes 
the general requirements necessary to implement the rights. The Court adds that "[wlhere 
there are alternative ways of satisfjhg the requirements, the public authorities may 
choose the means of hilfilling their dut ie~ ."*~~ 
1 suggest that the Eldridge cases66 also supports the argument that a Chorrer 
challenge regarding implementaîion of dispositions should be brought against delegated 
decision makers, in this case, the public oficials allocating mentai health resources. La 
Forest J. in Eldridge States 
s6'Supra note 55 8. 
s63Supra note 3 8. 
saSupro note 558 at 106. 
565fiid at 93. 
'69Stpra note 38. 
First, legislation may be found to be unconstitutional on its face because it 
violates a Charter right and is not saved by S. 1. In such cases, the 
legislation will be invalid and the court compelled to declare it of no force 
or effect pursuant to sS2( 1 ) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Secondly, the 
Charter may be infringed, not by the legislation itself. but by the actions of 
a delegated decision-maker in applying it. In such cases, the legislation 
rernains valid, but a remedy for the unconstitutional action may be sought 
pursuant to s.24(1) of the C h e r .  567 
La Forest J then declares that the proper framework for determinhg whether the Charter 
infnngement &ses fiom the impugned legislation or the actions of an entity or official 
pursuant to the legislation is set out in Siaight Communications Inc. v. Da~idson. '~  
Under this h e w o r k .  the Court must first decide whether the impugned legislation can 
be interpreted in conformity with the Charter. La Forest J. decides in Eldridge that since 
the statutes in question "could be read to conform with S. 15(1) ... it is not the legislation 
that is constitutionally suspect, but rather the actions of delegated decision-makers in 
applying it."S69 This conclusion is based on the fmding that the provincial health 
legislation in question was silent with respect to the provision of sign language 
interpretation but the legislation gave discretion to entities authorized under the 
legislation to make decisions with respect to the provision of services. Therefore. the 
Charter infnngement arose fiom the exercise of discretion by authorized decision- 
makers. 
5671bid at para. 20. 
56gSupra note 472. 
569 Supra note 3 8 at para. 24. 
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C. Preliminary Question of Jurisdiction 
Given that the Code is federal Iegislation and that the mental disorder provisions 
are administered by the provincial ministries of heaith, the issue arises of whether a 
Charter challenge should be brought against the federal or provincial Crown where an 
accused person wishes to argue that a disposition order or the implementation of a 
disposition order infiinges his or her rights under the Charter. 
a) Jurisdiction of provincial government 
McKinnon J. of the Supreme Court of British Columbia dealt with this issue in 
C. IJ.) v. British Columbia (Forensic Services ~ommissioner). '" In this case. the plainti ff 
was detained in custody at the British Columbia Forensic institute under a warrant of the 
Lieutenant-Govemor issued under the insanity provisions of the Code. She sought a 
declaration that the defendants, the Forensic Psychiatrie Service Commissioner, the 
Attorney Generai of British Columbia and the Attorney General o f  Canada had breached 
her right under subsection 15(1) of the Charter in the distribution of services that they are 
mandated to provide. She argued that, in particular, the policy of the institute in refusing 
to permit female patients to reside in premises known as the "cottages" was 
discriminatory and offended subsection 1 S(1). Regarding the question of jurisdiction, the 
Attorney General for Canada argued that 
[Slhe has no role to play in the treatment of the plaintiff, rather the federal 
role is strictly one of custody and ielease. She submits that the issue is not 
570(1992) 65 B. C.L.R. (2d) 386 (B.C.S.C. ). Though this case arose prior to the 
coming into force of the current mental disorder provisions, the issue of whether a 
Charter challenge should be brought against the federal or provincial government 
remains applicable. 
one about the status of J.C. [the plaintifTl, rather it is d l  about treatment 
and facilities which are solely within the scope of the province: see R. v. 
Swain ... Re Kleinys, the Constitution Act, 1 982, S. 92(7), and Schneider v. 
British Columbia ... It is contended that access to facilities that are within 
the scope of the province is an aspect of treatment and rehabilitation, not 
an aspect of custodial status. There is no federal fùnding of any programs 
except shared medical services and there is no federal administration or 
fiinctiond control over the institute. Finally it is contended that the 
manner of confinement of a person in J.C.'s position is within the sole 
cornpetence of the provincial govemment: see R. v. ~olernan."' 
The provincial Attorney General did not dispute these submissions. McKinnon J. agreed 
with the submissions of the Attorney General of Canada and found that the federal 
Attorney General was not a proper party to the action. However, McKimon J.  found that 
the Attomey General of British Columbia and the Forensic Psychiatric Service 
Commissioner were proper parties to the action because the Foremic Psychiatry  AC?^ 
authorized the Forensic Psychiatric Services Commission to provide custody and 
treatment for persons held in custody under the insanity provisions of the Code."' 
5 7 ' R . ~ . ~ . ~ .  1979, c.139 now R.S.B.C. 1996, c.156. 
5730f note is that British Columbia is the only province which has a Forensic 
Psychiany Act. However, in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick. 
Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, the respective Iegislation governing mental 
health refers to the admission and detention of accused persons under the jurisdiction of 
the mental disorder provisions of the Code. In some of these jurisdictions, the provision 
refers to treatment of these persons. See the Mental Health Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.  M- 13.1, 
s.3; the Mental Healrh Services Act, S. S., .1984-85-86, c. M-13.1, S. 23; the Mental 
Nealth Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 25; thé Mental Patients Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P- 
4 l ,  s.33; the Mental Health Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M- l O as amended by S.N.B. 1989, c. 
23, S. 18; the Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208, S. 40; and the Mental Health Act, 
S .P.E.I. 1994, c.39, S. 19. Since none of these provisions order that services be provided 
to accused persons, as is the case under the Forensic Psychiatry Act, the argument 
regarding the provision of mental health services to accused persons might be more 
difficult to make. An accused person rnight have to delve more into the policy of the 
In addition, an argument can be made that the decision on the jurisdictional issue 
in C. (J.) v. British Columbia (Forensic Services Comrnis~ioner)~'" is well founded on the 
basis of Schneider v. The ~ueen,"' R. v. S ~ a i n " ~  and other cases Sn which have held that 
[T]he general jurisdiction over health matters is provincial (allowing for a 
1 imited federal jurisdiction either ancillary to the express heads of power 
in s.9 1 or the emergency power under peace, order and good govemment) 
has prevailed and is now not senously questioned.578 
The Supreme Court of Canada reiterates that to determine whether health legislation falls 
within section 91 or 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867jT9 the "pith and substance" of the 
legislation has to be ascertained. In Schneider, the Court determines that the "pith and 
substance"of the Heroin Treatment Act is '9he medical treatment of heroin addicts and is 
respective Ministries of Health on forensic services. For example in Ontario, the Ministry 
of health has adopted The Provinciul Forensic System: Strategic Directions respecting 
the provision of services to accused persons, as stated in the Discussion Paper: The 
Distribution of Forensic Be& in Ontario, supra note 39 1 .  
'"(1 992) 65 B.C.L.R. (2d) 386 (B.C. S.C.). Though this case arose pnor to the 
coming into force of the curent mental disorder provisions, the issue of whether a 
Charter challenge should be brought against the federal or provincial government 
remains applicable. 
"'(1982) 139 D.L.R. (3d) (S.C.C.). 
5 7 6 S ~  note 17. 
5 n  Bell Canada v. Quebec (Cornmipion de la santé et de la sécurité du travail 
(1988) 51 D.L.R. (43 161; R. v. Morgentuler (1993) 107 D.L.R. (4') 537; RIR- 
MacDonald lnc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1 995) 1 27 D.L .R. (4*) 1 ; and R. v. 
Hydro-Québec (1997) 15 1 D.L.R. (4') 32. 
note 575 at 439. 
579Supra note 253. 
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within the general provincial cornpetence over health matters under 92(16).""0 As argued 
in Schneider, civil committai critena under provincial mentai health legislation authorizes 
the detention of persons with mental disabilities, however, the mental health legislation is 
intra vires of provincial legislatures because it provides for treatment. The Court in 
Schneider adds that "[e]xamples of compatible federd and provincial legislation abound, 
in heaith legislation.""' Frnvcett v. Onrario (Attorney Generaf)5'2 is one example of 
compatible health legislation. In this case the constitutionality of the Mental Hospitals 
AC?'' is in issue because a provision of the Criminal Code authorized a magistrate to 
remand an accused who the magistrate believed was mentally il1 and section 38 of the 
Mental Hospitals Act also authorized a magistrate to require the Superintendent to admit 
an accused to a psychiatrïc hospital. The Supreme Court of Canada determined that the 
Menral Hospitals Act "is legislation in relation to the subject-matter described in head 7 
of s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act and not in relation to criminal procedure, that the relevant 
provisions of the Criminul Code are complementary to, and not in conflict with. each 
o t i ~ e r . " ~ ~  R. v. Lenari j8-' provides another example of compatible legislation respecting 
health. The Court of Appeal of Ontario in Lenurr is asked to determine whether sections 
- - - - - - - 
'gosupra note 575 at 439. 
s8'lbid at 436-437. Also see R. v. Hydro-Québec supra note 577 at 103-1 04. 
58'[1 9651 2 C.C.C. 262 (S.C.C.). 
583R.S.0. 1960, c. 238. 
'"Supra note 582 at 267. 
'"(1998) 158 D.L.R. (4*) 508 (Ont. C.A.). 
21 and 22 of the Ontario Mental Health ACP which permit a judge to remand a penon 
who was either in custody, or charged or convicted of an offence and who appeared to be 
suffering fiom a mental disorder to a psychiatric facility for assessrnent for a period not 
exceeding two months was ultra vires of the provincial legislature.587 Sections 720 and 
72 I of the Code also permit a judge to remand a person after a finding of guilt and order a 
pre-assessrnent report. The Court of Appeal States that sections 2 1 and 22 are not 
-'prohibitive of federal matters, but are expansive insofar as they do not restrict 
Parliament's authority to legislate on criminal law or procedure.""' Sections 2 1 and 22 
are in pith and substance provincial legislation which touch on federai matters. The 
Court of Appeal declares that the fact that the Mental Health Act and the Criminal Code 
-'work together in dealing with individuals who have mental disabilities and are involved 
in the cnminal justice ~ ~ s t e r n " " ~  was not in question. 
In R. v. Morgentaler,'* the Supreme Court of Canada declares that 
The provinces have general legislative jurisdiction over hospitais by virtue 
of S. 92(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and over the medicd profession 
and the practice of medicine by virtue of S. 92(l3) and (1 6). Section 
92(16) also gives them general jurisdiction over health matters within the 
province.. . 
'87~he provisions were not being chailenged as king in pith and substance an 
exercise of the criminal Iaw power. Rather the constitutional challenge was that sections 
2 1 and 22 were not availabie to a judge on sentencing. 
5s8S~pra note 5 85 at 53 1. 
590Supra note 577. 
In addition, there is no dispute that the heads of s.92 invoked by the 
appellant confer on the provinces the jurisdiction over health care in the 
province generaily, including matters of cost and eficiency, the nature of 
the health care delivery system, and privatization of the provision of 
medical ~ e w i c e s . ~ ~ '  
R. v. Swaid9-' deals with the issue of whether the insanity provisions (as the 
mental disorder provisions were then refened to) of the Code were ultra vires of 
Parliament's criminal Iaw power under subsection 9 l(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 
( U . K . ) . ~ ~ )  The appellant argued that the pith and substance of the insanity provisiorr is to 
treat and cure the mentally il1 rather than punish them, and therefore, the provisions fell 
within the scope of provincial powers of subsections 92(7) (hospitals. asylums), 92(13) 
(property and civil rights) and 92(16) (matters of a merely local or private nature) of the 
Consritution Act, 1867 (U.K.). In Swain, Larner C.J. discusses whether "health" falls 
within the federal or provincial competence. He cites with approval Schneider v. The 
Queen.j9' He notes that in Schneider '" the main object of the provincial legislation in 
question was treatment and the coercive aspect was incidental. On the other hand. 
Lamer C.J., writing for the majority of the Court in Swain, describes the object of the 
insanity provisions as follows: 
It is tme that the dominant characteristic of these provisions is not 
59'lbid at 558-559. 
59'Supra no te 1 7. 
593S~pra  note 253. 
594Supra note 5 75. 
r951bid 
punishment; however, neither is it treatment. The 'pith and substance' of 
the legislative scheme deaiing with individuals acquitted by reasons of 
insanity is the protection of society fiom dangerous people who have 
engaged in conduct proscnbed by the Criminal Code through prevention 
of such acts in the future. While treatment may be incidentaily involved in 
the process, it is not the dominant objective of the legi~lation.'~ 
He emphasizes that the criminal law power of the federal government includes the 
prevention of crime. Furthermore, Lamer C.J. notes that the insanity provisions "do not 
speak directly of the administration of medical treatment. They simply stipulate 
procedures for a cnminal committal, procedures designed to protect society, not to treat 
the individ~al."~~' In addition, Lamer C.J. in Swain declares that "it is not Parliament's 
responsibility to treat these people [accused persans]; Parliament m u t  concern itself with 
the consequences for society if these individuals are released while danger ou^."^^' 
The Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald inc. v. Canada (Af~orne~v 
General)59' emphasizes that 'rhe protection of 'heaith' is one of the 'ordinary ends' 
served by the criminal law, and that the criminal law power may be validly used to 
safeguard the pubiic nom any 'injurious or undesirable effectYdw The Court adds that 
criminal legislation aimed at the protection of heaith must "contain a prohibition 
accompanied by a pend sanction and must be directed at a legitimate public health 
- -  - 
5 9 6 ~ ~ p r a  note 1 7 at 998. 
597/6id at 1 005. 
5981bid at 1006- 1007. 
"'Supra note 577. 
6001bid at 23. 
In my view, the above-rnentioned decisions make clear that "health" is not a 
matter specifically assigned to the provincial or federal cornpetence under the 
Constitution Act, 1867.60' Thus, each level of government may legislate with respect to 
health but only within the scope of its legislative powers. For exarnple. the provincial 
government may validly legislate regarding hospitals or general heaIth matters which are 
local in nature, and the federal government rnay validly legislate where there is a national 
dimension to the health problem or to protect the public under the federal cnminal law 
power. 
In my opinion, the decision of C. ( J )  v. British Columbia (Forensic Services 
~ o m m i s s i o n e r ) ~ ~  is applicable to the current mental disorder provisions of the Code. 
based on R. v. S w ~ i n ~ ~ '  and a number of other cases .'OS 1 argue that the pith and 
substance of the mental disorder provisions is the protection of the public fiom dangerous 
persons. This argument is also supported by the wording of section 672.54 of the Code 
which requires the Review Board to consider the need to protect the public from 
dangerous persons when making a disposition. To achieve the protection of the public. 
602Supra note 25 3. 
603 S u p  note 570. Though this c&e arose pnor to the corning into force of the 
current mental disorder provisions, the issue of whether a Charter challenge should be 
brought against the federai or provincial government remains applicable. 
604 See Swain supra note 1 7 and RIR-MacDonaId supra note 5 77. 
'05See Daviakon supra note 23 at 277 and 279 and Winko supra note 17 at 58. 
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section 672.54 of the Code authorizes a Review Board to make a disposition either 
detaining an accused person or setting the conditions of that detention. If an accused 
person is not a significant threat to the safety of the public, a Review Board must grant an 
absolute discharge. 
Furthemore, I contend that the administration of the mental disorder provisions is 
given to the provincial Minister of Health by the following provisions: section 672.1 of 
the Code states that a hospital means "a place in a province that is designated by the 
Minister of Health for the province" for the custody, treatment or assessrnent of an 
accused person under a disposition; under section 672.38 of the Code, the Review Board 
is established and the appointments to the Board are made by the Lieutenant-Governor in 
council, and the Board is treated as having k e n  established under the laws of the 
province;6w and under section 672.56 of the Code, the person in charge of a hospital has 
the obligation of implementing the order if the Review Board delegates to her or him the 
power to do ~0 .~" '  
1 suggest that valid federal legislation may impose an administrative burden on 
provincial govemments as ruled in Reference re: G o o h  and Services Tax  ta.). 60' In 
this case, the Attorney General of Canada argued that 'rhere is nothing impemissible in 
valid federal legislation imposing administrative burdens upon provincial govemments, 
b06~embers  of a Review Board are remunerated by the province. 
607 As discussed in chapter 2, the Review Board delegates to the person in charge 
the implementation of a disposition. 
608(1 992) 94 D.L.R. (4*) 5 1 (SCC). 
provided that these are necessarily incidental to the operation of a valid federal scheme of 
taxation.'- The Supreme Court of Canada accepts this submission though it does not 
rule on the lirnits of the federal government to impose administrative burdens on the 
provinces. La Forest J. ad& that 
It by no means follows, however, that an administrative duty reasonably 
placed by Parliament on a province in the course of enacting a scheme 
falling squareiy within federal power will be invalid because the 
performance of that duty will in consequence require some expenditure by 
the pr~vince .~  'O 
1 also argue that treatment is only peripheral to the mental disorder provisions in 
that subsection 672.55 (1) of the Code prohibits the ordering of treatment in a disposition 
under section 672.54 of the Code. However, a disposition may include a condition 
regarding treatment where the accused person consents and the Review Board considers it 
reasonable and n e c e s s q  in the interest of the accused person?' There are no sections 
regarding the provision of treatment or other mental health services relating to accused 
persons in Part XX. 1 of the Code. 1 suggest that this is due to the existence of 
complementary provincial mental health Iegislation. For example, in Ontario, section 25 
of the Mental HeaIrh ACP specifies that an accused person who is detained "may be 
admitted to, detained in and discharged from a psychiatrie facility in accordance with the 
'" The only other provisions regarding treatment are sections 672.58 to 672.62 of 
the Code which authorize the court to order treatment in the case of unfit accused persons 
prior to a disposition k i n g  made under section 672.54 of the Code. 
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law." In addition, under subsection 5(2) of the Mental Hospituls ~ c t . ~ ' '  the Lieutenant- 
Govemor in Council may make regulations "regarding the care, treatrnent and 
maintenance of patients'' which would include accused persons. Section 7 of the Mental 
Hospitals  AC^'^ states that a person in charge of an institution has control and charge of 
the institution for which she or he is appointed. These Acts govem the treatment and the 
psychiavic facilities in which the treatment is generaily provided? In British Columbia 
the Forensic Psychiafry Act provides that one of the b c t i o n s  of the commission is 'ro 
provide forensic psychiatric services" for accused persons.6'6 The administration of 
psychiatric facilities and the provision of mental health services are under the jurisdiction 
of the provincial mental health ministry. At present, the federal government does not 
provide any mental health services to accused persons, it does not adrninister any health 
facilities. and does it not provide fbnding for the mental disorder provisions of the 
Code. '" 
b) Jurisdiction of federal government 
However, an argument can be made that the federal government should be 
6'sMental health services may also be provided in psychiatric units of general 
hospitals under the Public Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. P.40 and by psychiatrists and 
physicians under the Healrh Insurance Act, R.S.O., 1990 c. HA. 
6'6See subparagraph S(b)(ii) of R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 156. 
6'7Under the Canada Health Act R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, the federal govemment 
shares with the province the cost of health services in generai. 
providing adequate mental health resources to accused perçons. First, Parliarnent could 
validly enact treatment provisions within Part XX. 1 of the Code. The Supreme Court of 
Canada in Srvain fmds that 
It should be noted that while "treatment" in a narrow sense falls under 
provincial heads of power, Parliarnent may have cornpetence over certain 
subjects which may appear to be "treatment" in certain aspects. For 
example no one disputes that criminal law sentencing may deal with 
considerations of rehabilitation. The criminal law power authorizes 
Parliarnent to provide for conditional discharges just as wetl as 
unconditional discharges, even though some of the conditions rnay involve 
a treatment program. If Parliament chooses to respond to conduct 
proscribed by the Criminal Code in a manner more sensitive to 
rehabilitation concerns, it does not thereby lose its legislative 
corn petence'"" 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada in RAZ-MacDonald v. Canada ( A . G . ) ~ ' ~  
emphasizes the "plenary nature of the criminal law powerYa0 and in R v. S (S..).6" the 
Supreme Court of Canada States that ' a s  court has held repeatedly that the legislative 
power over cnminal law m u t  be sufficiently flexible to recognize new developrnents in 
methods of dealing with offenders ""' In R. v. S.(S.).6"y one of the issues was whether 
section 4 of the Young Offenders  AC^,^" which empowered a provincial Attorney General 
6'8S~pro n te 17 at 1007. 
6'9S~pra note 577. 
6'016id at 28. 
6"(1990) 77 C.R. (3d) 273 (scc).' 
"%id at 294. 
6231bid. 
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to establish alternative measure programs, was ultra vires. The Court concludes that 
section 4 is an attempt to deter young offenders fiom criminal activities and is within 
Parliament's power over criminal law. This suggests that treatment of accused persons 
could be within the scope of the federal criminal law power under which the mental 
disorder provisions are enacted. The federal govemment should provide adequate mental 
hedth resources to impiement the mental disorder provisions because the administration 
of the disposition sections does not appear to fall to the provincial Attorney General 
under the administration of justice power (section 92114)) of the Constitution Act. 1867 
(U. K.).^" Radier, it is a health matter. 
Second, treatment of accused persons is the means of attaining the object of the 
mental disorder provisions. The Supreme Court of Canada in Swaina6 States 
The objective of the legislation is to protect society and the accused until 
the mental health of the latter has k e n  restored. The objective is to be 
achieved by treatment of the patient in a hospital, rather than a prison 
environment. (Emphasis in the f ri gin al)^" 
I t  follows that the federal govemment should f h d  adequate mental health resources to 
ensure that the objective of the mental disorder provisions is attained so that accused 
persons receive the Ieast onerous and least restrictive disposition or that a disposition is 
implemented. These arguments would f o m  the basis for seeking a declaration of rights 
against the federal govenunent for the provision of adequate mental health resources. 
6"Supra note 253. 
"'Supra note 1 7 .  
6271bid at 1 005. 
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c) Stronger case respecting provincial jurisdiction 
In my view, a stronger case can be made that the provincial government is the 
govemment against which to seek a Charter remedy under subsection 24 (1) for the 
provision of adequate mental heaith resources. First, historically, the provinces have 
provided mental health resources to accused persons. Second, on the basis of Swain and 
C. (4 v. British ~olurnbia,6~' the provision of treatment under the mental disorder 
provisions of the Code has been determined to be a provincial health matter while the 
federal govemment has the responsibility of protecting the public by authorizing the 
detention of accused persons who present a significant threat to the safety of the public- 
Third, the federal govemment may Legislate within its sphere of competence and may 
impose the administrative burden of implementing the federal legislation on provincial 
govemments. In summary, while acknowledging that a Charter challenge might be 
made to the disposition sections of the mental disorder provisions. in particular section 
672.54 of the Code, 1 reiterate that the stronger argument is that the mental disorder 
provisions of the Code are not constitutionally suspect because they balance the rights of 
accused persons and the protection of the public. The Court of Appeal cases refer 
repeatedly to the requirement in section 672.54 of the Code that a Review Board must 
make the l e s t  onerous and least restrictive disposition after considering the factors set 
out in this section. This requirement affqds substantive protection to accused persons 
62g~wain  supra note 17 and C(J) supra note 570. Furthemore, the other cases, 
supra note 524, dealing with the matter of "health" have declared that the provincial 
govemment had competence in "health" matters of a local nature or regarding the 
establishment of hospitais as discussed above. 
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and guarantees the Ieast intrusion "possible into the lives and liberty of those who are 
unfortunately afflicted.'*" Where the legislative scheme has run aground is in cases 
where inadequate mental health resources have resulted in accused persons either not 
receiving the least onerous and Least restrictive dispositions or receiving an appropriate 
disposition order but experiencing lengthy delays in the implementation of dispositions. 
In rny opinion, the Review Board would grant the least onerous and least restrictive 
disposition if the lack of resources was not an issue. Furthemore, the McGillis case630 
which held that, if there was no suitable accommodation in the community, the Ontario 
Review Board should have ordered his detention in custody order, would not have any 
application, if there existed adequate resources. Presumabiy also persons in charge of 
hospitals would implement dispositions if they had enough resources. Arguably, the 
cunent situation in which some accused persons find themselves will not be remedied 
unless the necessary mental health resources are allocated to accused persons. 
1 reiterate that the stronger argument with respect to jurisdiction is that the federal 
government has validly enacted the mental disorder provisions, and has delegated the 
administration of the disposition sections to the provincial Minister of Health and persons 
in charge of hospitals. The mental disorder provisions deal with the custody and release 
of an accused person and are siIent on the provision of mental health resources. The 
provision of mental health resources, including treatment, is done under provincial health 
i 
6'9S~pra WjnkO note 1 7 at 4 1. 
630S~pra note 1 6. 
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legislation. Swain and C(4 v. British Columbi8' suppon this argument. 
Given that 1 argue that the Charter infiingement relates to provincial legislation, 
E/dridge suggests that the provincial legislation should be exarnined to determine 
whether Charter infnngement results fiom the legislation or the actions of delegated 
decision-makers acting under the legislation. On reviewing the following legislation in 
Ontario: Mental Healfh Act."' the Mental Hospitals  AC^^'' and the Minisny ofHealth 
ACP" and Savings and Restruct ur ing Act, 1 99Q3' and in British Columbia: the Forensic 
Psychiafry  AC^,^^^ the Ministry of Heafrh ~ c f - ' '  and the Health Authorities A ~ f , ~ ~ q n  my 
opinion this legislation is silent on the question of the provision of mental health 
resources. Therefore, in keeping with the approach in Eldridge, this legislation can be 
read as being constitutionally valid; thus the Charter breach arises out of the discretion 
exercised by the delegated decision-makers. An accused person should seek a remedy 
under section 24(1) of the Charter against the provincial government for the provision of 
adequace mental health services on the grounds that the impact of inadequate mental 
631Supra Swain note 17 and C(J) note 570. 
63 '~.~.0 1990, c. M.7. 
6 3 3 ~ . ~ . ~  1990, c. M.8. 
63".S.0. 1990, c. M.26. 
63'S.0, 1996, c. 1. 
636R.S.B.C. 1996, c.156. 
637R.S.B. C., 1996, c.301. 
638R.S.B. Cs, 1996, c. 180. 
health resources is greater on accused persons than persons with mental disabilities in 
general. This greater impact results fiom the fact that accused persons are detained under 
the mental disorder provisions and that their release fiom detention is linked with the 
adequacy of resources, as argued in chapter 2. Therefore, 1 propose that accused persons 
raise the following constitutional questions: 
1. in Ontario, do the decisions taken by public officiais under the Mental 
Heaith Act. '.'' the Mental Hospitals Act. and the Ministry of Health 
ACP and by the Health Services Restructuring Commission under the 
Savings and Reshrcturing Act, 1 9966J2 which affect the administration of 
the mental disorder provisions of the Code infringe the rights and 
fieedoms of accused persons under section 7 and subsection 15 (1) of the 
Charter by not providing adequate mental health resources to accused 
persons? 
In British Columbia, do the decisions taken by public officiais under the 
Forensic Psychiahy  AC^' or under the Ministry ofHealth  AC^" or by the 
British Columbia Mental Health Society and Health ~ u t h o r i t i e s ~ ~  which 
affect the administration of the mental disorder provisions of the Code 
inInnge the rights and fieedoms of accused persons under section 7 and 
subsection 1 5 ( 1 ) of the Charter by not providing adequate mental health 
resources to accused persons? 
2. If the answers to the above are yes, is the infiingement demonstrably 
justified in a f3ee and democratic society pursuant to section 1 of the 
Charter? 
639S~pra note 632. 
wOSupra note 63 3. 
M'Supra note 634. 
"'Supra note 635. 
&'Supra note 636. 
&USupra note 637. 
asSupro note 638. 
Part 2 - The Proposed Charter Challenge 
A) Application of the Charter 
As determined in EIdridge the Charrer applies to the actions of a decision- 
maker delegated to cary  out government policy under provincial legislation and 1 argue 
that the Charrer would apply to the actions of a decision-maker delegated to c a r y  out 
provincial govenunent policy made pursuant to federal legislation where the 
administration of the federal legislation is delegated to the provincial government. In the 
case of accused persons, the proposed Charter challenge would not be brought against 
either the provincial legislation governing mental heaith services or the disposition 
sections of the mental disorder provisions of the Code, but against the exercise of 
discretion by government departments or agencies or psychiatric hospitals under the 
provincial and federal legislation. In Ontario, at present, a nurnber of entities are 
involved in the provision of mental health services and might therefore be the target of a 
Charter challenge: one, the province, because it directly administers the provincial 
psychiatric hospitals under the Mental Hospitais  AC^;"' two, the Health Services 
Restmcturing Commission, established under the Suvings and Restructuring A cf, 1996, 
has decision-making regarding the restructuring of psychiatnc and other hospitds; and 
three, the Minister of Health has the overall responsibility respecting the provision of 
. 
6 M S ~ p r a  Eldridge note 38 at para. 20. 
a7S~pra  note 633. 
assupra note 635. 
health services under the Ministry ofHeafth  AC^&^ In British Columbia, at present the 
Forensic Psychiatnc Services Commission, established as an agent of the govemment 
under the Foremic Psychiatry  AC^.^^' is responsible for providing forensic psychiatrie 
services to accused persons. However, as discussed in chapter 2, The 1998 Mental 
Health Plan"' proposes to integrate forensic services with mainstrearn mental health 
services and to @ansfer the govemance of the British Columbia Forensic Psychiaaic 
Institute to the British Columbia Mental Health Society and the forensic clinics to the 
différent health authoritie~.~~' 
The tem of section 32 of the Charter has k e n  interpreted as applying to ail 
activities of government. La Forest J. in Eldridge States 
ln Douglas and Lavigne, the argument was made that even if the entities in 
question were generalty part of 'govenunent' for the purposes of s.32, the 
Charrer should not apply to the 'private' or 'commercial' arrangement 
they engage in. In each case, the Court rejected this contention, holding 
that when an entity is determined to be a part of the fabric of government, 
the Charter will apply to al1 its activities, including those that might be 
thought of as 'private'. The rationale for this principle is obvious: 
governments should not be perrnitted to evade their Charter 
responsibilities through the vehicle of private arrangement? 
However, prior to the Eldridge case, it was unclear whether the Charter applied to an 
entity such as a public hospital, the Heaith Services Restnicturing Commission , the 
<*9Supra note 634. 
650Supra note 636. 
'"Supro note 3. 
65'Supra note 638. 
6S3Supra Eldridge note 38 at para. 40. 
British Columbia Mental Health Society or the Heaith Authorities in British Columbia 
which may be construed as private acton. The Supreme Court of Canada held in Eldridge 
that the Charter applies '?O a private entity ... found to be implementing a specrfic 
governmental policy or program" (emphasis in the original)654 Professor Pothier 
comments that 
Although this principle had been alluded to in passing before, Eldridge is 
the first concrete application of that principle in the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Whereas previously the focus had been only on govenunental 
actors, Eldridge shifis the focus to the quality of acts, though with 
ultimate reference back to the primary govemmental actor whose policy or 
program is being irnplemented.ls5 
Therefore, the Charter wouid apply to any decision-maker implementing mental health 
policy under provincial heaith legislation and in administering the mental disorder 
provisions of the Code. It is clear that the Ministry of Health sets mental health policy. 
as discussed in chapter 2.656 In dl the various reports on mental health reform, the 
Ministry of Health retains the responsibility for setting mental health policy though 
different proposais have been made on who and how this policy is to be implernented. 
654 Ibid at para. 43. 
655D. Pothier, Case Comment on Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 
(1 998) 9 N.J.C.L. 263. 
656 For example, in The 1998 Mental Heafth Plan British Columbia supra note 3 at 
3 1. it States that the ministry of health is rtisponsible for "maintaining the policy, 
legislative and organîzationai framework for health services; funding the heaith care 
system; defining core programs and services to be provided.. Another example is the 
statement in Ministry of Health, Ontario, Putting People First: The Reform of Mental 
Heafth Services in Ontario supra note 26 at 20 that "[tlhe ministry must accept and fiilfil1 
its responsibility to establish provincial policies and to manage the system effectively." 
Other examples are cited in chapter 2 in the discussion on heaith care reform. 
B) Section 7 of the Charter 
i) Deprivation of Liberty 
In R. v. Swain."' the Supreme Court of Canada stated that, to invoke section 7 of 
the Charter, "an individual must establish an acnial or potential deprivation of life. liberty 
or security of the person'*" and show that the deprivation of liberty or security was not in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. To address the first part of section 
7 of the Charfer, the mental disorder provisions clearly provide that accused persons are 
subject to restrictions on their liberty foIlowing the verdict of NCRMD until they are 
determined not to be a signifiant threat to the safety of the public. As Williams J.A.. 
with whom the rest of the Court of Appeai was in agreement on this point. noted in the 
CVinko case 
It is common ground that s.672.54 depnves a person in the position of the 
appellant ... of his liberty ... He is irnmediately subject to restrictions on his 
liberty, and wiil remain under those restrictions until it c m  be shown that 
he is 'not a significant threat to the safety of the 
1 argue that to this restriction of liberty mandated by the Code, there is added the 
acrual or potential deprivation of liberty or security that results fiom lack of adequate 
mental health resources. Exarnples of this include: 
the case of an accused person whose disposition authorizes a transfer fiom 
a maximum secure psychiatric facility to a medium secure psychiatric 
facility, but whose transfer is delayed because of a lack of psychiatric 
beds; the delay in the transfer of an accused person fiom a medium secure 
'"Supra Swain note 1 7. 
6581bid at 969. 
659S~pra Winko note 1 7 at 3 8. 
unit or hospital to a minimum secure unit or hospital because of a lack of 
psychiatric beds; a delay in a transfer to the community, or the refusai by 
the Review Board to authorize such a transfer because of Iack of 
appropriate housing or other adequate resources to support. resulting in an 
accused person being detained in custody in hospitat. 
1 suggest that al1 these scenarios result in accused persons being deprived of their liberty 
in that they do not benefit fiom less restrictive environments and are unable to exercise 
any additional liberties that result tiom a less restrictive form of detentiodm 
Furthemore, these delays may also result in lengthier detentions for accused 
persons. If the accused persons do not have an opportunity to be reintegrated into the 
cornrnunity because of inadequate mental health resources, neither the accused persons 
nor any other Party may be able to marshal the evidence that the accused persons are not a 
significant threat to the community. Therefore, the Review Board may be unable to form 
the opinion that the accused person is not a significant threat to the safety of the public 
and will not grant an accused person an absolute discharge. The Iink between the liberty 
of an accused person and treatment as a result of the mental disorder provisions needs to 
be reiterated to demonstrate the rnanner in which inadequate mental health resources 
result in lengthier detentions for some accused persons. 
The object of the mental disorder provisions (as was the case of its predecessor. 
the insanity provisions) is the protection of society. This can only be achieved by means 
&'One illustration of my point is that in Ontario, an accused person in a maximum 
secure psychiatric hospital is not given even escorted access to the community while one 
in a medium secure psychiatric facility is given such access. These situations are 
discussed in chapter 2. 
of providing treatment to accused persons as determined in S ~ a i n ~ ~ ' .  D a v i d s ~ n ~ ~ ~ .  and 
Whko.  663 In addition., the McGillis case664 clearly links the availability of mental health 
resources with the tvpe of disposition a Review Board may grant an accused person. in 
that case. the Ontario Review Board grants the accused person-a conditional discharge 
which could not be implemented because no appropriate housing was available. The 
Court of Appeal of Ontario finds that, in such a situation. the Review Board should have 
granted a custodial disposition because the evidence before the Ontario Review Board 
was that the appropriate housing did not exist in the community. The Court of Appeal 
determines that a disposition granting a conditional discharge was illegal because the 
accused person had to remain in hospital given the lack of appropriate housing. 
Furthemore, the British Columbia Court of Appeal emphasizes in Winkf6' 
[Tlhe legislative scheme of the new provisions goveming the detention 
and release of those found NCRMD attempts to balance protection for the 
public with the eariy retum to conditional or unconditional liberty of these 
patients? 
In addition, the Court of  Appeal in Winko and Lepage.'" states that the legislative scheme 
is meant to restrict the liberty of the accused person no more than is needed to meet the 
66'S~pra Swain note 1 7 at 1004 & 1005. 
662S~pra note 23 at 277. 
W i n h  note 1 7 at 58. 
6 6 j ~ ~ P r a  note 16. The effects of d s  decisions are discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
665S~pra Winko note 17 at 50. 
6661bid 
667Supra Winko and Lepage note 1 7. 
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objective of the ~e~islation."~ However, without adequate mental health resources the 
return to liberty is not possible. The result is lengthier detention of some accused 
persons. 
These situations are analogous to those in the prison context involving transfers 
from a prison with a lower security rating to one with a higher one, except in reverse. 
The change in conditions of imprisonment that result fiom such a transfer in prisons 
[Mlay affect the ... residual liberties [of the offender]. More specifically, 
there is a negative effect on the liberty of an offender when the conditions 
imposed are more restrictive and severe. kcording to the notion of 'a 
prison within a prison' the remaining rights of incarcerated individuals- 
that it is to Say their residual liberties- will be negatively a f f e ~ t e d . ' ~ ~  
In another ca~e,6~' administrative segregation was judged more restrictive because it 
restricted the mobility and activities of an offender as well as the offender's contact with 
other offenders. The courts have determined that the following were restrictions on 
residual liberties: "a heavier atrnosphere, frequent investigations and more limited access 
to recreational services'*" 
ii) Deprivation of liberty in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice 
The second component of section 7 of the Charter, that any deprivation of liberty 
must be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, raises two interpretation 
issues, one respecting the meaning of the pnnciples of fundamental justice and the other 
A 
%3id Lepage at 20 and 2 1. 
&9S~pra note 48 1 at 9-64. 
670Cardinol v. Kent Institution LI9851 2 S.C.R. 643. 
67'See supra note 48 1 at 9-64. 
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whether "liberty" should be given a broad or narrow meaning. The case in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada first examines the meaning of the expression "principles of 
fundamental justice" is Reference re S. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (British 
C ~ l u r n b i a ) . ~ ~  Larner J. for the Court states that "[tlhe principles of fundamental justice ... 
are not a protected interest, but rather a qualifier of the right not to be deprived of li fe. 
liberty and security of the p e r ~ o n . ' ~ ~ ~  Larner J. clearly states that the expression. 
"principles of iündamental justice" in section 7. is broader than the concept of "naturai 
justice." He adds that the principles of fimdarnental justice "are to be found in the basic 
tenets of our legal system,'"" but the exact parameten of these pnnciples are to be 
determined by the courts. Furthemore, Lamer I. in Reference re S. 94(2) of the Motor 
Vehicle Act (British Columbia)67s makes ctear that section 7 extends to substantive as well 
as procedural j ~ s t i c e . ~ ~ ~  
The Supreme Court of Canada states that a vague law violates a principle of 
fundamental justice because it "offends two values that are fundamental to the legal 
6"Reference re S. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) supra note 
480. 
6761n Singh v. Minister ofEmployment and Immigration supra note 478 held that 
section 7 includes a a requirement of procedural faimess where a decision-maker has the 
power to make decisions which affect the life, liberty or security of the person. See also 
supra note 48 1 at 9-49-9-53. 
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system.'"?' The values as explained by Lamer J. in Rejerence Re Criminul are 
that a law must give a reasonable warning to individuals so that they know what is 
prohibited and so they may act accordingiy; and that a law must "suficiently outline the 
discretionary power of authorities which are in charge of applying the law '*" so that they 
do not act arbitrarily. Lamer J. concludes that a law whose provisions include possible 
sanctions which deprive a person of her or his liberty or security must not be of an 
"unacceptable degree of vag~eness.'"~~ Sirnilarly. in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical 
S~cie@,~' '  the Suprerne Court of Canada reiterates that, as a principle of fundamental 
justice under section 7 of the Charter, laws may not be too vague. A law will be 
unconstitutional if it so vague that it provides no guidance for judicial debate.68' 
A law which is overbroad also violates the principle of fundamental justice. In R. 
v. Heywood,@' the Supreme Court of Canada States that the concept of overbreadth and 
that of vagueness are different concepts which are sometimes related: 
[Tlhe meaning of a law rnay be unarnbiguous and thus the law will not be 
vague; however, it may still be overly broad. Where a law is vague, it may 
6 n ~ .  W Hogg . supra note 457 at 1045. 
678[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1 123. 
'"Sec supra note 48 1 at 9-54 for discussion of the vagueness doctrine which is a 
principle of fundamental justice. 
680S~pra note 678 at 1157. 
baiSupro note 5 19. 
68'See supra note 48 1 at 9-58 & 9-59 for a discussion of other cases which deal 
with the principle of vagueness. See also P. Mecklam et al. supra note 457 at 956-958. 
683Supra note 5 18. 
also be overly broad, to the extent that the ambit of its application is 
difficult to define. Overbreadth and vagueness are related in that both are 
the result of a lack of sufficient precision by a legislature in means used to 
accomplish an objective. In the case of vagueness, the means are not 
clearly defmed. In the case of overbreadth the means are too sweeping in 
relation to the objective. 
Overbreadth analysis looks at the means chosen by the State in relation to 
its purpose. ... If the state, in pursuing a legitimate objective, uses means 
which are broader than is necessary to accomplish that objective. the 
principles of fundamental justice will be violoted because the individuai's 
rights will have been limited for no reason. The effect of overbreadth is 
that in some applications the law is arbitrary or disproponionate.fw 
Another issue is whether "liberty" should be given a narrow interpretation- to 
rnean protection tiom interference with physical liberty- or a broad one to include al1 
forms of liberty. For the most part, the courts restrict the meaning of "liberty" in section 
7 to the protection of physicai liberty.685 However, in the Morgentaler casePg6 Wilson J .  
broadens the concept of liberty to include the right to dignity- an individuai's nght to 
persona1 autonomy over important decisions affecting their private lives. Furthemore. 
courts in reviewing changes in the conditions of detention of a prisoner. have determined 
that these changes correspond to a deprivation of liberty.687 
Now, 1 examine whether the deprivation of liberty of accused persons resulting 
6albid at 792. 
685See the cases cited by P. Garant, supra note 48 1 at 9- 13. 
686[1986] 2 S.C.R. 388. 
687See R v. Miller [1985] 2 S.C.R. 613,  Soiusky v. Canada [1990] 1 S.C.R. 821, 
Balian v. Canada (Regional Transjér B d )  (1 988) 62 C.R. (3d) 258 (Ont. H.C.), and Hqv 
v. Canada (National Parole Bd) ( 1  985) 1 3 Admin. L.R. 1 7 (Fed. T.D.). 
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fiom inadequate mental health resources is in accordance with the principles of 
fiundamental justice. As argued previously, a disposition order that is not the least 
onerous or the least restrictive as a result of inadequate mental health resources is illegai 
because it exceeds the powers of the Review Board, even though the Review Board may 
have heId a hearing in accordance with the mental disorder provisions. I contend that the 
resulting deprivation of liberty would not be in keeping with the basic tenets of our legal 
system in that the accused person does not receive any notice of the deprivation and has 
no opportunity to be heard regarding the deprivation of liberty. In addition, a lengthier or 
more restrictive detention resulting fiom a delay in implementation or the non- 
implementation of a disposition due to inadequate mental health resources is not a 
deprivation of liberty in accordance with the principles of fundamentai justice for the 
following reasons. Where a disposition is made but not implemented, the person in 
charge of a hospital who is responsible for implementing the disposition does not give the 
accused person notice of the reasons for the delay in implementation. The accused person 
does not have any right to question the decision of the person in charge of a hospital to 
deiay the irnplementation of the disposition or not to implement it. In addition. the 
accused person is denied the benefit of a hearing before the Review Board under 
paragraph 672.81(2)(a) of the Code because, where the disposition is not implemented or 
the implementation delayed, the person in charge of the hospital has not increased the 
restrictions on the liberty of  the accused person. Rather, the accused person has not had 
her or his Iiberties increased as permitted by the disposition. The detention is unlawfùl 
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and results fkom the non-implementation of lawfùl dispositions. In R. v. 1MiZler.688 the 
Supreme Court of Canada States that "a prisoner has the right not to be deprived 
unlawfully of the relative or residual liberty permitted to the general population of an 
instit~tion.'"'~ Therefore, in prisons, offenders have the following procedural guarantees 
in cases of transfers: 
[T]he right to be notified that a transfer will be proposed and to be 
informed of the specific reasons behind this decision; the nght to contest 
in writing this decision and to take into account the reasons behind the 
offender's contestation; and the right to have this decision transmitted to 
him .6w 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal of British Columbia in Davidson and Winko, clearly 
held that section 672.54 of the Code, as interpreted within the context of Part XX. 1 of the 
Code, does not infinge section 7 of the Charter because there are procedural and 
substantive safeguards such as notice, annual hearings, the nght of an accused person to 
be present at the hearing and ta question witnesses, provisions for early reviews, criteria 
for making a disposition and the right to receive a copy of written reasons on which the 
disposition is based. 
Therefore, 1 conclude that some accused persons, in Ontario and in British 
Columbia and in any other province where a similar lack of adequate mental health 
resources exists, are deprived of their nght to liberty contrary to section 7 of the Charter. 
In addition. the potential exists for other accused persons to be depnved as well. The 
6881bid Miller. 
6891bid at 637. 
690Supra note 481 at 9-64 & 9-65. 
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deprivation of liberty arises fiom a more restrictive or lengthier detention and is not in 
accordance with the principles of fiuidamental justice. Although 1 argue that accused 
persons are depnved of their liberty contrary to section 7, the question remains as to 
whether the violation is saved under section 1 of the Charter, which is discussed below. 
C) Equality rights of  accused persons 
a) Scope 
In subsection 1 S(1) of the Charter, the emphasis is on equality before and under 
the law and equd protection and benefit of the law without discrimination as afirmed in 
Andrews v. Law Society of British ~olurnb ia .~~ '  The Supreme Court of Canada in 
Andrews6" adopts a contexnial approach to subsection 15(1) of the Charter. whereby the 
courts must inquire into the personal characteristics of the claimant and the resulting 
discrimination. However, the inquixy must place the individual in the broad societal 
context and consider the effects of stereotyping and historical disadvantage on the 
individual and the group in determining the effect that the impugned legislation has on 
the individual or group. McIntyre J. adopts the words of Hugessen J. who stated 
The inquiry [to determine whether there exists discrimination], in effect, 
concentrates upon the personal characteristics of those who daim to have 
been unequally treated. Questions of stereotyping, of historical 
disadvantagement, in a word, of prejudice, are the focus and there may 
even be a recognition that for some people equality has different meaning 
than for ~ t h e r s . ~ ' ~  
69'(1989) 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (SCC). 
69ilbid. 
6931bid at 1 6 .  
McIntyre J. emphasizes that a substantive and purposive approach must be taken to 
subsection 1 S(1) because 
ï h e  promotion of equality entails the promotion of a society in which al! 
are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human 
beings equally deserving of concem, respect and consideration. it has a 
large remedial c o r n p ~ n e n t . ~ ~  
Furthermore, in R v. Turpin. 695 the Supreme Court of Canada reiterates and expands the 
approach to subsection 15(1) set out in Andrews. It rules that in determining whether 
discrimination exists a court must not only analyze the impugned legislation but aIso the 
%.rger social, political and legal ~ o n t e x t " . ~ ~  In later cases:" the Supreme Court of 
Canada rules that while "it is not necessary to show membership in a historicdy 
disadvantaged group in order to establish a S. 15 (1) violation, the fact that a law draws a 
distinction on such a ground is an important indicium of di~crimination?"~ Furthermore. 
as La Forest J. States in the Eldridge case699 ''[wlhile this Court has not adopted a 
uniform approach to S. 15(1), there is broad agreement on the general analytic 
f rame~ork" '~  which the Supreme Court of Canada applies to equality claims. This 
(j9'[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296. 
697Miron v. Tnrdel [1995] 2 S.C.R, 418; Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; 
Eldridge supra note 38 and Vriend supra note 38. 
"%id Eldridge at para 54. 
699~6id Eldridge. 
7Wlbid Eldridge at para.58 and Vriend at para. 73 & 74. 
fiamework of analysis is reiterated in the Vriend case.70' 
b) Equality Claim Of Accused Persons 
The next step is to analyze the equality ciaim. McIntyre J. States in Andrews v. 
Law Sociew of British ~olurnbia'~' that 
p]iscrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentionai or 
not, but based on grounds relating to personai characteristics of the 
individual or group, which has the effect of imposhg burdens, obligations. 
or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or 
which withholds or lirnits access to opportunities, benefits and advantages 
available to other memben of so~iety.'~' 
This is a two-step approach. An accused person m u t  first establish that, due to the 
actions of a decision-maker implementing mental health policy under provincial hedth 
legislation and in administering the mental disorder provisions of the Code. a distinction 
has been drawn between accused persons and others based on personal characteristics and 
that this distinction has resulted in a denial of equality before the law. equality under the 
law, equal protection of the law or equal benefit of the law. Secondly, the accused person 
must establish that the denid constitutes discrimination on the b a i s  of one of the 
enumerated grounds listed in S. 15(1F mental d i ~ a b i l i t ~ . ' ~  
'O ' lbid Vriend. 
note 69 1 . 
7wSee Eldridge supra note 3 8 and Vriend supra note 3 8 for a discussion of 
differences in approach to an equality claim. However, in both these cases the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that the two-step approach was suficient and did not address the 
differences. 
i) Distinction results in a viohtion of equality 
As in Eldridge,705 the issue is one of fùnding and the provision of services within 
the health care system and the impact on persons with disabilities. I suggest that the 
allocation decisions of entities implementing mental health policy under provincial heaith 
Iegislation and in the administration of the mental disorder provisions of the Code do not 
result in an adequate supply of psychiatrie beds and adequate inpatient or community 
mental health resources. Furthexmore, inadequate mental heal th resources have a 
different impact on accused persons in cornparison to other persons with mental 
disabilities. Where a person with mental disability is detained under civil cornmittal 
legislation, the person is discharged fiom involuntaxy detention by hospital authonties 
when the person no longer meets the committai cnteria, which is generally when the 
person is no longer a danger to herself or himself or ~ t h e r s . ' ~  Whether the person will 
once again become a danger to herself or himseif or others is not considered. In this 
situation, the decision is based on the mental condition of the person at the time of 
discharge. However, the release fiom detention of an accused person is govemed by 
different factors. 
Without adequate mental health resources, an accused person remains longer 
under the jurisdiction of the mental 
previously in chapter 2, an accused 
disorder provisions of the Code. As emphasized 
person can regain her or his liberty only if evidence 
-- -- 
m'Supra note 38. 
706 Civil cornminal criteria varies across Canada. For a more detailed discussion 
see G. Robertson, Mental Disability Law in Canada, supra note 133 at 367- 437. 
c m  be placed before a Review Board that she or he is not a significant threat to the safety 
of the public. Under section 672.54 of the Code. when a Review Board is determining 
whether an accused person is a significant threat to the safety of the public, it considen 
the mental condition of the accused person: 
The significance of the accused's mental condition to that determination 
will depend on many variables, including the nature of the mentai disorder 
[disability], if any, fiom which the accused sufEers at the time of the 
inquiry, the available treatment, the accused's understanding of his mental 
condition, and the accused's willingness to conform to any proposed 
course of treatment.'07 
Furthermore, the Review Board considers the future risk that an accused person will 
present to the public. These variables corne into play when a Review Board is 
considering a disposition other than an absolute discharge. Since the majority of accused 
persons suffer fkom a serious mental illness, the availability of treatment and other mental 
health resources has an impact on the mental condition of the accused person. Without 
adequate mental health resources, the liberty of some accused persons is k ing  restricted 
unduly and their detention iengthened , which is contrary to the spirit and object of the 
mental disorder provisions of Part XX. 1 of the Code and which results in a distinction 
that violates the equality rights of accused persons. Furthermore, 1 cite C. (J) v. Brirish 
in suppon of the argument that the allocation decisions of the provincial 
decision-rnakers violate the equaiity rights of accused persons. McKimon J. states that 
707S~pra Lepage note 17 at para. 69. 
708S~Pra note 570. 
J-C .. the accused person, is subject to a provincial statute, the Forensic Psychiarry Act. "OD 
which regulates her confinement and 
While there is no specific 'law' prohibiting K . ' s  move to  the cottages, the 
administration of the provincial statute operates to exclude her. It is this 
action of the authorities that bnngs her within the jurisdiction of the coun 
and a review of S. 1 5.7'0 
McKimon J. concludes that this action results in a violation of the accused person's 
equality rights. 
ii) Distinction results in discrimination and imposes burden 
The analysis of the claim of discrimination of accused persons under subsection 
15(1) of the Charter must be conducted within the broader social, legal and political 
context, as determined in ~ndrews'" and Turpin. "' Accused persons fa11 within a 
category enurnerateci under subsection 15(1) of the Charter- the rnentally disabled A 
compelling account of the discrimination, exclusion and subordination of persons with 
disabilities is rendered by M.D. Lep~fsky.~" He notes that though peeons with 
disabilities number over four million in Canad- they are "over-represented among the 
poor." "under-represented among those persons who have graduaied fiom post- secondary 
educational institutions," "under-served by the legal profession" and "they are daily 
7 0 9 ~ . ~ . ~ . ~ .  1979, c.  139 now at R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 156. This Act rernained 
basically unchanged in the intervening period. 
7'0Supra note 570 at 396. 
b 
" 'Supra note 69 1 .  
" ' ~ u ~ r a  note 695. 
"'See supra note 159 at 270. 
impeded by a barrage of pejorative, inaccurate stereotypes which pewade public 
perceptions of tl~ern."~" Specifically regarding discrimination against persons with 
mental disabilities, Larner C.J., for the Court, stated in R-V. Sr~ain''~ 
The mentally il1 have historically k e n  subjects of abuse, neglect and 
discrimination in our society. The stigma of mental illness can be very 
darnaging. The intervener, C.D.R.C., describes the historical treatment of 
the mentaily iil as follows: 
For centuries. persons with a mental disability have been 
systematically isolated, segregated from the mainstream of 
society, devalued, ridiculed, and excluded from 
participation in ordinary social and political processes. 
The above description is, in my view, unfortunately accurate and appears 
to stem from an irrational fear of the mentally il1 in our ~ociety."~ 
He concluded that "[tlhere is no question that the mentally il1 in our society have suffered 
from historical disadvantage, have been negatively stereotyped and are generally subject 
to social prej~dice."~ '~ This finding was reiterated in Battlefords & District Co-operacive 
Ltd v. Gibbs. "" Most recently this was reaffîrmed in Eldridge, wherein La  Forest J. 
stated that "disabled persons have not generally been afforded the 'equal concem. respect 
7'41bid at 266-272. A similar picture of prejudice, high unemployment, poverty 
and educational and employment segregation is found in L. Legault, L 'intégration au 
rravail des personnes ayant des incapacités (Montreal : Wilson and Lafleur. 1 996) at 1 1 - 
67. 
715Supra note 17. 
71g(I 996) 140 D.L.R. (4") 1 (S.C.C.). For a detailed discussion of the exclusion 
and marginalization of persons with disabilities see M. D. Lepofsky, "A Report Cardon 
the Charter's Guarantee of Egualiîy to Persons with Disabilities afrer 10 Years - Whar 
Progress? Whar Prospects? " supra note 1 59. 
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and consideration' that S. 1 5(1) of the Chorrer dernand~.""~ Accused persons are M e r  
stigmatized by the underlying assumption of the mental disorder provisions that society 
must be protected from dangerous persons. This assumption can be traced back to the 
adoption of the Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800, as discussed in chapter me. that it is 
reasonable to assume that some accused persons will pose a threat to so~iety.'~~' As one 
author has argued, this assumption is based on a psychiatrie myth that "there is a higher 
rate of violence among people who have been diagnosed as mentaily disordered than 
among the general public, and therefore mentally disordered offenden present a greater 
risk to the public than other offenders.""' Therefore, they rnay be rehised access to 
programs or housing based on being stereotyped as dangerous." 
'I9Supra Eldridge note 38 at para 56. Though Mr. Justice La Forest made this 
statement in the context of persons with physicai disabilities it is even more applicable to 
persons with mental disabilities because as noted by M. D. Lepofsky that "our history is 
sadly replete with instances of persons with mental disabilities being treated worse than 
persons with physicd disabilitiesWin "A Report Cardon the Charter's Gzcarantee of 
Equaliry to Persom with Disabilities afrer 10 Years - What Progress? What Prospects? " 
supra note 159 at 33 1. 
"'Sec Swain supra note 17 at 1 O05 and 10 14. 
"'C. McKague, "nie Charter, Psychiarry and the Criminal Code " in B.Dickens 
& M. Ouelette. eds., Heditiz C'are, Ethics and Law (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for the 
Administration of Justice, 1993) at 6 1. 
" ~ n  example of such prejudice is found in a document produced by the 
institutionai Heaith and Community Services, Mental Heaith Programs and Services, 
Ministry of Health of Ontario, Backgrounder: The Provincial Forensic System, dated 
April, 1997 (unpublished) at 9. It States that even when an accused person no longer 
needs specialized forensic services there "appears to be a reluctance to accept forensic 
patients into general programs. Some hospitals have had exclusionacy criteria that 
essentially dictated that forensic patients will always remain with forensic units" rather 
than be integrated into the general population. 
The next step is to detemine whether decisions regarding allocation of mental 
health resources discnminate against accused persons. These decisions do not appear to 
discriminate directly against accused persons; however 1 suggest that the decisions result 
in adverse effects discrimination against accused persons. La Forest J. in Eldridge v. 
British Columbia (A.G.)" for the Court reiterates the concept of "adverse effects" 
discrimination which was first dealt with in Ontario Human Rights Commission v. 
Simpson-Sears Ltd. ''' He cites Mclntyre J. who stated 
A distinction must be made between what I would describe as direct 
discrimination and the concept already referred to as adverse effect 
discrimination in c o ~ e c t i o n  with employment. Direct discrimination 
occurs in this connection where an employer adopts a practice or rule 
which on its face discriminates on a prohibited ground. For example, 'No 
Catholics or no women or no blacks employed here.' ... On the other hand. 
there is a concept of adverse effects discrimination. It arises where an 
employer for genuine business reasons adopts a rule or standard which is 
on its face neutrai, and which will apply equally to al1 employees, but 
which has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited ground on one 
employee or group of employees in that it imposes, because of some 
speciai characteristic of the employee or group, obligations, penalties, or 
restrictive conditions not irnposed on other memben of the work force? 
La Forest J. reaffirxns the principle set out in the Andrews decision, wherein McIntyre J. 
declared, that the "equality principles developed by the Court in human rights cases are 
rqually applicable in S. 1 5 (1)  case^.""^ The Egan case"' also adopted the Simpson-Sears 
" Supra note 38. A 
n"[1985] 2 S.C.R. 536. 
"'Supro Eldridge note 38 at para.63. 
727Supra note 697. 
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definition of adverse effects discrimination in the context of section 15(1) of the Charter. 
With respect to adverse effect discrimination, the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Eldridge v. British Columbia (A.G.)"' held that 
[Slection 15(1) of the Charter protects against this type of discrimination 
... a discnminatory purpose or intention is not a necessary condition of a S. 
1 S(1) violation. It is suficient if the efect of the legislation is to deny 
someone the equal protection or benefit of the l a ~ . ~ ~ [ ~ r n ~ h a s i s  in the 
original] 
In addition, La Forest J. reiterates that the Supreme Court of Canada has held that where 
the state does provide a benefit "it is obliged to do so in a non-discriminatory r n a ~ e r . " " ~  
Furthermore, La Forest J. declares that discrimination will result fiom a "failure to take 
positive steps to ensure that disadvantaged groups benefit equally fiom services offered to 
the generai public.""' 
Under subsection 15(1) of the Charter, the provincial govemment has to take into 
account that its decisions may impact on individuals differently. La Forest J. in Eldridge 
endorses the approach espoused by Lamer C.J. in Rodriguez v. British Columbia 
(Attorney Get~eral)'~~ wherein he stated that "to promote the objective of the more equal 
society, S. 15(1) acts as a bar to the executive enacting provisions without taking into 
"'Supra Eldridge note 38. 
7">ibid at para. 6 1 & 62. 
'jOlbid at para. 73. 
7j'lbid at para. 78. 
732Supra note 495. 
account their possible impact on already disadvantaged classes of persons ."733 
On the basis of the above discussion, I conclude that accused persons are 
discriminated against on the ba i s  of their mental disability. The provincial govemment 
has failed to take into account the adverse impact that its decisions respecting the 
allocation of mental health resources and delivery of mental health services have on these 
persons. In addition, I cite C(4 v. British Columbiam in support of this argument. 
Although in that case the discrimination was on the b a i s  of gender, it raises the same 
issues regarding allocation of resources and the impact on an accused person. The 
evidence before the Court indicated that "but for budget restrictions, provisions could be 
made for the accommodation of female patients in ~ottage."~" McKinnon J. fin& that 
[A] policy restricting participation in a rehabilitative program based 
entirely on gender is discriminato W...  J-C. by most accounts needs the 
benefit of the cottage program to make the transition into the community. 
She has been denied that prograrn because of her gender and for no other 
rea~on."~ '~  
In this case the provincial Attorney General argues that J.C.'s denial to the program was 
motivated solely by financial considerations. M c K i ~ o n  J. reiterates the ruling of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in M~Kinney"~ that this fact does not alter the fact that the 
'"~upra Eldridge note 38 at para 64. 
"'Supra no te 495. A 
'"Supra McKinney note 473. See also Andrews supra note 69 1 ; Rodriguez supra 
note 495 and Simpson-Sears supra note 732. 
action is nonetheless a denial of equality and discriminatory under section 1 S(1). 
1 conclude that the equality rights of accused perrons are violated, but the question 
remains whether the violation is justified under section 1 of the Charler. 
D) Section 1 : Limits to Charter Rights and Freedoms 
a) Positive or negative Charter rights 
Whether the Charter imposes positive or negative duties on govemment impacts 
on the outcome of the analysis under section 1 of the Charter. A succinct explanation of 
the different conceptions of positive and negative duties and the Charter and their 
implications is given by H. Lessard et al. They state 
A purely negative definition of rights and fieedoms would ensure that the 
Charter benefits only those individuals with the means to exercise and 
enforce their rights. Such a conception of rights is closely allied with the 
abstract individual of classical liberal theory, for the pretense of 
guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms equally to al1 can only be 
rnaintained if the individual circurnstances and context that may 
effectively hinder or block access to those rights are repressed or ignored. 
lncorporating positive state obligations into various Charter rights on the 
other hand, entails some recognition of the comection between fieedom 
and equality of condition in order to put Charter nghts within the grasp of 
Canadians of al1 classes. Thus, a positive conception of rights is closely 
allied with the contextualized individual of pluralist liberal thought; a 
consideration of the linguistic, cultural, econornic and other differences 
that mark individuals in society reveals the inadequacies of a purely 
negative conception of right~.'~' 
Some Charrer rights are seen as imposing a mix of negative and positive obligations on 
govemments such as " the denorninational school rights, language rights, aboriginal treaty 
738H. Lessard, B. Ryder, D. Schneiderman & M. Young, "Developments in 
Consriturional Lm:  the 1994-95 Term " ( 1 996) Suprerne Court L.R. (2d) 8 1 at 1 0 1. 
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rights , the nght to a fair trial and the right to vote."739 The courts determine whether the 
Charter imposes a negative or a positive duty in the context of each right or freedom. 
The issue becomes whether the Charter nght or freedom in question 
guarantee[s] simply negative freedom. that is the right to be free from state 
interference with individual fkeedom or does the Charter also impose 
positive obligations on the state to extend benefits or to create the 
conditions necessary for the meaningful exercise of rights and fieedoms by 
al1 c i t i~ens?~"~  
For example. in Mahe v. ~lber ta . '~ '  the Supreme Court of Canada finds that section 23 of 
the Charrer [right to minority language education ] imposes a positive obligation on 
govenunent to permit rninority parents the care and control of the schools where their 
children are taught. Another example is R. v. ~ran'~' ,  where the Supreme Court of Canada 
determines that section 14 of the Charter (the right to an interpreter for a party or witness 
in any proceedings where the person does not speak or understand the language of the 
proceedings) imposes a positive obligation on government. However. in R W. Prosper7" 
and R. W. Matheson, "' the Supreme Court of Canada states that paragraph 10(b) of the 
Charter (the right to retain and Uistnict counsel on arrest or detention) does not impose a 
positive duty on govemment to provide state-funded duty counsel on arrest or detention. 
7391bid at 1 00. 
7401bid. 
"' Supra note 558. 
"'R. v. Tran [1994] 2 S.C.R. 95 1. 
7'3[1994] 3 S.C.R. 236. 
7U[1994] 3 S.C.R. 328. 
With respect to section 7 of the Charter [the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person], the theory of negative rights would interpret the purpose of this section as k i n g  
'-absence of al1 coercion vis-à-vis the person. Under the other approach. the objective is 
the imposition of positive obligations on the state with a view to protecting and. indeed. 
even promoting these rights.""' However, the courts have not given any precise answer 
in favour of one theory or another with respect to section 7.746 
With respect to subsection 15(1) of the Charter [the right to equaiity], the 
Andrews decision made it clear that section 15(1) of the Charter is intended to ensure 
"equality in the formation and application of the  la^""^ and does not constitute a 
"general guarantee of equality.""' In R. v. Sehachfer, '" the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that subsection 15(1) is a hybrid of positive and negative obligations and that "[i]n 
some contexts it will be proper to characterize section 15 as providing positive r i gh t~ . "~ '~  
The Supreme Court of Canada has limited the positive duty of governrnent to existing 
legislation or pro gram^.^^' However, when a govemment provides a benefit, it must do so 
without discrimination against disadvantaged groups or must not impose a burden that 
" 5 S ~ P r ~  note 48 1 at 9-6. 
746h5id at 9-7. 
747S~pra Andrews note 691 at 15 and Swain note 17 at 992. 
7'9S~pra note 497. 
7501bid at 702. 
'"Sec Brooks v. Canada Safiway Ltd [1989] 1 S.C.R. 12 19; Schachter supra 
note 497 and Egan supra note 697. 
218 
results in discrimination on such groups."' In Thibaudearc v. Canada, L' Heureux-Dubé 
J. states that 
Although section 15 of the Charter does not impose upon governments 
the obligation to take positive actions to remedy the symptoms of systemic 
inequality, it does require that the governent  not be the source of further 
ineq~ality.~~' '  
In Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) and Vriend v. ~lberta-'~ the 
Supreme Court of Canada states that it will not decide whether subsection lj(1) imposes 
a positive obIigation to remedy systemic inequality, since the issue is not raised in these 
cases.7s7 However, one author argues that in Eldridge and Vriend "the court is resisting 
the implications of its own analysis" and that in these cases the Supreme Court of Canada 
does place a positive obligation on govemments under subsection 1 j(1) to implement 
programs to ameliorate disadvantage and a duty to legislate  protection^.'^^ The result is 
that the Supreme Court of Canada has not made m y  definitive ruling on whether 
subsection 15(1) imposes a positive obligation on government to remedy or ameliorate 
disadvantage. As one author notes, "[tlhe Court's treatment of the issue of positive 
"'See Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Oficer) [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995; Egan supra 
note 69 7; and Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995] 2 S. C. R. 62 7. 
7531bid Thibaudeau. 
7541bid Thibaudeau at para.3 7 .  
755Supra Eldridge note 3 8. 
756~upra Vriend note 3 8. 
757S~pra Eldridge note 38 at para. 73 and Vriend at paras. 63-64. 
7S8 See B. Porter, " Beyond Andrews: Substantive Equal iîy and Positive Obligations 
Ajier Eldridge and Vriend" ( 1  998) 3 Const. Forum 7 1 at 75. 
obligations has been peripheral and indeci~ive.'"~~ 
b) Framework for aaaiysis 
R. v. ~ a k e s ' ~  sets out the framework for analysis for the justification of the limits 
on a right or fieedom under section 1 of the Charter. The Oakes test suggests "a relatively 
stringent view of S. 1. one that cedes the protection of rights and fieedoms only in rare 
cir~umstance."~~' However, in cases subsequent to Oakes, courts adopt a "more 
deferential, flexible, reasonableness-based approach to the various strands of the Oakes 
test."76' The Egan case7" restates this h e w o r k  which is cited with approval in Eldridge 
v. British Columbia (A-G) and in Vriend v. Alberta 
A limitation to a constitutional guarantee will be sustained once two 
conditions are met. First, the objective of the legislation must be pressing 
and substantial. Second, the means chosen to attain this legislation must be 
reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a fiee and democratic society. 
In order to satisQ the second requirement, three criteria must be satisfied: 
(1) the rights violation must be rationally comected to the aim of the 
legislation; (2) the impugned provision must minimaily impair the Charter 
guarantee; and (3) there must be proportionality between the effect of the 
rneasure and its objective so that the attainment of the legislative goal is 
no< outweighed by the abridgement of the right.'& 
7CoSupra note 492. 
7 6 ' ~ e e  P. Macklem et al. supro note 457 at 638. 
76'lbid at 643. The authors state th& Edwardr Books and Art Ltd. v. the Queen 
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, and Imin Toy Ltd v. Quebec 119891 1 S.C.R. 927 introduced a 
more flexible approach to section 1 . 
763S~ra  note 697. 
764Supra Eldridge note 38 at para. 84 and Vriend note 3 8 at para. 108. 
In Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada states that "a legislative objective would not 
count as a justification if it was not suficiently important to ovemde a Charter nght.""' 
The Court adds that the legislative objective rnust be consistent with the values of a fiee 
and democratic society and be directed to "the realization of collective goals of 
fundamental importance."766 These statements would appear to require a court to 
scnitinize ciosely the legislative objective. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
been easily persuaded that 
[Wlhen the Parliament or Legislature acts in derogation of individual 
rights, it is doing so to M e r  values that are acceptable in a fiee and 
democratic society , to satisQ concerns that are pressing and substantial 
and to realize collective goals of fundamental imp~rtance.'~' 
The Court has been deferential to the legislature's choice of objective, "especially if the 
legislation can be characterized as having a social justice agenda."768 In addition. in 
Vriend, the Suprerne Court of Canada notes that, on the first condition. the jurisprudence 
is "somewhat divided with respect to the proper focus of the analysis at this stage."769 
The Court states that the focus of the analysis must be on the objective of the impugned 
"'P. W. Hogg, supra note 457 at 872. 
766S~pra note 492 at 136. 
7 6 7 ~ .  W- Hogg, supra note 457 at 870. 
768E. Mendel, "The Crucible of the Charter: Judicial Principles v. Judicial 
Deference in the Context ofsection l",  at 3- 13, in G.-A. Beaudoin & E. Mendes, The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedorns, supra note 47 1. 
7 6 9 ~ ~ p r a  Vriend note 38 at para. 109. The Court explains that "some authorities 
have examined the purpose of the Iegislation in its entirety (see e-g. Mron,  supra; Egan, 
supra), others have considered only the purpose of the limitation ... (see e.g. U R -  
Macdonald Inc. v. Canada, [ 1 1951 3 S.C.R. 199, per McLachlin J.; McKînney, supra)." 
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limitation, but that the limitation cannot be understood in isolation and consideration 
must be given to the purpose of the legislation as a ~ h o l e . " ~  
The next step is to determine whether the iaw is rationally c o ~ e c t e d  to the 
objective of the law. In making this determination, the law is scrutinized to assess "how 
well the legislative garment has been tailored to suit its purpose.'."' The law should not 
be "arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations."" According to one author. 
Oakes is the only case where the Supreme Court of Canada has found that a law was not 
rationally connected to i t s  objective." 
Under the requirement that, in order to be justified under section 1. a provision 
must have a minimal impact upon the Charter guarantee. courts have adopted the more 
deferential approach to legislative choices in cases "where the govenunent has acted to 
balance competing rights: to otherwise protect a socially vulnerable group; to balance the 
interests of various social groups competing for resour~es."'~~ As reiterated in Eldridge 
770S~pra Vriend note 38 at paras. 109- 1 1 1. 
"'P. W .  Hogg, supra note 437 at 875. 
TTI~~pra note 492 at 139. 
n 3 ~ .  W. Hogg, supra note 457 at 877. 
77'See P. Mackiem et al., supra note 457 at 643. See also P. WHogg, supra note 
457 at 877- 882 where he states that the Supreme Court of Canada was willing "to defer 
to the legislative choice on the basis that the choice was within a margin of appreciation, 
a zone of discretion in which reasonable legislators could disagree while still respecting 
the Charter right. The result makes for an unpredictable jurisprudence." at 882. The 
question of deference of the courts to the legislature will be discussed more fully later in 
this chapter. 
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and Vriend 4'although this Court has recognized that the Legislatures ought to be 
accorded some leeway when making choices between social interests ... judicial deference 
is not without lirnit~.""~ 
The element of proportionality requires a balancing between the effects of the 
Charter infiingement and the legislative objective; the question is "whether the Charter 
infringement is too high a pnce to pay for the benefit of the law."'" In order for the 
legislative objective to be justified under section 1, the legislative objective must 
outweigh the Charter violation. However, according Professor Hogg, 'This step has never 
had any influence on the outcome of any case."778 He adds that it is redundant because it 
is a restaternent of the fmt step, that the objective of Law is sufficiently important to 
justi@ the override of a Charter right. 
C) Justification of infringements of section 7 and subsection 15(1) of the Charter 
Given that 1 have argued that an accused person's liberty interests are limited in a 
way that infinges on section 7 and that an accused person has been denied equality in 
contravention of subsection 15(1), then the issue becomes whether this restriction of 
liberty or denial of equality can be justified under section 1. It is interesting to note that 
in Eldridge v. British Columbia ( A . G ) ~ ~ ~  La Forest J. States that 
"'Supra Eldridge note 3 8 and Vriend note 3 8. 
1 
776/bid Eldridge at para. 86 and Vriend at para. 126. 
777P. W. Hogg, supra note 45 7 at 883. 
'"Ib id. 
"9Supra Eldridge note 3 8 at para. 52. 
It is not necessary to consider each of these elements [in the analytical 
framework for section 11 in this case. Assurning without decidïng that the 
decision not to fund medical interpretation services for the deaf constitues 
a limit 'prescribed by law', that the object of this decision - controlling 
health care expenditures- is 'pressing and substantial,' and that the 
decision is rationally connected to the objective. I find that it does not 
constitue a minimum impairment of S. 1 5( 1 
He adds that the "Court has aiso held that where the legislation under consideration 
involves the balancing of competing interests and matters of social policy, the Oaks  test 
should be applied fle~ibly."~" As one author comments, the issues that La Forest J. 
assumes 
[AJway were not without substance. Given the complete absence of any 
statutory discretion. it might have seriously doubted that the decisions not 
to fùnd language interpretation were 'prescribed by law. On the pressing 
and substantial element, Justice La Forest was accepting without 
explanation the submission that the objective had to relate to the limiting 
rneasure (here non-fimding of sign language interpretation) and not, as had 
been done in previous cases, the objective of the statutory scheme as a 
wh01e.'~~ 
However, 1 apply the h e w o r k  for the analysis set out in R.. v. 0akes" to answer the 
question of whether the restriction of liberty or deniai of equality c m  be justified under 
section 1. 
780Zbid at para.84. 
'"Ibid at para. 85. 
"'Supra note 655 at 274. 
783Supra note 492. 
i) Objective test 
In McKinney,"' Wilson J. discusses the meaning of the word "law" in the 
Constitution Act, 1982"' and the diflerent interpretations that the case law has attributed 
to the word. Wilson J. deciares 
These two definitions of 'law' are obviously quite different. Their 
difference springs fiom the fact that S. 1 of the Charter and S. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 serve two very different purposes. Section 52 is 
animated by the doctrine of constitutional supremacy. As such, a wide 
view of 'law' under that provision is mandated so that dl exercises of state 
power, whether legislative or administrative. are caught by the Charter. 
Section 1, on the other hand serves the purpose of permitting limits to be 
imposed on constitutionai rights when the demands of a fiee and 
democratic Society require them. These limits mut. however, be 
expressed through the rule of law. The definition of law for such a 
purpose must necessari ly be narrow. Oniy those limits on guaranteed 
rights which have surviveci the ngours of the law-making process are 
effective. 
As determined in C(4 v. British ~olurnbia.~" the legislation in question is the mental 
disorder provisions of the Code which provide for the detention of an accused person and 
which the province administers and the following provincial health legislation: in 
Ontario, the Menfal Hospitals A C I ; ' ~  SaYings and Restructuring Act. 1996. 789 and the 
7wS~pra note 473. 
'"Supra note 453. 
i 
7 86 See Wilson J. in McKinney supra note 473 at 82-83. 
787S~pra note 570. 
788Supra note 633. 
789Supra note 635. 
225 
Minisir y of Health and in British Columbia, the Forensic Psychiarry Act, -" the 
Minisf7-y of Health ~ c t ' "  and the HeaZth Authorities which govems the allocation 
of mental health resources and the provision of mental health services to accused persons. 
The question is whether the objectives of this legislation are sufficiently important to 
warrant the limitation of a section 7 or subsection 15(1) Charter right. In Swain. "' the 
Supreme Court of Canada easiIy concluded that the objective of the mental disorder 
provisions, the protection of the public, was pressing and substantial, as did the dissenting 
judgcs in Winko and Le~age.'~' As for the provincial health legislation. it will depend on 
the m m e r  in which the provincial government argues the case. If it limits argues that 
the objective of the legislation is to provide mental health services, 1 suggest that a court 
would accept that such an objective is pressing and substantial because. as one author 
cornrnents, the Supreme Court of Canada has dealt summarily with the first part of the 
Oakes test by accepting that the objective of legislation was pressing and substantial and 
has been deferential to the legislature's choice of ~ b j e c t i v e . ~ ~  However, if the provincial 
government argues that "implicit in the statute[s] is a directive to accomplish those goals 
-- - 
7WSupra note 634. 
79 1 Supra note 636. 
792Supra note 637. 
793 Supra note 638. 
794 Supra Swain note 1 7. 
795Supra Winko and Lepage note 17. 
796S~pra note 768 at 3- 1 3. 
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[the provision of mental health resources] within current budget restrictions" as was the 
case in C(4 v. British Cof~rnbia,'~' the result might be that the court, as happened in ihis 
case. would not find such a directive '?O be suficiently important to warrant the 
limitation of a constitutional right.""' 
ii) Proportionality test 
1) Rational connection 
Under this part of the test, at issue is whether the law is designed to achieve its 
objective and is not arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In Swain, - ? h e  
Supreme Court found that a rational comection existed between the object of the insanity 
provisions, the protection of so&ty and the means of achieving the objective. the 
detention of accused persons. In Winko and ~epage.'" the appellant conceded that a 
rational comection existed between the means and the objective of the mental disorder 
provisions. In C(9.'0' McKimon J. determined that a rational comection existed 
between the policy which excluded women and the budgetary restra.int policy. I suggest 
that in the case of the provincial health legislation that a rational connection exists 
between the objective of providing mental health services and the means chosen to 
provide those services. 
- - - 
797Supra note 5 70. 
, 
7981bid at 398. 
799 Supra note 1 7. 
800 See Winko supra note 17 at 47 and Lepage supra note 17 at para. 1 18. 
80'Supra note 570. 
2 )  Minimal Impairment 
With respect to the second component of the proportionality test, minimal 
impairment, the Supreme Court of Canada has closely s~rut in ized '~~ whether legislation 
or decisions that infnnge Charfer nghts constitute a minimum impairment of those rights. 
a) Section 7 
1 argue that the lack of action in funding the appropriate mental health services 
cannot be said to rninimally impair the liberty rights of accused persons since it has the 
drastic effect of lengthier detention periods for some accused persons. The question 
becomes whether the state -'could easily employ a means which would still rneet its 
objective and yet not limit the appellant's liberty under S. 7 to such a great e ~ t e n t . " ~ ~ ~  I 
contend that the provincial goveniment would be able to achieve the objective of the 
mental disorder provisions without infiinging the C;;arter nghts of accused persons. by 
allocating additional h d s  to provide adequate mental health services. ensuring that 
present mental health resources were directed to accused persons first, or reallocating 
funds from other health areas to the mental health programs, since the courts do not hold 
governments "to search out and to adopt the absolutely least intrusive means of attaining 
its o b j e c t i ~ e . " ~  However, the provincial government might argue, as it did in C(4 and 
80LS~pra note 768 at 3-23-3-30. 
803S~pra Swain note 1 7 at 1 O 16. 
'"%ee Lepage supra note 17at para. 1 19 citing R. v. Chaulk [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 
at 1341. 
Eldridge. 'O5 that it cannot provide additional hinds, reallocate funds from other areas or 
direct mental health services to accused persons first and meet its objectives of providing 
mental heaith services to al1 persons with mental disabiiities or general health services 
given the fiscal constraints on the health budget. 
Given the deferentiai approach of the Supreme Court of Canada to govemmental 
actions under section 1 of the Charter, the Court might find that the allocation decisions 
of the state respecthg mental health services only minimally impair the rights of accused 
persons. La Forest J. in Eldridge summarized the case law on point when he stated that 
It is also clear that while fuiancial considerations alone may not justiQ 
Charter infnngements (Schacter, supra, at p. 709), govemments must be 
afforded wide latitude to determine the proper distribution of resources in 
society ; see McKinney, supra, at 2 8 8, and Egan, supra. at para. 1 04 (per 
Sopinka J.). This is especially true where Parliament, in providing specific 
social benefits, has to choose between disadvantaged groups; see Egan, 
supra. at para. 104 (per Sopinka J.). ... In the present case, the failure to 
provide sign language interpreters would fail the minimal impairment 
branch of the Oakes test under a deferential appr~ach."~ 
Furthemore. in Prosper and Mathesonm7 where the liberty of a person could be 
jeopardized by the lack of access to legal aid counsel on anest, the Supreme Court of 
Canada refused to extend a benefit. In these cases, the issue was whether the right to 
counsel set out in paragraph 10(b) of the Charter obliged the state to provide legal advice 
on mest or detention. In Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island respectively, where 
these cases arose, legal aid advice was unavailable afier houn. This service was available 
- 
'O5  See C(J) supra note 570 and Eldridge supra note 38. 
'061bid Eldridge at para. 85.  
807 Supra Prosper note 743 and Matheson supra note 744. 
in the other provinces. The Court d e d  that the right to counsel was not breached even 
though these persons had no financiai means of obtaining legal advice. Lamer C.J. in 
R. v. Prosper clearly advocated "fiscal prudence"808 when he stated: 
...(Il t would be a very big step for this Court to interpret the Charter in a 
manner which imposes a positive constitutional obligation on 
govermnents. The fact that such an obligation would alrnost certainly 
intertere with govemments allocation of limited resources by requiring 
them to spend public fûnds on the provision of a service is, 1 might add, a 
funher consideration which weighs against this interpretati~n.'~~ 
In addition, L'Heureux-Dubé J., who agreed with the majority position, 'btated that 
whether the poor would be able to exercise the constitutional nght to counsel set out in 
section 10(b) was a matter of legisiative p ~ l i c y . " ~ ~ ~  In addition in Eldridge v. British 
Columbia (A. G.)" ' La Forest J. emphasized that the cost of the service, sign language 
interpretation, was $150,000 or .O025 % of the health care budget of British Columbia at 
that time, therefore 
In these circurnsbnces. the refusal to expend such a relatively insignificant 
surn to continue and extend the service cannot possibly constitute a 
minimum impairment of the appellants' constitutional right~.~'' 
sO'~his terrn is used by the authors of Developments in ConstitutionaZ Law : The 
I994-9j Term supra note 738 to describe the Suprerne Court's rationale "to relieve the 
state of an obligation to provide the means to exercise freedom of expression and right to 
counsel in NWAC and Prosper surfaced again in Sopinka J . 3  decisive swing judgment in 
Egan." at 105. 
'OPSupra note 743 at 267. i 
"'~upra note 738 at 105. 
" '~upro  note 38. 
'I2Ibid Eldridge at para. 87. In C(J3 supra note 570 at issue was access to a 
rehabilitation program for at least 5 women and at most 17. 
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However, in the case of mental health services, we are not dealing with insignificant 
sums. The Ministry of Health of Ontario allocated, in 1997-98, % 1.4 billion for mental 
health services out of a totai heaith budget of 17.9 billionsu3 and in British Columbia the 
Ministry of Health spent $1 .O4 billion on mental health services out a totai health budget 
of $6.9 billions8" in 1996/97. The message is clear in Eldridge that if the cost of 
providing the service had been significant in cornparison to the provincial budget. the 
govemrnent might have been justified under section 1 of the Charter in infinging the 
rights of the appellants. La Forest J. stated: 
The govemrnent has simply not demonstrated that this unpropitious state 
of affairs must be tolerated in order to achieve the objective of limiting 
heaith care expenditure~.~'~ 
Therefore, based on the above mentioned cases, it seems likely that the Supreme 
Court of Canada would frnd that the section 7 infiingement was saved by section 1 of the 
Charfer. As previously mentioned, in the case of accused persons, not al1 mental health 
services are not being denied to them, although adequate and appropnate mental health 
services are being denied hem, nor are they being excluded as a class fiom receiving a 
"'The S 1.4 billion figure is taken h m  a Ministry of Heaith of Ontario entitled. 
Mental Heulth Progroms and Services 1 992/93 io 1 W6/9 7 ActuaUEsrimated expendi tures 
and 199 7/98 P reliminary Allocation, dated Augusî, 1 3, 1 997 (unpublished) and the S 1 7.9 
billions figure is taken fiom The Esrimates, 1998-99: Minisfry of Healfh, Summary 
distributed by the Communications Branch of the Ministry of Health, Toronto, Ontario at 
139. 
"'These figures were taken fiom a Ministry of Health table entitled Ministry of  
Health (Notel): Summury Level Informarion on Mental Health Services For Year Fiscal 
Year 83/85 , 89/90 to 96/97, revised on January 26, 1998, (unpublished ). 
a'sSupra Eldridge note 38 at para. 94. 
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benefit provided by the state, as was the case in Schuchfer v. R.,"6 Tétreault-Gadoury v. 
Canada (Emphyment and lmmigrcrtion Cornni~sion) ,~'~ Mironu8 and Eldridge..'" In 
addition, the provincial government might argue that it was attempting to refonn the 
mentai health system and to provide additional resources in time. 
However, 1 contend that the Supreme Court of Canada should eschew deferential 
approach in the case of accused persons because it would not lead to an appropnate 
outcome. The Court should adopt a purposive approach and focus on the effect that the 
lack of resources has on accused persons- lengthier detention which is very different 
from the issues discussed in the above-rnentioned cases. Seeing the high value that o u .  
society places on liberty, surely the Court would not permit such an infringement on the 
liberty of an accused person. 1 argue that the lack of adequate mental resources does 
more than minimaliy impair the liberty of accused persons. In support 1 cite, the Supreme 
Court of Canada statement in Eldridge v. British ~ o l u m b i a ( ~ . ~ . ) ~ ' ~  which has given 
governments "wide latitude to determine the proper distribution of resources in 
s o ~ i e t ~ " . ~ ~ '  However, this discretion is not limitless.'" In addition. in Tétreault- 
8 '6S~pra  note 497. 
"'Supra note 502. 
8'8Supra note 697. 
8 '9~upra  note 38. 
*"&id at para. 54. 
82'Similar comments have been made in cases conceming the right to be tried 
within a reasonable time if charged with an offence under paragraph 1 l(b) of the 
Gadoury, La Forest J. States that 
[G]overnment when Iegislating in these matters [social benefits] ... does 
not bave] an unrestricted licence to disregard an individual's Charter 
rights. Where the govemment cannot show that it had a reasonabie basis 
for concluding that it has complied with the requirement of minimal 
impairment in seeking to attain its objectives, the legislation will be struck 
down.'" 
Even if the court were to adopt a deferentiai approach based on the declaration of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Sehachter v. R..824 that "[alny remedy granted by a court will 
have some budgetary repercussions whether it be a saving of money or an expenditure of 
m~ney".''~ a court should find that the lack of adequate mental health resources more than 
minimally impairs the liberty of accused persons. In addition, the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. ~ s k o f l ~ ~  "appeared to recognize that the use of stays of proceedinps to 
snforce limits on systemic triai delays would require more resources to be devoted to 
Charter., for example see R. v. Askov, (1990) 59 C.C.C. (3d) 449. In addition, it cost the 
Ontario government $39 million for additional court resources and Crown Attorneys to 
avoid M e r  stays of proceedings as noted in K. Roach Constitutional Remedies in 
Canada (Aurora: Canada Law Book Inc., 1 994)(loose leaf edition) at 3- 10. However, in 
EIdridge v. B. C. (A.G.), supra note 38, the Court did emphasize that the cost to the 
government was estimated at $150,000 to provide sign language services. I wonder if the 
Court would have reached the same decision if the pnce tag of providing health services 
was considerably higher. For a discussion of past Supreme Court of Canada equality 
decisions see D. Pothier, "M'aider, Mayday: Section I5 of rhe C h e r  in Distress", 
( 1  996) 6 N.J.C.L. 295. 
, 
82'Supro note 502 at 44. 
82'S~pra note 497. 
'"Supra note 822. 
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backlogged j~risdictions."~" However, this did not deter the Court fiom finding that the 
Charter infiingement was not justified under section 1. 
b. Section 15 
Additional elements come into play on the justification of a violation of the 
equality section of the Charter, since subsection 15 (1) focuses on the discnminatory 
sffect of decisions regarding mentai heaith resources. The main issue is whether these 
decisions constitute a minimum impairment of accused person's equality rights. In the 
context of adverse effects discrimination, the issue of minimum impairment becornes a 
question of whether the state has af5orded reasonable accommodation to accused 
persons. La Forest J. in Eldridge states that the principle of reasonable accommodation 
is "generally equivalent to the concept of 'reasonable lirnits.""' The law is clear that. 
where adverse effects discrimination is detennined under human rights legislation. the 
obligation to accommodate extends tu the point of 'Lundue hardship," in this context . to 
the point of placing a severe strain on the health care sy~ te rn .~ '~  The onus is placed on the 
governrnent to prove that it has taken reasonable steps to accommodate to the point of 
undue hard~hip."~ 
"'K. Roach, supra note 822 at 3- 10. 
8'8S~pra Eldridge note 38 at para. 79. 
8290ntario Human Rights CornmisJion supra note 724; Central Alberta Dairy 
Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission) 119901 2 S.C. R. 489; Central Okanagan 
School District No.23 v. Renaud [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970, Saskatchewan (Human Righrs 
Commission v. Canadian Odeon Theatres L d  (1985) 18 D.L.R. (4th) 93 (Sask. C.A.). 
830For M e r  discussion of the ;;sues raised the duty <O accommodate and it 
ramifications in the employment context see A. Molloy, "Disability and the Dufy to 
As emphasized by a number of authors, the duty to accommodate is of the utmost 
importance for penons with disabilities; it goes "to the very heart of eq~ality."'~' Such a 
duty recognizes that, for persons with disabilities, the accommodation of differences is 
the key to achieving equality. This principle is clearly recognized in both the Eaton and 
EIdridge decisions. For persons with mental disabilities, the needs of each individual to 
overcome the impairment or disabling aspect of her or his disability must be 
accommodated. However, as noted by L'Heureux-Dubé J., the Supreme Court of 
Canada has held that "economic factors may be relevant in applying the criteria of undue 
hardship.-7sx In addition , as noted above, in Eldridge. La Forest J. reaffirmed that 
financial considerations can be argued under section 1 of the Charter. In the case of 
accused persons, the state may argue that these are times of fiscal restraint and escalating 
health care costs, and that if it had to allocate additional resources to accommodate 
accused persons, it would result in undue hardship, by placing a severe strain on the 
health care systern.')) As noted above, since the governments of Ontario and British 
Accommodate " ( 1  993) 1 Can. Lab. L.J. 23; S. Day & G. Brodsb, "The Dufy To 
Accommodate: Who WiZZ Benefit "( 1996) 75 Cm. Bar Rev. 433; L. Legault, 
L 'Intégration au m u i l  des personnes ayant des incapacités (Montreal: Wilson and 
Lafleur, 1996) 102- 13 8; M. LeFrançois, ''The Scope of the Duty to Accommodate in rhe 
Large Empiuyment Setfing" (1996) 5 C.L.E.L.J. 1. 
831See A. Molloy, ibid at 26. As well, see M. D. Lepofsky, supra note 159 at 278- 
283 and D. Pothier, supra note 822 at 537-538. 
"'C . L ' Hheureux-Dubé, " Volatile Times: Balancing Human Rights. 
Responsibilities and Resources " (1 996) 24 C.H.R.R. C/1 at C/2. 
833The British Columbia Govemment in Eldridge supra note 3 8 argued the if i t 
had to provide interpretation services to deaf persons it would have to provide them to 
perons who spoke neither English or French and that such a situation would increase the 
Columbia spend a portion of their health budget on mental health services, they would 
argue that they have made reasonable accommodation. In response, 1 argue that the 
expenditures required to detain accused persons in hospital and of their longer tenure 
under the jurisdiction of a Review Board may be more costly to the state than providing 
adequate community mental health resources and supports and an adequate supply of 
psychiatric beds. For example, the cost of a forensic bed per day in Ontario ranges fiom 
$3 5 1 .O0 to %588.43834 and that of a hearing of the Ontario Review Board is $1970.32 in 
Board costs done? 
As argued above, the deference shown by the Supreme Court of Canada to 
govemment's role in determinhg Iegislative policy and allocating govemment fimding 
has resulted in the Court irnposing very few positive obligations on govemment to extend 
benefits under existing programs under subsection 15(1). It is clear fiom the Supreme 
Court decisions in McKinney, Egan, and Thibaudeau that subsection 15(1) of the Charter 
cannot be readily used to compel governments to provide benefits. One author declares 
program expenses dramatically and place a severe strain cn the fiscal sustainability of the 
health care system. 
834These figures are taken from the Mental Health Programs and Services. 
Ministry of Health of Ontario, Forensic Patient Database: 1996 Annual Report supra 
note 357 at 3349. 
'35This figure is calculated as follows: The estimated cost of the Ontario Review 
Board for 1997-97 was 2,098,400. as stated in the Ministry of Health, The Estimates. 
1998-99 at 142, as distributed by the communications Branch of the Ministry of Health of 
Ontario was divided by the total nurnber of hearings of the Ontario Review Board of 1065 
hearings fiom AprÏl 1, 1997-March 3 1, 1998. The Board statistics are unpublished and 
were provided by the Ontario Review Board in a chart dated May 14, 1998. Of note is 
that the hearing cost figure of $1970.32 does not include the costs of legal counsel to the 
parties and witnesses. 
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that Egan and Thibaudeau illustrate that the Supreme Court of Canada is "prepared to 
manipulate section 15 and/or section 1 to avoid even the limited scope left by 
S~hachter ."~~~ Another striking example of the discrimination that results fiom this 
approach to subsection 15(1) and section 1 of the Charter is found in Fernandes v. 
Director ofsocial Services (Winnipeg central)."' In this case, the provincial government 
had refused a person with a disability an increase in welfare payments for attendant care 
which would permit the person to live in the cornmunity instead of a hospitai. The 
Manitoba Court of Appeal held that Mr. Fernandes' equaiity rights under subsection 
15(1) of the Charrer were not infnnged since he was treated in the same manner as al1 
other recipients and al1 his basic needs were k ing  met."' The Court found that the 
government was not discrirninating against Mr. Fernandes even though as a result of the 
refusal of the additional allowance Mr. Fernandes had to live in a hospital when his 
medical condition did not require it. Therefore, the impact of the Court's deference to 
government in the allocation of govemment funds "makes large parts of what government 
does effectively immune fiom Charter scrutiny in ways that significantly undermine 
836 D. Pothier , "M'Aider, Mqday:  Section I5 of the Charter in Disiress" supra 
note 822 at 304-305. 
"'(1992) 78 Man. R. 172 (Man. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refùsed [1993] 2 
S.C.R. vii (note). 
'''The Court of Appeal of Manitoba also rejected the appellant's section 7 
argument stating that section 7 only applies when a person is detained within the justice 
system because it is a legal right. The fact that Mr. Fernandes had to live in a hospital did 
not appear to be considered; the Court stated that "[tlhe desire to live in a particular 
setting does not constitute a right protected under section 7 of the Charter." See ibid at 
414. 
eq~ality." '~~ However, one author states that in Eldridgem and vrienff ' 
[Vhe Court has provided us with the legal tools to challenge the rnost 
important inequalities in society arising fiom govemment acquiescence in 
face of violations of fundamental human nghts ... In Vriend and Eldridge 
the Court has taken an important initiative toward h i n g  a new paradigrn 
of substantive equdity."' 
Even if the Supreme Court of Canada were to adopt a deferentiaî approach to the 
infiingement of the equality rights of accused persons, I argue that the govemment may 
be unable to demonstrate that it had a reasonable basis for concluding that its allocation 
decisions infnnge the equality rights of accused persons no more than is necessary. This 
is because of the drastic effect of the discrimination- lengther detention periods or more 
restrictive detention for some accused persons. As suggested above, the government 
would still be able to achieve its goal of containing heaîth costs or providing hedth care 
services and not adversely impact on the equality rights of accused persons, by providing 
adequate mental health services, either by allocating more of the existing mental health 
resources to accused persons on a priority basis or funding the necessary mental health 
services and supports. 
839 D. Pothier , "M'A ider, Mayday. Section 15 of the Charter in Distress" supra 
note 822 at 305. 
840~upra note 38. 
"'Supra Vriend note 3 8. 
"2Supra note 758 at 82. 
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3. Proportionate effect 
As rnentioned above, although the cowts go through this step, it has not been 
influential in deciding the outcome of a case."' This step requires the court to weigh the 
effects of the Iaw liriiiting a Chorrer right against the objective of the legislation and the 
court has to determine that the object is sufficiently important to warrant the ovemde of a 
Charter right. 1 argue that the legislative objective of controlling health care espenditures 
or to provide mental health services within a limited budget cannot outweigh the cirastic 
effect of infringing the liberty rights of accused persons for the reasons set out above. In 
addition. as previously argued, the attainment of this legislative objective renders the 
mechanisms in section 672.54 of the Code. which ensure the protection of the rights of 
accused persons, inoperative. 
E) Charter Remedy 
If it can be shown that the Charter rights of accused persons were infnnged under 
either section 7 or subsection 1 5(1) and that this inhingement cannot be justified under 
section 1. accused persons would use subsection 24(1) of the Charter to seek a remedy in 
the superior courtw (in Ontario, in the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division) and in 
B. C., the Supreme Court of British Columbia). 1 propose that accused persons should 
seek a declaration stating that thefailure to provide adequate mental health services to 
81 3 P. W. Hogg, supra note 457 at 883. 
844 As previously mentioned section 24(1) does not create a court with jurisdiction 
to grant a Charter remedy, the abili ty for a court to grant a particular remedy stems from 
the statute establishing the court or, as is the case with a superior court, its inherent 
jurisdiction. I suggest a supexior court since its jurisdiction is unlimited and this court has 
exercised a parem parrioe jurisdiction in regard to penons with mental disabilities. 
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accused persons is unconstitutional and directing the provincial governrnent to administer 
the law in a manner consistent with section 7 and subsection 15(1) of  the Charter. In 
Eldridge,'" La Forest J. stated that "[a] declaration as opposed to some kind of 
injunctive relief. is the appropriate remedy in this case because there are myriad options 
available to the government that may rectiQ the wiconstitutionality of the current 
sy~tern.""~ The Supreme Court of Canada uses this same approach in Mahe v. ~ lber ta"~ 
because of the complexities of the issues in question and the fact that the provincial 
govemment could fiilfil1 its constitutional obligations in different ways. Such a remedy 
would place the constitutional obligation on governrnent to ensure that aiiequate mental 
health services are provided to accused persons so that their detention under the mental 
disorder provisions of the Code is the least restrictive on their liberty. 
If the challenge arose in Ontario, the applicants would seek a declaration that the 
effect of the decisions on mental health services made under the Mental Hospitais Acr. 
the Ministry of Health Act and the Savings and Restrucruring Act. 1 9 9 p 8  is to infinge 
accused persons' rights under section 7 or subsection 15(1) of the Charter and that this 
infringement does not constitute reasonable limits under section t and is therefore 
unconstitutional. Accused persons would seek an order directing the Government of 
U5Supra note 38. 
&%id at para. 96. 
note 633. 
"'Supra note 634 and 635. 
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Ontario to administer the Mentd Hospitals ~ c t , ~ ~  the Ministry of flerlth ACP and the 
Health Services Restmcturing Commission under the Savings and Restructuting Act. 
199685' including policies and decisions made under these statutes, in accordance with 
section 7 and subsection 1 S(1) of the Charter. If the challenge arose in British Columbia 
the relevant statues are the Foremic Psychiutry ~ct ,"" the Ministry of Health Act or the 
HeaIth Authorities Act **' and the direction to compiy with Charter rights would be given 
to the Government of British Columbia and the delegated decision-makers. In essence, 
the order would require the government to provide adequate mental health resources to 
accused persons to ensure that they are not detained in a more restrictive environment or 
in custody when the protection of the public does not warrant it. 
F) Conclusion 
In my view, the lack of adequate mental health resources has resulted in an 
infringement of the rights of accused persons which is not justifiable in a fiee and 
democratic society. Therefore, 1 suggest that tiis is the problem that needs to be 
remedied. An argument can be made that since the mental disorder provisions of the 
Code are not king implemented as intended by the Parliament or in accordance with the 
legislative scheme as interpreted by the appellate courts, the constitutional validity of the 
"9Supra note 63 3. 
850S~pra  note 634. 
8 5 1 S ~ p r a  note 63 5 .  
'"Supra note 636. 
'"Supra note 637 and 638. 
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mental disorder provisions of the Code, in particular section 672.54, should be challenged 
under subsection 52(1) of the Cornfitution Act, 1982. The challenge would be taken 
against the federal government. If such a challenge were successfùl, the key section of 
the mental disorder provisions would be invalid and new disposition provisions would 
need to be enacted, since in my view, the court is uniikely to use the other techniques of 
reading down, reading in, severance or constitutional exemption. based on the outcome in 
R. v. SwainBJ' 
However, a stronger argument can be made that an accused person should bring 
an application under subsection 24(1) o'f the Charter, requesting a declaration of rights 
which would direct the provincial government to act in a manner that does not infnnge an 
accused person's Charter right and to provide adequate mental health resources to 
accused persons. As discussed in this chapter, the challenge would be taken against the 
provincial government since under provincial health legislation it provides mental health 
services and it has the responsibility of administering the disposition sections of the 
mental disorder provisions of the Code. Altematively, an accused person could seek a 
declaration of invdidity of the mental disorder provisions of the Code under subsection 
52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and, if the provisions are determined to be valid. seek 
a declaration of rights under subsection 24(1) of the Charter. 
1 subscribe to the position espoused by nghts advocates, though some are criticai . 
854Supra note 1 7 .  
of the argument of rights advocates, "' that the "courts should have the last word not only 
because they are likely to be the strongest guardians of minority interests, but also 
because the Charter itself provides objective and determinative right a n s w e r ~ . " ~ ~ ~  In 
addition, the decisions in Eldridge and Vriend emphasize the importance of equality 
rights and provide some of the necessary tools with which to attack the problem of 
government inaction to adequately fund mental health services in that 
p]n Vriend the Court makes explicit what is implicit in Eldridge, that 
govenunent need not have entered a particular legislative or benefit area in 
order for a Charter daim to be made with respect to a f"ai1ure to act to 
address a needmgS7 
As argued by one author. the decisions impose a positive obligation on govenimcnts to 
act because 'Wie majority in Vriend makes it clear that section 15 creates broader 
obligations to protect and promote equality in al1 areas where the governrnent has the 
855For a discussion of the different positions taken on the rights debate in R.F. 
Devlin. "The Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory " (1 997) 1 Rev. Const. Studies 1. 
The author states that there is a debate between those who believe in the utility of a rights 
discowse, those who do not, and those who resist dichotomous analysis ... The dominant 
intellectual paradigm in Canadian jurisprudence presumes that rights, like law, are both 
natural and unequivocally desirable ... Jurists who subscribe to such a perspective envision 
the Charter as a normative and institutional structure designed to encourage both the 
courts and legislators to maximize human rights and social justice ... Importantly, many 
rights theorists emphasize that judicial enforcement of rights is grounded in principle. not 
policy, politics or power ... Others however, are unimpressed and advance severai 
arguments against the ideology and practice of the Charter-ization of rights. First, critics 
argue that judicial review is undemocratio because judges are unelected and, therefore. 
unaccountable." at 35-37. See also M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights a n d  the 
Legalizution of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Thornpson Educational Publishing , Inc.. 
1 994). 
856~ .F .  Devlin, " nie Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory "ibid at 36. 
8S7S~pra note 758 at 79. 
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jurisdiction to act.""' Furthemore, in Eldridge, the Supreme Court of Canada adopts a 
p]urposive approach ... [which focuses] on the inequality which needs to 
be remedied by the provision of a service or benefit rather than on a 
question of how the inequality is comected to an existing statute ... There 
is really no requirement of an 'application of law' beyond the requirement 
that it be within the government's jurisdiction to address the t~eed.~'~ 
This new approach is important where allocation decisions are in question since 
"[d]ecisions not to provide, or failures to act in the face of the need of vulnerable goups. 
can rarely be pinpointed to one actor within govenunent or to a particular  tat tu te."'^^ 
In addition, the Eldridge decision makes clear that deference to govemment will not 
necessarily carry the day where the government failure to provide services does not 
minimally impair the rights of the claimants. 
The Charter remedy is best suited to ensuring that the spirit and intent of the 
legislative scheme of the mental disorder provisions, which has been reiterated by 
different Courts of Appeal, are respected. The courts must not permit the lack of adequate 
mental health resources to render the safeguards of rights of accused persons contained in 
the mental disorder provisions inoperative. The courts by means of a declmtion of rights 
under subsection 24(1) of the Charter can ensure that accused persons are not detained in 
more restrictive settings or for any longer than the protection of the public requires since 
the court can order govemments to provide adequate mental health resources to accused 
persons. This would go a long way towards ensuring that the liberty and equality rights 
, 
of accused persons are respected. 
CONCLUSION 
As argued in chapter 1, in the 19" century, different attempts to provide 
institutional care and treaûnent to persons with mental disabilities failed. The initiatives 
such as providing moral treatment in asylums or bettering the conditions in pauper 
lunatic asylurns were motivated at the outset by hurnane and compassionate grounds. 
However. overcrowding and barely minimal living standards were soon the n o m  and 
these institutions abandoned dl pretense of providing treatment. The pauper asylums 
became prisons whose inmates were rarely released. The failure of these initiatives has 
been attributed mainly to the lack of funding of these institutions, and to their use as the 
"dustbin of society". 
The transformation of the asylums into mental hospitals in the first half of the 
20th century does not appear to have changed the living conditions in these institutions. 
The mental hospitals were for the most part large custodial institutions. As a result of the 
medicalization of mental iliness, somatic treatments were provided which would have 
certaidy inflicted pain and suffering on the persons confined within the hospital. The 
wave of refonn in the 1960s in Canada which advocated the deinstitutionalization also 
appears to have been motivated by humane and compassionate concems for persons with 
mental disabilities. The stated goal was to provide comrnunity mental health services and 
supports to these persons so that they could be re-integrated into the comrnunity. Despite 
these good intentions, however, deinstiqonalization, as argued in chapter 2, has been a 
failure in that persons with serious mental illnesses have not received adequate mental 
health services and supports to remain in the comrnunity. Instead they have been caught 
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up in the "revolving door syndrome" with repeated re-admissions to psychiatric units. 
The many reports on reform of the mental health system have emphasized that the lock of 
funding of cornmunity mental health services and the closure of psychiatric beds. 
following the shifi in mental health policy from institutional to community mental health 
services, are the reasons that these persons have not received services. In addition. 
persons with serious mental illness have become homeless due to the lack of appropriate 
housing and inadrquate income supports. The mental health system has been described 
as 
A non-system ... where a few patients get more than they need, many 
patients get iess than they need and some get nothing at d l .  Patients may 
get lost in this non-system and no one feels obliged to look for them. 
Patients may refuse to follow a program's d e s  and be teminated from 
treatment by staff who believe that they had no other choice. Patients are 
moved from the community into hospital and fiom the hospital back into 
the community such that the hospital, the community. the patient. and the 
family al1 feel mistreated." ' 
Accused persons under the jurisdiction of the mental disorder provisions generallp 
suffer fiom senous mental illness. As a result of committing an offence and being found 
not guilty on account of mental disorder, an accused person is placed under the 
jurisdiction of a Review Board who determines whether she or he is a significant threat to 
the safety of the public, as discussed in chapter 2. The principal aim of the mental 
disorder provisions is to protect the public from dangerous persons. However, in making 
a disposition, a Review Board m u t  also consider the re-integration of the accused person 
86'L. Stein, R. Diarnond, & R. Factor, ''A system approach to the cure ofpersons 
ivifh schirophrenia " in M .  1. Herz, S. J. Keith, & J. P. Docherty (eds.) Handbook of 
Schizophrenia. vol. S (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publisher, 1990) 
ci ted in Best pracrices, supra note 4 1 at 1 7. 
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into the cornmunity and the other needs of the accused person. Only a few accused 
persons are given an absolute discharge afier their initial disposition hearing. The others 
are detained in custody at a hospital or given a discharge on condition and placed under 
the supervision of a person in charge of a hospital. 
The Iack of mental health resources has additional consequences for accused 
persons. While persons under civil committal are released from a psychiatrie unit when 
considered no longer dangerous to self or others or no longer suffering fiom a mental 
illness, in order to receive an absolute discharge, accused persons have to contend with 
the additional requirement (under the mental disorder provisions) that they will not pose a 
significant threat to the safety of the public in the future. Without adequate mental health 
resources, an accused person cannot okain her or his liberty because she or he will be 
unable to convince the Review Board that they do not pose a significant threat to the 
safety of the public. In fact, for a number of accused persons, inadequate mental health 
resources render the mental disorder provisions virtually inoperative. 
The Charter remedies suggested in chapter 3 are aimed at identi@ing ways of 
forcing govemments to fùnd the mental health system and other support services tu 
ensure that adequate resources are available to accused persons. These resources are 
necessasr to ensure that the mental disorder provisions are tmly the least onerous and 
least restrictive and do not infkinge the liberty and equality rights of accused persons. 
1 suggest that govemrnents should avoid litigation and direct the necessary 
resources towards accused persons. This goal may be achieved by reforming forensic 
services '?O ensure that action is taken to increase accessibility to both inpatient and 
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community-based forensic services"&' and to mainstrearn mental health services. 
Govenunents should reallocate or enhance funding to increase community-based mental 
health services and supports prior to any downsizing of psychiatrie beds. as outlined in 
the 1998 Mental Health planb6' in British Columbia and as recommended by the Health 
Services Restnicturïng Commission in Changes and Transition. As noted by one heaith 
economist, "[wlhen the cost of mental illness is tallied, a massive reinvestment in 
community supports makes economic. not just humane, sense."'" Therefore, the 
implementation of the suggested changes should be accelerated. As stated by the 
executive director of the British Columbia Division of the Canadian Mental Health 
Association "[wle know what the right things to do are, but there are never. ever the 
resources to do it."'"* 
Furthemore, two documents can serve as usefiil guides to goveniments to 
enhance services and supports. The first is contained in A Provincial Strategy To 
86'~ealth Services Restructuring Commission, Change and Transition: Planning 
Guidelines and Implementation Simtegies for Horne Care, Long term Cure, Mental 
Health. Rehabilitation, and Su&-acute Care, supra note 3 at 55. 
863S~pra note 3. 
86' Dr. W. Gnam, psychiatrist and heaith economist aflliated with the Clarke 
Institute of Psychiatry in Toronto, Ontario as cited in T. Boyle and D. Vincent, "Madness: 
Seven parts on how we 're failing the rne~ally ill, " The Toronto Star. January 10 to 
16,1998, Part 7 "What are the answers?"on January 16, 1998 supra note 1 at 5. In this 
article Dr. Gnam explains that in a study he conducted in 1990 he found that the cost of 
clinical depression was $476 million in Ontario. 
865 C. McImess ,Victoria correspondent, "How the system failed a troubled rnind: 
Case of a schizophrenic who killed his mother highlights cracks in mental-health cure." 
supra note 1 at A2. 
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Coordinate Human Services and the Criminal Justice Sy~tern.<'~~ The aims of the strategy 
are twofoid. One is to attempt to stem the tide of persons with mental disabilities coming 
into conflict with the law since these persons "fiequently fail through the cracks in service 
delivery.""' The strategy identifies two main points at which persons with disabilities c m  
avoid falling into the criminal justice system: crime prevention and diversion out of the 
criminal justice system of persons with mental disabilities. Diversion prograrns are 
directed at persons who commit minor offences. If fewer persons with mental disabilities 
enter the criminal justice system, there is less likelihood that they will corne under the 
jurisdiction of the mental disorder provisions. This would decrease the pressure on the 
mental health system to provide forensic services. However, unless there are community 
services and suppons in place for persons with mental disabilities. neither prevention nor 
diversion cm happen. 
The other aim of the provincial strategy referred to above is to coordinate services 
to persons with mental disabilities who are in conflict with the law. This would enswe 
cooperation between ministries providing services to these persons and promote savings 
in the long term to govenunent by eliminating duplications and identiQing gaps in 
services. As noted in A Provincial Strategy To Coordinate Human Services and the 
"6Supra note 42. 
867 Letter of deputy ministers of health , community and social services, and 
corrections and deputy attorney general and deputy solicitor general of Ontario undated 
accompanying A Provincial Strategy To Coordinate Human Services und Criminal 
Justice systems in Ontario, ibid. 
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Crimiml Justice Systemam accused persons and w o n s  with mental disabiiities serving 
sentences "consume a disproportionate amount of services throughout the health care, 
social services and criminal justice ~ysterns."'~~ 
The second document which offers government a useful guide in implementing 
mental health reform is the discussion paper, Besr Practices in Mental Health Reform."" 
The strategies suggested in this document are based on "proven and promising 
approaches for providing individual supports, inpatientloutpatient care. crisis response. 
housing, employment and self-help.""' However. the authors of the discussion papa 
emphasize three points. The first is that without political will and reallocation of 
resources to support reform, it cannot be achieved. The second point is the importance 
of "defining and protecting the budgets that are allocated for persons with severe mental 
illne~s."~" The third point is the establishment of mental health authorities to administer 
the mental health system for a particular geographic area. 
Since the mental disorder provisions of the Code result in the deprivation of 
liberty for an accused person, the safeguards set out in the provisions to ensure that 
accused persons regain their liberty must be respected. If an accused person does not 
receive the least onerous and least restrictive disposition because of a lack of adequate 
mental health resources or if the disposition is not implemented, the safeguards are 
meaningless. It is of utmost importance that adequate mental health resowces be 
provided so that the legislative scheme of the mental disorder provisions of the Code can 
be implemented as intended and the liberty interests of  accused persons are truly balanced 
against the protection o f  the public. 
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